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ABSTRACT

FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN DEMOCRACY:
MACHIAVELLI AND THE PURSUIT OF GREATNESS

Katherine Paton, PhD
Department of Political Science
Northern Illinois University, 2017
Dr. Andrea Radasanu, Director
In this dissertation, I focus on the role of the people in Machiavelli’s political thought.
Throughout the Discourses, Machiavelli advocates for an increased political role for the people,
and the extension of citizenship to the lower classes. The ancient city found greatness by
empowering the plebs against the nobles, until the balance of the humors was disrupted as the
plebs took on an increasing amount of political power. In modernity, Rome has succumbed to
corruption, as human nature is inherently self-interested and the city is no longer able to
inculcate any sort of virtue. As a solution, Machiavelli envisions a strong plebeian class to
protect itself against the grandi, but more importantly to aid in the institutional greatness of the
city. This expansion of the people’s place in the modern city requires a reassessment of the other
components of modern politics, particularly the value of an aristocracy and the need for an
executive. Machiavelli’s modern grandi sheds all titles of nobility as a means to alleviate the
potential for corruption, as a landed nobility is more likely to draw politics into the private realm
in order to reap partisan benefit. Executive power is expanded as the executive belongs neither
to the plebeian nor patrician class, and is thus in a good position to facilitate the political process.
The modern city must reestablish political institutions in such a way as to connect self-interested
human nature to the good of the city, and to dispel the damaging effects of corruption.

All of this is evidence of Machiavelli’s proto-liberalism, and his desire to move away
from the classical republican tradition. However, while Machiavelli anticipates several strands of
liberal political thought, his concerns for the trajectory of Rome suggest grave misgivings
regarding the abandonment of greatness in favor of government predicated on self-interest. In the
absence of republican virtue, the city must find some other motive to connect the well-being of
the people to the city itself. Without this connection, self-interested individuals are likely to
resort to partisanship and corruption to further their own welfare at the expense of greatness.
Ultimately, Machiavelli’s modern reestablishment of political institutions allows him to
reconcile greatness and self-interest, rejecting the need for civic virtue in modernity.
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INTRODUCTION

Given the political climate in America following the 2016 election, a reconsideration of
Machiavelli’s politics is appropriate – maybe even necessary. Somewhere amid the rhetoric of
“greatness” and “corruption” is a desire for political success and further a departure from an old
way that, for some, no longer seems applicable to contemporary American politics. However, as
should always be the case with politics of change, one must avoid hastily replacing the old with
the new. Although Machiavelli’s rhetoric focuses on the greatness of the past and modern
political failure, he does not attempt to completely leave the past in favor of the future. Instead,
Machiavelli’s project is centered around the lessons that antiquity can provide for the coming
years, while understanding that innovation and new modes and orders are necessary for the
modern political agenda.
Machiavelli embraces the need to replace, or at least redefine, the republican institutions
of antiquity. However, in anticipating multiple strands of liberal thought, Machiavelli is critical
of the potential for the coexistence of liberalism and greatness. Theoretically speaking,
modernity has enshrined democracy as the proper regime type to entrench liberal values such as
individual liberty, egalitarianism, and autonomy. However, the practical institution of democratic
regimes has led to some unintended consequences, some of which are incompatible with such
liberal democratic values. Most salient to the discussion that will follow in this dissertation is the
role of inequality in the modern democratic regime. In the case of America, democratic politics
has led to the erosion of the middle class, which has increased the financial gulf between the rich
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and the poor. Although liberal democracy is predicated on legal equality, in the absence of mores
against acquisition such as is the case in America, individuals can gain as much wealth as
desired. As Machiavelli would see it, such inequality is problematic, as it is the ultimate cause of
corruption in republics. The connection between inequality and corruption in Machiavelli’s
thought will be elucidated later; suffice it to say that a reconsideration of Machiavelli’s position
on equality and other liberal values provides a useful context in which to understand the
American republic. As is the case for Machiavelli, where strong inequality exists, corruption
abounds and political success is undermined.
The following chapters will assess the role of greatness in both antiquity and modernity.
While greatness itself can be, and has been, understood in many ways, this project utilizes the
Machiavellian understanding: political success via empire and wealth. Machiavelli is
unequivocal in his praise of the greatness of ancient Italy, but his praise falters in its discussion
of Italy during his lifetime. What factors gave rise to the greatness of antiquity? What factors
have caused the disappearance of that greatness in modernity? To answer these questions, I’ve
focused on the role of the people in Machiavelli’s works. The people are certainly an important
aspect of the greatness once enjoyed by Rome. However, the people are also implicit in the
corruption that oversaw the downfall of that once great city. Even so, Machiavelli still
understands the people to be a necessary support of greatness, although their role need to be
altered from the ancient to a modern version. Today, regimes such as America have implemented
political systems that provide support for Machiavelli’s claims, and thus revisiting his works may
well prove beneficial for a better understanding of liberalism for both theoretical and practical
concerns.

3
Democracy, Liberalism and Greatness

Proponents of democracy are committed to the expansion of equality and the extension of
rights and freedoms to all individuals. The foundation of legitimate power in a modern
democracy replaces divine or natural legitimacy with rule valid only when based on the
sovereignty of free and equal individuals. This rule of the people is inherently different from
previous origins of rule, which concern themselves primarily with who “ought” to rule whether
based on merit or divine origins of power. In modern democratic polities, no one citizen has a
stronger claim to rule than any other, leaving legitimate rule to the collective of free and equal
citizens or their representatives. Consequently, the normative desire to engender rule on the most
meritorious is replaced by equal access to rule by all, foregoing the need to demonstrate one’s
virtue or other qualities worthy of ruling. Such foundations present in modern democracies, as
they establish a discernable shift from an idealistic understanding of who ought to rule, require
further investigation of their consequences.1 If the normative desire is for the rule of the people
based on their status as equals, it can be argued that the people are the best political
representatives of their own interests. On the other hand, rule of the people presents challenges,
particularly in regards to the achievement of the best regime.2 How can one be sure that the
people are properly educated to rule themselves? Further, are individuals intimately connected to
the good of everyone, or only an immediate, personal good?

1

Bartlett (1994a, 1994b) and Geise (1984) both argue that the virtuous ideal proscribed to Aristotle in his
Ethics and Politics does not accurately depict his theory of regimes. Instead, Aristotle’s theory accounts
for the conflict between what the common good and the good life for the individual. Aristotle’s “realism”
is shown in his acceptance of the common good in creating a political system.
2

See Vatter (2000) who argues rightly that Machiavelli does not consider the virtue of a regime based on
“best form” but in terms of the “best practical” regime.

4
Contemporary democrats take for granted the notion that democracy is a positive good
that should be extended to free and equal peoples, an assumption that did not exist before
modern times. In the ancient tradition, democracy is looked upon as at best a flawed method of
government, and at worst, one that is doomed to collapse. In regimes that did utilize the rule of
the people, inculcation of specific virtues or mores were required to create citizens capable of
performing their political duties. However strongly ancients advised against the rule of the
people, this form of government is the one that has persevered against all others in the form of
liberal democracy.3 Such fervent contemporary advocacy for an institution not traditionally
understood as the best political option raises a multitude of questions: has democracy
fundamentally changed? Or, have the capabilities of the people as rulers changed? Is democracy
different in vital ways that make ancient concerns no longer relevant? Are the people so attached
to their individual liberty that they assume democratic institutions are the best – or only – way to
maintain such freedoms?
Modern democrats often look back only as far as Hobbes or Locke to understand the
founding principles of modern politics. Machiavelli is overlooked, although in many ways he is
the birth of the modern political tradition.4 Machiavelli is a useful guide for modern peoples,
prescribing specific methods to return modern Italy to the glory of its ancient regimes.
Machiavelli differentiates himself from the tradition that precedes him by rejecting the past and
emphasizing new modes and orders for modernity. Particularly, Machiavelli criticizes the
ancients for their “imagined republics” that “have never been seen or known to be in truth,” as

3

Ancient democratic institutions were considered a necessary component of the mixed regime, but did
not exist on their own as a total democracy (Politics IV).
4

See Strauss (1995).
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there is a difference between how a man “lives and how one should live” (Prince 93). To accept
5

the people as they are allows Machiavelli to divorce himself from aspects of classical
republicanism, particularly the need to inculcate civic virtue to achieve greatness. This realism
leads him to suggest that the multitude is in some ways responsible for their own fortune, and for
this reason he advocates an expansion of popular institutions. However, although Machiavelli
introduces some popular institutions, he recognizes the people for what they are: generally
unknowledgeable, self-interested individuals (Prince 101).6 Machiavelli does not prescribe
Aristotelian civic virtue as the tool necessary to implement the mores necessary to create a good
democracy, nor does he make an argument for enlightened self-rule. Instead, Machiavelli accepts
human nature as is and constructs institutions to take advantage of the strengths of that nature
while mitigating its many flaws. Machiavelli’s institutions do not claim to present a resolution to
human wickedness. To the extent that Machiavelli’s institutions are liberal, they forego the
idealistic for a realistic understanding of the fickle inclinations of individuals.
This tension in Machiavelli’s works attempts to solve the underlying question: to what
extent are citizens truly capable of ruling themselves? If capable, to what extent should self-rule
be desired? Does self-rule provide cities with the tools they need to achieve greatness? If indeed
democratic institutions provide the tools needed to achieve greatness, it is possible that the
definition of greatness has changed from ancient to modern times. Ultimately, Machiavelli is

5

Prince references are to the Leo Paul S. de Alvarez edition, Waveland Press, Inc., 1980. All in text
citations are to the Prince and Discourses, unless otherwise noted.
“For one can say this generally of men: that they are ungrateful, fickle, hypocrites and dissemblers,
evaders of dangers, lovers of gain; and while you do them good they are wholly yours, offering you
blood, goods, life, and sons, as has been said above, when need is far off; but when it approaches you,
then they revolt” (Prince 101). “ . . . in many times, deceived by a false image of good, the people desires
its own ruin; and if it is not made aware that that is bad and what the good is . . . infinite dangers and
harms are brought into Republics” (D I.53.1).
6

6
clear that Italy in his time is far from “great.” The city has succumbed to partisan corruption and
is lacking in virtue. As he anticipates the trend towards democracy and liberal values, he
criticizes the liberal regime for its inability to institute greatness, as the city is not able to
inculcate love of virtue, glory, or the fatherland. As a remedy, Machiavelli attempts to solve the
problem of liberalism as he sees it – by recognizing the benefits of a republican regime and
attempting to create a new, modern foundation for political greatness.
As I intend to prove throughout this dissertation, Machiavelli’s moniker as the “father of
modernity” references his anticipation of several strands of modern thought. Machiavelli
deliberately distances himself from traditional political theory, advocating entirely “new modes
and orders” for the city. Although he presents ancient statesmen as great men who should be
revered, he is aware of the irreconcilable differences between the modes and orders advocated by
the ancients and the reality of modern populations. At the same time, his understating of the
people’s role in ruling is not akin to the liberal tradition. Thus, although Machiavelli does not
entirely advocate the liberalism of his successors, in many ways his revision of classical
republicanism provides fuel for modern liberal democrats. The ancients are to be commended for
their ability to create modes and orders appropriate for their time, all the while amassing great
fortune and strength. However, current rulers cannot hope to enact the same policies and expect
to find a renewal of that greatness. Human nature is presented as a constant that remains the
same in all times and places, allowing Machiavelli to demand that rulers prepare for the future by
studying the events of the past (I.39.1).7 Machiavelli’s call to imitation of the greatness of the
past is not wholehearted praise of old customs and political institutions, but an admiration for the

7

References to the Discourses are to the Mansfield and Tarcov edition, University of Chicago, 1996. In
text citations for the Discourses are formatted by book, chapter and section: e.g. (I.11.4).
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ability of ancient Rome to overcome the passions of fortune through its prudent political
decisions.8 Machiavelli recognizes that with modernity comes a wholly new set of circumstances
that requires the prudent application of both the old way and new modes and orders, one that
cannot prescribe wholly new or wholly old solutions to current problems, but a prudent mix of
both.
This dissertation contends with Machiavelli’s redefinition of the role of the people in the
modern republic, as well as the role of their noble counterparts. Machiavelli argues in favor of
the potential for meritorious and knowledgeable, yet poor, members of society to be full
participating members of a polity. Machiavelli’s thought engenders government by the people,
but still requires a strong elite base to maintain order in its few democratic institutions. He does,
however, lament the expansion of full-fledged equality, viewing this as bad for political and
social greatness. Liberalism, it would seem, creates a meager society full to the brim of selfinterest and individual liberty, at the expense of political liberty and glory. As Machiavelli
understands virtue to be accompanied by prudence and manliness, it is not feasible for only the
socially and economically well-off citizens to have access to rule. Instead, it is imperative that
Machiavelli’s republic provides for the removal of societal barriers that prevent the facilitation of
true greatness. To achieve this goal in modernity, Machiavelli’s grandi earn their positions
through merit, not through land-owning or fortune of birth.9 This allows the maintenance of the

8

Ancients are to be “admired.” Machiavelli argues that admiration for the ancients has waned in ancient
times as people have stopped reading histories. Imitation of the ancients has decreased, as modern
religious values do not coincide with the actions of ancients (I Pref).
9

To the extent that this is the case, Machiavelli provides a political articulation of this point throughout
both the Prince and the Discourses, as well as a comical one in La Mandragola. Francese (1994) argues
that the plot of La Mandragola showcases Machiavelli’s meritocracy, as the successful protagonist is not
socially or economically well off, but is able to manipulate the situation and other characters of higher
status.
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ambition needed for political greatness while at least partially mitigating the problem of
corruption. As a further protection, the role of the people is redefined and expanded to inculcate
a relationship similar to the tumulti of antiquity, as a means to keep corruption at bay.
Such a meritocracy does not exist in Machiavelli’s lifetime, or at least so he believes.
Instead of maintaining a strong commitment to virtú, Italy of Machiavelli’s time engendered
weakness, both in its citizens as well as the cities within its borders. As cities had fallen further
into corruption, they empowered weak men from whom partisan benefits can easily be sought.
The nobility was particularly at fault, as their own ambition was challenged by that of a virtuous
leader, and their deep pockets made an excellent source of private benefits. The people were, to
an extent, also pulled into this vicious cycle of partisanship and corruption, but Machiavelli finds
the people an important tool in improving the city. By empowering the people, the city provides
an important mechanism for checking the nobility – a relationship that existed in antiquity
through the informal yet powerful tumults. Institutions that value the people are imperative in
pulling politics back into the public sphere and out of the private, and thus such institutions are
necessary to any potential of strong, modern republics.
Thus, Machiavelli redefines each of the actors involved in the traditional mixed regime.
The people play an important role in protecting the “free way of life,” while the nobility must
become a meritocratic grandi in order to harness their ambition while also undermining the
aristocratic mores that engender partisanship and private benefits. The executive was expanded
by Machiavelli into a new role, one that was simultaneously extralegal and bound by law and
custom. Machiavelli’s prince must walk a particularly tight line, knowing when to be wicked, but
not too wicked, and not in the incorrect way. Where classical republicanism inflated the role of
the aristocracy and limited the role of the people and the “king,” Machiavelli inverts this system
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to decrease the role of the aristocracy while creating a people and prince beholden to one
another. Later moderns would pick up where Machiavelli left off, further debasing any
aristocratic grandi and empowering executives. One such example is Locke, who gives a
thorough picture of executive prerogative in his Second Treatise.10
In a way, while sowing the seeds for liberalism, Machiavelli maintains reservations that
provide fodder for potential theoretical opposition to democratic institutions that aim to inculcate
equality. His new modes and orders reflect the predicament of reconciling human nature with
self-rule, as Machiavelli rejects any project to inspire virtue in the people he is attempting
“order” (I.3.1).11 Specifically, the notion that there is a virtuous end to politics that must be
fostered through a well-ordered society is subverted by an understanding that the people are at
best self-interested, but malleable enough to be redirected by a strong leader or group of elites
along with the proper laws. The people writ large cannot actually rule themselves as they wish,
regardless of their increasing desire to do so (I.7.1; I.9.2, I.11.2). It is not the goal of
Machiavelli’s republic to maintain full democratic institutions where authority comes from the
consent of the governed. Instead, the exalted notion of a regime ordered towards virtue is
replaced by a regime ordered towards greatness, and the pathway is modern in that it does not
require the virtuous fulfillment of the human soul. It is illiberal, however, in its rejection of an
egalitarian view of rights.

See Locke, pg. 374-380. For a discussion of executive prerogative and Locke’s understanding of its
dangers, see Kleinerman (2007).
10

11

This understanding is prevalent in modern conversation, which suggests that individuals are at best
legislating selfish interests. However, Aristotle was not naïve in his understanding of the nature of
humans, suggesting the proper city would serve as a vehicle for the development of virtuous citizens,
without expecting the surrender of self-interest (Geise 1984).
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The debate

The extant literature approaches Machiavelli from both perspectives: the last of the
ancient tradition as opposed to a thinker with an entirely new project for political science. Leo
Strauss’ Thoughts on Machiavelli (1995) examined the place of Machiavelli, not only within the
history of political thought, but to argue he belonged amongst the greatest of political thinkers –
not simply a practitioner, but a political philosopher. Strauss’ argument placed Machiavelli as a
significant departure from the ancient tradition, creating a new way of thinking about politics
that left the republicanism of antiquity behind. In Machiavelli’s work, one finds little of the
republican virtue found in Aristotle, and much focus on the legitimacy of almost any action that
results in greatness.
Within twenty years, a significant opposition to the modern Machiavelli thesis emerged
with the work of JGA Pocock and Quentin Skinner, arguing that Machiavelli’s works are better
understood as belonging to the republican tradition of the ancients and Renaissance Italy. Pocock
argues that Machiavelli’s republicanism can be understood in the Aristotelian tradition, and that
“at heart” Machiavelli would prefer some form of republic if one could be achieved in modern
Rome (2003; 2010).12 Skinner’s Machiavelli is not the modern realist of Leo Strauss, but an
advocate of republican liberty that requires overcoming the individual self-interest in favor of the
common good (1978; 1990). Skinner posits that no individual right exists in Machiavelli and that
ultimately the political goal of Roman greatness is less important than the flourishing of

12

Pitkin (1984) also provides an understanding of Machiavelli that is akin to Aristotle, arguing that
Machiavelli is a republican who teaches the value of community based on “well-founded mutual trust”
between citizens, but also that Machiavellian human nature is like the “political animals” found in
Aristotle.
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individual liberty. Both authors posit that civic virtue is a Machiavellian response to the
corruption of modernity; the city must simply be restored to its ancient republican greatness
through the reestablishment of ancient republican virtue. Pettit (1997) advances this thesis by
arguing that the emphasis Machiavelli places on the importance of formal legal institutions and
civic virtue mandate his inclusion in the republican tradition. In his version of republicanism,
Pettit emphasizes the role of the people as editors, not authors, of political policy.14 In order to
reconcile the authoritarian message of the Prince with this republican interpretation, some
suggest that the Prince is a rhetorical work, to be interpreted as a warning for republics.15
The interpretation given by authors such as Pocock, Skinner and Pettit inspired a new
debate over the republicanism of Machiavelli’s thought. Sparling (2013) argues that Skinner and
Pettit redefine republicanism in order to include Machiavelli in the canon, essentially creating a
republicanism that is more individualistic than the tradition into which they are trying to fit
Machiavelli. Sullivan (2004) emphasizes that Machiavelli’s praise of Rome is praise of its
acquisition and aggression instead of its republican modes and orders – it is not so much support
of a specific regime type as it is support of the ends it achieved. Rahe (2004) concurs with this
thesis, advancing an argument for Machiavelli’s liberal republicanism that sets itself apart from

13

See also Viroli (1998;1990). Viroli argues that Machiavelli wrote rhetorically in the Prince, and was
committed to the ideal of a well-ordered republic (1998, pg. 112-116).
Coby (1999) also emphasizes the contradiction between Machiavelli’s praise of the people and his
argument that the people are flighty, unknowledgeable and often dangerous to their own political good.
While this contradiction does exist, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that Machiavelli does embrace
the people as a significant part of the political regime. See chapter 1 of this dissertation.
14

See Dietz (1986), who argues that the purpose of the Prince is to “trap” the prince into destroying his
own rule. Thus, the work is an act of political deception intended to jeopardize the power of Lorenzo de
Medici. See also Langton and Dietz (1987).
15
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the ancient version in part by the demise of ancient virtue. Similarly, Mansfield (1989) sees
Machiavelli’s elites as regulating the desires of their people through law and order, instead of
inspiring a virtuous commitment to the good of the commonwealth at the expense of one’s
individual good.
Some, including Rahe, argue that the correct interpretation of Machiavelli is through a
lens of liberal republicanism. This argument suggests that while Machiavelli’s influence is a vital
influence on modern liberal democracy, his own politics are still republican. However, the new
republicanism is modern in nature, and lacking many of the hallmarks of the ancient version. For
example, Fisher (2006) argues that Machiavelli’s “new” republicanism is without moral
constraints, where the only distinction between a republic and a tyranny is the focus on the
common good.17 Fisher (1997) further argues that Machiavelli’s version of republicanism sees
human beings as self-regarding. Individuals are incessantly ambitious and engage in a constant
struggle with one another for glory. Jurdjevic (2009; 2014) refers to Machiavelli’s republicanism
as a “hybrid” version of the tradition, as modern Rome is unable to imitate ancient Rome in part
due to its lack of ancient virtue.

16

See also Clarke (2013) who argues that Machiavelli critiques republican virtues including personal
loyalty and trustworthiness.
17

See also Berlin (1972); Sullivan (1992); Major (2007); and Lukes (2009). Berlin, Lukes and Major all
emphasize Machiavelli’s distinction between morality and greatness. Berlin argues that Machiavelli is
clear in saying the political good and morality are distinct, and often incompatible. Lukes points to
Machiavelli’s praise of “order” instead of “virtue” in political actions and ends. Sullivan posits that
Pocock’s Machiavellian Moment directly contracts Machiavelli by prescribing a notion of the “common
good” that is incompatible with the text. Sullivan argues, and I will agree in chapter 2 of this dissertation,
that Machiavelli’s common good is nothing more than the common “benefit,” thus dismissing any
transcendent ideal of a republican commitment to good government.
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Others, most notably John McCormick, interpret Machiavelli’s works as democratic.

18

For McCormick, the people play an active role in politics by controlling elites. This role requires
the people not only to have the power of accusation and election, but also an active role as
creators of policy. This interpretation emphasizes not only Machiavelli’s mistrust of elites, but
also his complete disdain for them. The free way of life often Machiavelli often mentions is
protected and policed by the multitude. As such, the tumults are important for their ability to pit
the strength of the multitude against the institutional strength of the nobility. In advancing this
thesis, McCormick’s depiction of Machiavelli is more democratic than most others, although he
ultimately argues that Machiavellian politics require both an elite and a popular class of
government that can maintain the tumults of antiquity.
My argument draws from the insights of many of these scholars. Similar to Rahe, I argue
that Machiavelli is best interpreted as a mixture of both the republican and liberal traditions.
However, where Rahe is willing to still classify Machiavelli as a republican, albeit a liberal one,
I argue that the key to Machiavelli is found in his discussion of what differentiates modern from
ancient Rome. His argument, as well as that of others who view Machiavelli as a republican,
originates in Machiavelli’s praise of the ancient republic. Machiavelli is sincere in his praise of
antiquity, but it is important to separate the description of the past from the prescription for the
future. He does not desire a return to ancient Roman institutions, only a return to ancient Roman
greatness. To achieve greatness in modernity, a more liberal understanding of human nature and
politics is a necessary starting point for the structuring of institutions. Even then, the greatness
appropriate to modernity is distinct from the greatness of the ancients.
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Throughout this dissertation, I will consider the role of Machiavelli’s citizen as an
instrument of greatness and corruption. I find Machiavelli to be far more critical of the nature of
the people than McCormick, particularly in the emphasis he places on “shackling” the multitude
with proper laws and elite authority.19 While Machiavelli certainly understands the power that is
available to a republic that properly orders the peoples participation, significant emphasis is
repeatedly put on the “ordering” instead of the “participation” (I.58). Democratic regimes are
mostly concerned with their own power and material gain, and require frequent reminders of the
common good (II.22.1; II.25.1). We are reminded “how much men are deceived . . . in taking up
policies, and how often they believe they will gain a thing and lose it” (II.25.1). Individuals must
be reordered towards the common good frequently, as it is their nature to be selfish and easily
deceived (II Pref 3). Due to this, republics are easily corrupted, and must be refounded often to
maintain the order of the people. Corruption and democracy create a tension in Machiavelli’s
thought, and his response is to temper any glorification of the plebs with the need to “order” or
“regulate” their contribution to politics through a strong elite.
Machiavelli’s democratic tendencies, however, are emphasized in his distrust of the
nobility and goal to alter their place in modern Rome. Although an ambitious noble class is vital
to an acquisitive republic, the character of the nobility is such that corruption is easily fostered in
the city that empowers a landed nobility. The nobility tends toward private goods instead of
public ones, and it becomes the job of the second humor in the city, the people, to force the
nobility back into the public sphere. The nature of all men, noble and plebian alike, is corrupt.
However, the economic acquisition of the nobility instigates their corrupt nature, as their
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ultimate fear is a loss of property and power. This fear perpetuates the utility of private benefits,
while simultaneously pulling the people into corruption as the only way to challenge the nobility.
Where McCormick finds Machiavelli to be optimistic regarding the peoples’ ability to overturn
noble corruption, I question whether this is truly the case. Ultimately, I argue that Machiavelli’s
recommendation for modernity considers the inevitable corruption of human nature instead of
attempting to ameliorate it or deny it.

Chapter Overview

The first chapter serves to examine the role of the people in Machiavelli’s Discourses.
Throughout the chapter, I argue that Machiavelli considers the people to be an important part of
the Roman political regime. I discuss Machiavelli’s assertion that the people must be armed and
that the city must rely on its own arms – thus, its own people. But including the people in
governing is somewhat problematic, as I argue that Machiavelli understands human nature to be
insatiable and corrupt. This presents the problem to which the rest of this project speaks: how
does Machiavelli reconcile the need to extend political power to the multitude with his claim that
the people are only problematically and temporarily citizens?
The next chapter is focused on greatness. Specifically, I explore Machiavelli’s
understanding of the greatness of ancient Rome and the relevance of the people in its
achievement. I argue, alongside Sullivan (1992), that Machiavelli’s redefinition of the “common
good” is synonymous with the common benefit found in economic and political success.
Machiavelli uses both terms, and the text seems to use to them interchangeably. For Rome to
maintain its greatness, or return its modern city to ancient greatness, the city must place an

16
emphasis on the common benefit. To maintain a strong commitment to greatness, the ancient
regime inculcated a reverence for both law and virtue, as well as a specific form of religion. The
modern regime fails to live up to ancient virtue, as Rome has lost the reverence for these social
supports to greatness and the common good. While Machiavelli does not advocate in favor of a
complete return to ancient modes and orders, the modern state could revive greatness by
redefining institutions so as to make self-interest conducive to the modern good.
The third chapter examines the corruption that has replaced the greatness of antiquity.
Machiavelli views this corruption as rooted in the insatiability of human nature, as individuals
are motivated by desire for wealth and power. Ultimately, corruption leads the plebs to resort to
“partisan friends” as a means to subjugate the nobles and gain property. A well-ordered regime
should inspire partisan enemies, not friends, as the stability of a well-ordered city allows both
warfare against external forces and also a free way of life at home. Thus, the understanding of
human nature as corrupted by its desire to subjugate others calls into question the ability of the
multitude to participate in political institutions and maintain Roman perfection. To solve this
problem, the city must found with a view to corruption; it must craft institutions that
acknowledge the people as they are. In this formulation, Machiavelli suggests a critique of
ancient Roman republicanism insofar as its foundations rested upon Roman virtue. Without
rescinding his advocacy of an empowered multitude, Machiavelli presents an argument for a
regime that both satisfies corrupt human nature while also eliminating the lure of partisan
friends.
Chapter four revisits Machiavelli’s place in the history of political thought. Machiavelli
draws from the ancient republican and modern liberal traditions in significant ways. I argue that
to best understand Machiavelli, one must differentiate his praise of the past from his preferred
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regime for modernity. In so doing, Machiavelli opens the door to liberalism by gesturing towards
ideas taken up by later moderns, including Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau. Here, I
am particularly interested in Hobbes and the connections that can be drawn between the two
thinkers and their ideal regimes. In his current day Italy, Machiavelli advocates for a weaker
upper class, divested of landed wealth. The multitude, of course, has an expanded role that
includes countering the power of the rich. The executive appears as a strong individual in
Machiavelli’s regime, as he legitimates strong executive power – both the legal and extralegal
variety. These ideas are taken up again by Hobbes, who uses a thought experiment in the
Leviathan to build a regime influenced by Machiavelli but unconstrained by practical politics.
The last chapter attempts to apply Machiavelli’s proto-liberalism to an example of liberal
democracy in practice: the American founding. While Machiavelli was not widely cited by the
figures responsible for writing our Constitution, his ideas nevertheless exist in the rhetoric found
in the Federalist Papers and documents written by others before and after the Constitution itself.
Similar threads that were important to Machiavelli’s work, including the relationship between a
multitude and an aristocracy, the place of ambition in modernity, and the role of human nature in
politics all connect the American founding to Machiavelli’s political worldview. Even today, the
rhetoric of ambition, greatness, and corruption are particularly salient to American politics. It is
likely that a return to Machiavelli’s writings will be fruitful to forming a robust understanding of
American political institutions.

CHAPTER 1: THE ROLE OF THE PEOPLE IN ROME

Machiavelli’s presentation of the Roman republic provides a glimpse into his critique of
the past as it relates to the role of the people in politics and political life. Machiavelli’s
assessment of ancient Rome points to significant deviations from the ancient republican
tradition. By enabling the plebs to enjoy a modicum of political power, Machiavelli’s innovation
speaks to the necessity of incorporating popular influence in the institution of new governments.
In making this argument, he deviates from those who wrote before him, yet not to the extent of
proposing all political institutions should be popular in nature. Although Machiavelli praises the
Roman republic for utilizing the people in its quest for acquisition and greatness, he does not
argue that the people are capable of ruling themselves independently. On the contrary, he praises
a “well ordered,” “shackled,” multitude that is only a complement to elite leadership.
Machiavelli provides a critique of ancient Rome through examining the role of the people
in that city. His critique focuses not only on popular political institutions, but also on the nature
of the people who are part and parcel of ancient Rome. In so doing, Machiavelli highlights the
insatiability of the people that instigates a shift in the relationship between the patricians and the
plebs. Throughout his analysis, Machiavelli questions the consistency and capabilities of the
people as a political power while acknowledging the necessity of Rome’s choice to arm the
people.
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In his critique of Rome, Machiavelli implies a broader critique of republicanism. In his
use of Rome as an example, Machiavelli highlights the increasing corruption of the people that
coincides with the decline of Roman virtue and political order. I argue that Machiavelli’s broad
critique of Rome is that it ought to have prepared itself for this unavoidable corruption, which is
unavoidable because it is an aspect of human nature. By founding institutions on a virtuous
people, even if that virtue was not as high-minded as Aristotelian virtue, the Romans set
themselves up for failure. To found on the people, which Machiavelli argues is necessary, means
to found on corruption.1 Thus, the proper institutions would not only serve to protect and secure
Rome, but would do so even among a corrupt people.
Three specific and interwoven critiques pertaining to the people’s role in Rome can be
found in Machiavelli’s Discourses. The first pertains to the institutional place of the people – that
while the tumultuous relationship between the two humors kept Rome free for a long time by
creating a balance of power, eventually that balance shifted in favor of the plebs.2 Thus, while
the plebs may not have ended up with more power than the nobles, their portion of the
institutional power changed in significant and problematic ways. While the tumults provided
Rome with a mechanism through which to come to perfection, eventually the tumults became
counter-productive. While good, the tumults led to further freedoms for the citizens of Rome.
Most significantly, the tumults in the early years of ancient Rome led to the creation of the
plebeian tribunate, an institution that mirrors the patrician Senate and thus gives a political voice
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One example among many can be found in the Prince, chapter 9. Here, Machiavelli says that the prince
“who founds on the people, who is able to command, and is a man of heart, is not dismayed in adversity,
and if he does not lack other preparations, and if with his mind and his orders he animates the whole, he
will never find himself deceived by them – and he will see that he has laid for himself good foundations.”
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See Parel (1992, pg. 101-102), who argues that tumults are healthy in the city if the two humors stay
more or less balanced.
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to the lower class of Roman citizens. Eventually, the insatiable nature of the people changes the
nature of the tumults. Later tumults allow the creation of institutions that are problematic and
dangerous for the city as the city devolves into corruption. An example of the wickedness of later
tumults is the Decemvirate, which comes to power as both humors attempt to rid the other of
political power.
Secondly, explicit in the critique of the people’s role in Rome is a critique of the people’s
nature, particularly as it relates to good government. The use of both patrician and plebian
institutions ideally provides Rome with a well-ordered political system borrowing from two
different regime types. Under a mixed regime such as this, both the patricians and the plebs have
the ability to prevent the other from becoming an oppressor. As Rome declines, the plebs are no
longer primarily interested in stopping oppression at the hands of the nobles, but are motivated
by revenge. This change is significant, as the desire for revenge against the nobles inflames the
insatiability of the plebs while also influencing whom they choose to empower. The former
critique, the insatiability of the plebs, is shown explicitly in Discourses I.37, where Machiavelli
notes that the Agrarian Law was a partial cause of the ruin of Rome. The Law was revisited as a
means to take lands from the patricians and redistribute to the plebs, eventually leading to the
rise of Marius as the champion of the plebs during a violent civil war against the nobles and their
leader, Sulla. Machiavelli then makes the latter critique, regarding the misguided empowerment
of plebeian leaders, when he argues that if Sulla and Marius had lived in the times of Manlius
they would never have accomplished the wicked deeds that they did (III.8.2). As the “matter,” or
the people, is already corrupt in the times of Marius and Sulla, the people welcome Marius as a
leader capable of beating down the nobility. Manlius, on the other hand, is crushed as he tries to
come to power when the matter is not yet corrupt. Marius is empowered as a means for the
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Roman plebs to oppress the Roman patricians. Once Rome became corrupt, the nobles - who
found themselves the object of plebian vengeance - could no longer control the formerly latent
people. With vengeance in mind, and the potential for acquiring material goods, the nature of the
people leads to the emergence of Caesar, and the dissolution of freedom in Rome.
Lastly, ancient Rome’s orders are established to gain wealth and territory as an imperial
republic. With such goals in mind, Rome must arm its people to have a sizeable military capable
of going to war and succeeding against other war making cities in Italy. In so doing, Rome
quickly finds that political power must also be extended to the people, as given their military
power, they are capable of taking it for themselves. The imperialistic republic is successful for
quite a long time, until the insatiable nature of the plebs alters their place in both military and
political institutions.3 When Marius lowers the wealth requirement for soldiers to serve in the
Roman army, the result is a stronger potential for Romanization of nearby territories, but also a
significant change in the structure of the army itself. The paid soldiers allow the army to go on
longer quests, farther from home, and to make constant warfare. As a result, the soldiers become
beholden to their army superiors instead of the fatherland, as those superiors are perceived as the
means by which the soldiers get paid and disbursed booty. To the soldiers, the purpose of war is
now financial, no longer glory mongering on behalf of the Roman Empire. By further arousing
the insatiability of the plebs through expanding their prospects of wealth, the way the city
chooses to pursue its goal of empire in the later decades of the republic is problematic, and lays
the foundations for later corruption in the plebian class.

3

A more in depth analysis of human nature and the particular nature of the plebs will be offered in
chapter 3 of this dissertation. The Roman plebs and nobles are both characterized as insatiable, but their
respective situations lead to different manifestations of human nature. The plebs are generally satisfied by
being free (unoppressed) while the nobles’ fervent ambition is the product of their insatiability.
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Each of these critiques highlights the Roman republic’s popular institutions and the good
and bad that came out of them. By studying each individually – the strength of the plebs vis-à-vis
the nobles, their ability to rule, and empire – Machiavelli’s multilayered assessment of the people
in ancient Rome can be better understood. Although Machiavelli recognizes certain
disadvantages to empowering the people, I argue that he ultimately accepts the need to bolster
their role in political life. In the final analysis, the risks of implementing popular institutions are
not substantial enough to dismiss the rewards.

The role of the people

While Machiavelli’s praise of the people as a political force in Rome is by no means
without its caveats, Machiavelli stands apart from the philosophical tradition before him by
arguing for a regime that both empowers and arms the people.4 In the first book of the
Discourses, Machiavelli speaks most directly to his understanding of republicanism, advocating
for the popular institutions of Rome that he reasons are a factor in that city’s perfection (I.2.2).
Here, he argues that a regime with institutions that empower the multitude, the aristocracy and a
principality is able “to turn to one of these [institutions] according as it appears to them more to
the purpose” (I.2.2). Rome’s empowerment of three different classes of people differs from other
cities of its time, where a principality or rule of one is often established without extending power

McCoy (1943) argues that Machiavelli’s place in the history of political thought is dependent on his
expanded role of the people. McCoy argues that Machiavelli values the common good above all else, and
his project is to help the people out of their condition of political corruption in Italy (629). As will
become clearer in later chapters, I disagree with this analysis, and argue Machiavelli sees the common
good as a utility, not an end. Further, that far from bringing people out of corruption, Machiavelli finds
corruption to be inevitable in modernity, and Rome must find a way to endure it.
4
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to the people. Machiavelli understands such a principality to follow a regime cycle, where
eventually power is wrested away from the few into the hands of the many, as the multitude sees
the few turn to “avarice, to ambition, to usurpation of women” (I.2.3). The popular state then
comes to power as an act of vengeance against the rule of one, eventually turning to license when
each individual is allowed to live in “his own mode.” Thus, while Machiavelli understands the
popular state to be a possible remedy to the oppression of the rule of one or the few, he does not
suggest that a purely popular state is the best remedy. Without a mixed regime that empowers
each of the classes, an unchecked popular state will turn to license, unbounded by fear and
immoderate in its pursuit for self-interest without concern for the fatherland.
Based on this cycle of regimes, the popular state comes into being not out of a desire to
rule, but out of the desire to avenge the misdeeds of the past aristocratic regimes. The people are
not motivated by the desire for good government, but are instead motivated to rule to oppress
their former oppressors. If the plebs were not instigated by the perceived impropriety of the
nobles, it is possible they would not be interested in ever ruling themselves.6 The nature of the
people, particularly the Roman plebs, is bound in two desires – “to be avenged against those who
are the cause that it is servile; the other to recover its freedom” (I.16.5). Thus, the prudent prince
or ruler must satisfy the first desire by not inspiring such vengeance. One way in which this can
be accomplished is to extend some political power to the people. As the people become part of
the political process, their perceived role in the direction of their own affairs satisfies them,
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Francese (1994).

This argument can be seen where Machiavelli discusses Sparta in I.6; the Spartan multitude never acted
out against its “narrow Senate” because the regime did not incite its people. There, the people had
equality of belongings and thus did not have reason to turn to vengeance against the regime. See
McCormick (2001) and Pitkin (1984) who argue that that the people desire positive freedom to legislate.
See also McKenzie (1982).
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particularly when it comes to the allocation of rewards, punishments and property. For obvious
reasons, it is better for the regime to choose the way in which the multitude will be empowered
than to withhold political rule. In the latter case, the resulting tumults make it impossible for the
nobles to control which institutions will fall into the hands of the people.
On the other hand, Machiavelli criticizes Athens for creating a purely popular state under
Solon (I.2.6).7 To empower the people is important, but Athens went too far by establishing only
popular institutions. As such, Athens lasted only a short time as a democracy before deteriorating
into a tyranny under Pisistratus. In the regime cycle explained earlier in I.2, the license that
characterizes popular institutions can be remedied only by a return to a principality. Here,
Machiavelli follows a similar line of argument but notes that instead of a principality, Athens
turns to a tyranny.8 In either case, a kingly power is required to replace the popular state. Athens,
then, is doubly troubled when it replaces a tyranny of the many with a tyranny of one. True to
Machiavelli’s intent to suggest that popular institutions are problematic, he claims that even after
Athens returned to the orders of Solon and put down the tyranny, that city could never maintain
itself long due to not mixing popular institutions with aristocratic and kingly ones (I.2.6).
Although there remains a place for popular institutions, it is apparent early in the
Discourses that popular government is not, on its own, good government. Instead, Machiavelli is
advocating for something much more complicated than a simple democracy – the political power
given to the people must operate in conjunction with political power given to the other classes,

Machiavelli’s understanding of Athens here is ahistorical. Solon does not establish strictly popular
institutions. By not giving a historically accurate example, Machiavelli is both crafting an example to
juxtapose with Rome, but also asserting that the reader should focus on this particular aspect of Athens’
institutions.
7
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In many places, Machiavelli blurs the distinction between principality and tyranny, or a prince and a
tyrant.
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and the maintenance of both aristocratic and kingly institutions. The praise of Rome does not
come only from its choice to empower the people, but also for its decision to “never take away
all authority from kingly qualities so as to give authority to the aristocrats, nor . . . diminish the
authority of the aristocrats altogether as to give it to the people” (I.2.7; see also I.9). While
kingly power was taken away in name after the Tarquins, that power was merely reformed in the
establishment of the consuls, who maintain the same authority but are elected by the Senate.
Consequently, even in “democratizing” its institutions by way of election, Rome maintained its
original kingly authority to counterbalance the influence of the people.
The proper place of the people in a Machiavellian republic is to be both empowered and
“shackled.”10 The people are empowered as the guardians of freedom, as their nature lends itself
as a more effective mechanism to maintain freedom secured by the nobles (I.5). Institutions must
be founded by the patricians, whose ambition is most aligned with acquisition. While both
humors are characterized as ambitious, plebian ambition comes from a desire to be free from
oppression, but without the desire to dominate. A successful republic, however, must pair
acquisition with maintenance; a state ruled entirely by nobles would quickly become too big to
maintain, as dominance and acquisition are the nature of the nobility. Without maintaining what
has been acquired, a republic cannot be a truly imperial strength. In this construction, the
political power of the plebs comes from the creation of the tribunate, an institution that
establishes freedom in Rome. The plebs are empowered to maintain the “guard of freedom”
through the elevation of plebeian tribunes, as it is in their nature to have “less appetite for
usurping it” (I.5.2). Thus, the different natures of the plebs and the patricians are best served
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See McCormick (2007) for a nuanced explanation of the plebs’ as “checking” the nobility.

10

See Balot and Trochimchuk (2012) on the shackled nature of the people.
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when they can be utilized in conjunction to achieve the objectives of the city. Without popular
power and its maintenance of the guard of freedom, noble rule is bound to devolve from a wellformed aristocracy to the rule of the partisan few at the expense of the many.
When shackled, the people are a valuable part of political society. In ancient Rome,
institutions were properly ordered with regard to their citizens, who were punished and rewarded
as their actions merited. Rome never allowed a citizen’s good deeds to overshadow what he may
have done wrong, as “no well-ordered republic ever cancels the demerits with the merits of its
citizens” (I.24.1). Only when the proper punishments are given without consideration of past
good deeds is a citizenry truly “ordered.” Such a system prevents the emergence of fraud and
corrupt benefits, as each is punished directly in relation to the actions taken. Just as one must
punish appropriately, a city must also be liberal in its rewards for good deeds (I.24.1). As
punishments seek to prevent citizens from acting badly, rewards must be used to encourage
actions that preserve the fatherland. Machiavelli quotes Livy as saying, “this is the nature of the
multitude: either it serves humbly or it dominates proudly” (I.58.1). Thus, the multitude must be
shackled in order to utilize the first nature of the people, to serve their fatherland humbly. The
well-ordered city must, at all costs, prevent the emergence of a people who “dominates proudly.”
An unshackled multitude is in many ways similar to a lawless prince, a connection that
Machiavelli draws to illustrate the necessity of an elite class that manipulates the people. When
properly ordered, the people is “more prudent, more stable, and of better judgment than a prince”
(I.58.3). When armed, a shackled people serves to increase the empire of a fatherland much
faster than a prince, and is able to “attain the glory of those who order” the city by maintaining
those orders better (I.58.3). When left unshackled, the people are without enough political power
to do evil, but can give the power they do have to one tyrant, who rises amongst the “midst of
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such confusion” (I.58.4). In this way, while the people cannot directly do evil, they can (and
will) bring indirect evil to the city by empowering one individual whom they believe can turn the
tide of oppression back on their noble oppressors.

Tumults

Machiavelli credits “tumults” between the patricians and the plebs as the mechanism that
keeps Rome free.11 The tumults refer to the enmity between the plebs and the patricians, the
beginning of which is marked by Machiavelli in I.2: “when the Roman nobility became insolent,
the people of Rome rose up against it; so as not to lose the whole, it was constrained to yield to
the people its part” (I.2.7). Rome, in its original form, did not give formal power to the multitude
through popular institutions. Those institutions came to be a part of Rome only through the
people revolting against the nobility. The tumults, then, are the “first cause of keeping Rome
free” as the orders that arose from the disunion of the patricians and the plebs serve the cause of
freedom (I.4.1). Although good came out of the tumults, “many” are of the opinion that the
tumults are to be blamed, as “the modes were extraordinary and almost wild, to see the people
together crying out against the Senate, the Senate against the people” (I.4.1). Far from agreeing
with those people, Machiavelli praises the disunion between the two humors in Rome, and

See Parasher (2016, 42-44) for a discussion of the “stable aristocratic” republics of Sparta and Venice
as opposed to the “popular and tumultuous” republic of Rome. Parasher’s discussion is particularly useful
in his recognition of Machiavelli’s differentiation of civic discord and destructive factionalism. See also
Skinner’s Foundations of Modern Political Thought (1978) and Carty (2016), who argues that the focus
on the tumults is the overall teaching of both the Discourses and the Florentine Histories. Winter (2012)
argues that Machiavelli’s politics ultimately result from the class struggle and antagonism between the
two humors, in contention with the civic republican thesis.
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generalizes it as advice to all cities. Every city should seek to create modes in which the people
can vent its ambition, particularly those cities that empower the people with political tasks
(I.4.1). The tumults serve to satisfy the people in part, as they perceive their own fight for
freedom satisfied in involvement in the political institutions of the city. Further, the tumultuous
political disruption by the does not present a significant danger to the city, as the “desires of free
peoples are rarely pernicious to freedom” (I.4.1). In the event that the people are properly
ordered - shackled by the other humor and the law - the tumults act to maintain the enmity
between the two humors that serves to keep each side in check.12 The disunion of the two
humors, as evidenced by the tumults, does not allow the people to throw off the yoke imposed on
them by the nobles, yet simultaneously checks the possible insolence of the nobility.
Without the tumults, Rome could never have achieved the greatness it did. Although
other cities (Machiavelli uses Sparta and Venice as examples) could order themselves without
such disunion between the people and the nobles, their stability came at the expense of empire.
Expansion requires a large city that accepts foreigners and employs plebs in war (I.6). Given the
size of the plebeian class, it is necessary to employ the plebs in war to create a sizeable army
capable of defending the fatherland.13 Without a large army, acquisitions cannot be easily won,
and cannot be maintained. While Sparta and Venice existed without the tumultuous relationship
between the humors that was found in Rome, that existence was at the expense of greatness.
Given that Rome is ordered towards different goals, the tumults are not only useful, but also
necessary. Arming the plebs is required to make war, but also provides the plebs with a certain
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To clarify, tumults are only beneficial in free cities, where the people are given some political power. In
aristocratic cities, or kingships, any vent on plebian ambition would likely need to take a different form.
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level of power, leading to tumults as the plebs and patricians struggle over politics and
influence.14
Thus, the tumults are a manifestation of the disunion between the plebs and the patricians
and are responsible for freedom in ancient Rome. Due to the tumultuous relationship between the
two humors, neither class could overtake the other. The tumults are responsible for maintaining
the mixed institutions that Machiavelli advocates in the early chapters of Book 1. Without strong
opposing humors, Rome might have found itself akin to Athens with too much popular power, or
may have never perfected its own orders by adding popular institutions to the patrician ones that
existed from its very beginning. Political unrest in Rome serves the city by leading to the
creation of new institutions as required to maintain the freedom of each class. The popular
element utilizes the tumults to expand its influence in politics to limit their oppression by the
nobles. The nobles, on the other hand, use the tumults to prevent the plebs from throwing off the
yoke under which they are shackled. Machiavelli provides some useful examples of the
institutions that came out of the tumults, aiding Rome in achieving greatness.
The orders “perfected” in Rome through the tumults are the creation of the tribunate, the
institution of accusations and the establishment of the dictator. The tribunate comes first, a direct
result of the people rising against the Senate. Due to the tribunate, the “state of that republic
came to be more stabilized, since all three kinds of government had their part” (I.2.7). The
nobles, who acted humanely towards the plebs while under the Tarquins, offended the plebs as
soon as the Tarquins were removed from power and the nobles were no longer fearful that the
plebs would gain the Tarquins against the patrician class. After “many confusions, noises and
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Livy and Machiavelli both point to instances in Roman history where the plebs are able to succeed
politically by refusing to go to war.
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dangers of scandals that arose between the plebs and the nobility” the tribunes are created as
“intermediaries between the plebs and the Senate” to “prevent the insolence of the nobles”
(I.3.2). While the tribunes do not by themselves create a popular government, the institution adds
a popular element to the existing regime that furthers the perfection of Rome. Without the
tumults stirring in the people a desire to rise up against the nobles, this perfection could not have
happened.
Next, Machiavelli speaks of accusations as a mechanism used by Rome to vent the
ambition and anger of the plebs. With a popular guard of freedom such as existed in Rome, “one
cannot give a more useful and necessary authority than that of being able to accuse citizens to the
people” (I.7.1). Through accusations, the people can accuse any individual of any class of
wrongdoing “when they sin against the free state” (I.7.1). Machiavelli credits accusations with
creating fear in all individuals, plebian and patrician alike, to dissuade them from acting against
the free state, and providing a method to crush such individuals if they attempt to do so. Further,
as the plebs require an outlet with which to vent their ambition, the accusations allow for venting
to happen in a way ordered by the laws. In these instances, public punishment and execution
accomplish what otherwise would be accomplished by an extraordinary tumult – something akin
to a riot. When some individual believe they have been done an injustice, the choices available
are to rise violently against the persecutor, or to accuse him through the laws. The first option,
akin to a lynching, is an extralegal application of justice. Extraordinary tumults such as this are
dangerous, and set a dangerous precedent for future unrest between the two humors. Thus, the
method of accusations provides a legal path for individuals to be brought to justice in a way that
both satisfies the people and prevents a mob-like tumult.
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As a last example, the institution of the dictator allows further perfection of Roman
orders due to the continuing disunion between the plebs and the patricians. The dictator emerges
when the consuls of Rome are no longer able to command the city and thus choose to elect one
who will take the reins to steer the city out of immediate danger. The dictator is appointed
according to “public orders” and not of his own accord, to protect the city (I.34.1). As the
dictator comes to power in a lawful, “ordinary” way instead of an extraordinary one, he is not
harmful to the republic, as “in so much course of time no dictator ever did anything but good to
the republic” (I.34.1). A dictator is appointed in Rome when a conflict, either external or
internal, comes to such a head that the existing institutions are not enough to temporize it. With
the dictator, a single individual is placed at the head of the city, but cannot take power away from
the city, the Senate or the people (I.34.2). As an example of an “ordinary” order, he cannot
change the orders of the city, but is limited in his authority, only sanctioned to bring Rome out of
its current danger. Under the watchful eye of both humors, the dictator finds it impossible “to
escape his limits and to hurt the city” – on the contrary, the dictator is a significant asset for
Rome. Potential alternatives to dictatorial authority would be to expand the power of the nobility
or the popular element of the city, both alternatives that would shake the fragile stability created
by the tumults. Instead, by creating an outside institution that is empowered only as long as
necessary to rid Rome of its impending disaster, the dictator serves to maintain the orders of
Rome while also maintaining its freedom.15
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The dictator could not serve more than a year, but it was the expectation that a dictator would step
down the moment his work was done, whatever it may have been. Thus, it was typical for a dictator to
serve a term closer to 6 months.
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The insatiability of human nature

While Machiavelli’s support for popular institutions is evident, he does not argue that
men are inherently good, or that their natures correspond with good self-government. Human
nature ensures that both the nobles and the people are corruptible. The multitude, when kept
subservient to a regime controlled by elites, is “nothing other than a brute animal” (I.16.1).
While the proper ordering of the people prepares it for a significant role in political institutions,
on its own, the people is “of a ferocious and feral nature” (I.16.1). If unshackled, the multitude is
unable to feed itself, and will come to be the prey of “the first one who seeks to rechain it.” This
coincides with Machiavelli’s earlier argument that the regime that follows a popular one is that
of a kingship or tyranny, one in which the people is placed under the yoke of another in order to
once again restrain them. Given human nature, without the proper ordering that comes from elite
management of political institutions, the people are motivated by their own selfish desires and
are uninterested in utilizing those desires in a way that might benefit the city. Humans are
“insatiable, for since from nature they have the ability and the wish to desire all things and from
fortune the ability to achieve few of them, there continually results from this a discontent in
human minds and disgust with the things they possess” (II Pref 3). The people always desire
more than they can achieve, causing political unrest, and furthering the disunion of the patricians
and the plebs. As they “wish” for things they cannot achieve, each side is motivated by the desire
to deprive the other of what it perceives itself as missing. Further, it is from this lens of insatiable
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desire that all people, but in particular the plebs, see the political world. Thus, motivated to gain
what they deserve, the people are blinded to what is good for the city as such.
The nobles are not exempt from this description of human nature. In describing the
Decemvirate, Machiavelli argues that nature leads both humors to ignore the danger of the Ten.
The power given to the Ten to write down the laws of Rome is misguided, it is “imprudent”
because the people are deceived and blinded (I.35). At first, Machiavelli judges the Decemvirate
for institutional problems but eventually speaks of the deception that blinded the Roman people
to the imprudence of the establishment of the Decemvirate.16 Although the Decemvirate is
established under the guise of necessity, as Rome required a written code of law, the hidden
impetus on both the part of the Senate and the tribunate is what comes to be the true problem.
Giving the pretext of the political utility of the written law, the two sides agree to the creation of
the Ten, “the one to eliminate the consular name, the other the tribunate” (I.40.5). Both sides are
blind to the danger and tyranny of the Decemvirate, as both are motivated to take political power
away from the other humor. The plebs look to Appius as their leader, and in doing so make “the
error of giving reputation to one individual because he beats down those it holds in hatred”
(I.40.5). The disunion of the two humors is then easily exploited by Appius, as both patricians
and plebs are willing to give away their freedom if in return they can subjugate the other.
For a tyrant, exploiting the nature of the people is an easy way to acquire and maintain
power. Using the example of Appius, who becomes the friend of the people as they perceive him
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The Ten are given unchecked power as the Senate and Tribunate are relieved of their duties during the
reign of the Ten. Further, such unilateral power should not be given for the length of time that the Ten are
in control. When speaking of the dictator, Machiavelli is clear that unilateral power must be laid down as
soon as the crisis is abated – usually around six months. The Ten is first established for a year, and then
with unchecked power, able to reinstitute itself for another term. Note here another difference between the
Decemvirate and the dictator – the dictator does not have the power to overtake other established
institutions.
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as capable of beating down the nobility, Machiavelli argues that tyrants “who have the
collectivity as a friend and the great as an enemy are more secure” (I.40.6). The multitude, due to
its size and passion, are a force to be reckoned with. The tyrant who has the people on his side is
ultimately much more secure in his power than one who sides with the nobles and thus offends
the people. Appius seals his own fate by reversing his position, leaving the people, and taking the
side of the nobles. The nobility “is always an enemy to the tyrant . . . because of the great
ambition and great avarice that are in it, since the tyrant cannot have either so much wealth or so
many honors that he may satisfy all of it” (I.40.5). The tyrant must only promise a better position
to the people, a much easier task to accomplish than to elevate the status of the nobles. Further,
to satisfy the ambition of the plebs requires fewer honors and less wealth, than the nobles who
are by nature attracted to acquisition (see I.5).
Machiavelli chooses to continue with the example of Appius as he discourses on the
corruptible nature of men, arguing that Appius only had to promise the noble youths very little to
bring them over to his cause (I.42). These young nobles are easily persuaded by the promise of
partisan favors from Appius, and are willing to be complicit in the subjugation of the freedom in
Rome for personal benefit and to satisfy their own ambition. A further example is that of Quintus
Fabius, who Machiavelli identifies as a “very good man” (I.42). Swayed by Appius, Quintus
Fabius is “blinded” by ambition and persuaded to change his “good customs to the worst” and
follow his example. The general advice that follows is to “make legislators of republics and
kingdoms more ready to check human appetites, and to take away from them all hope of being
able to err with impunity” (I.42). Thus, humans are naturally appetitive, and without the internal
control to check those appetites on their own. The proper institutions must be created to check
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appetites by ordering the proper punishments and rewards. A well-ordered regime would
prevent the two humors from engaging in appetitive behavior against one another under a
politically useful guise, and would further punish Appius for his individual behavior, motivated
by his own ambitions.18
While both humors fit within an understanding of human nature as insatiable, that
insatiability presents differently for one than the other. The nobles are most ambitious, as their
perception of their own well-being is tied directly to wealth. Further, the privileges and social
status enjoyed by this class require there be an economic difference that holds them to a higher
standard. As well connected, ambitious individuals, the nobles are also the most partisan, as they
utilize private benefits to engender political power and further wealth. With more discretionary
funds at their fingertips, they are much more likely to engage in deceptive behavior to further
their own ends. Thus, the insatiability of the nobles presents differently than that of the plebs,
whose insatiability is provoked by their noble oppression. The tumults are particularly useful in
checking human nature by playing the two humors off one another. Both humors must moderate
or contend with the other, and ideally, corruption will be kept at bay.
Although necessity requires that the multitude have political power, judgment by the
plebeians is not without issues. While weak when without a leader, “nothing is more formidable
than an unshackled multitude without a head” (I.57). Without a political leader, the people are
unable to wield their political power in significant ways, thus rendering themselves weak and
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Most view Machiavelli as advocating for cruel, surprise punishments, such as Mansfield (1989), though
Benner (2009) argues that Machiavelli is in favor of “harsh” punishments that are not necessarily “cruel.”
In I.45 Machiavelli does discuss Appius’ punishment: he is called before the people and Virginius as its
leader and sentenced to prison. Appius is denied an appeal, and kills himself in prison the day prior to his
day of judgment.
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useless. When left to their own devices, they are fickle, inconstant, and full of “bad dispositions,”
unable to cool their own spirits once incited. Unable to sort through various political options, the
people are often “deceived by a false image of the good” that leads it to “desire its own ruin”
(I.53.1). Due to the appetitive nature of humans, and the multitude’s inability to control its own
impulses, the people often make decisions based on whether the option “represents first on its
face either gain or loss” (I.53.2). Without political knowledge, the multitude cannot see past the
“face” of potential actions to the underlying good or bad. Thus, the multitude without a head is
apt to make decisions based on the cowardice or spirit associated with the action at first glance.
This could lead to rash involvement in military action based on the “spirit” the people perceives
as good, or refusing to retreat when necessary because of their impulse against “cowardice.”
Further, the face of a potential action persuades the people as it promises financial gain or loss.
One example is that of Fabius Maximus, who could not convince the people to proceed slowly in
war to sustain the thrust of Hannibal, as the multitude perceived that action as cowardly and
could not see the financial benefit beneath the face of the action (I.53.2).
Many examples can be parsed from Machiavelli’s work to help understand both the role
of the people in politics and the ways in which that role was corrupted over time, ending in the
fall of Rome. These examples point to the restlessness of the people and their insatiability when
it comes to property ownership and political power, characteristics that derive from human
nature. Machiavelli does not argue that individuals desire political rule to achieve good
government, but that the people want to take power and property away from the nobles, whom
they see as their oppressors. The example of the Agrarian Law speaks to the tumults between the
plebs and the patricians, and the pivot away from useful tumults to harmful ones that come with
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the Law under the Gracchi. Other examples, such as the rise of Julius Caesar, point to the ability
of the people to be hoodwinked by perceived partisan benefits, whether of power or property.

The Agrarian Law

The issue of the Agrarian Law speaks to the problem that arises when the people are
withheld benefits, particularly property or other tangible goods. When people begin to acquire,
the fear of losing acquisitions develops, a fear that comes with the desire to maintain what one
has (I.5.4). Further, when people begin to acquire, their “incorrect and ambitious behavior
inflames in the breasts of whoever does not possess the wish to possess so as to avenge
themselves against them by despoiling them or to be able also themselves to enter into those
riches and those honors that they see being used badly by others” (I.5.4). Desire for honor and
riches begins with only a small swath of the people, then easily extends to others, inflaming in
their breasts the desire to gain those riches and honors. As it extends to others, the desire to
acquire is not for the sake of acquisition itself, but to despoil others, to gain what they perceive
the nobles are “using badly.” Ideally, a correct understanding of human nature would have
allowed Rome to foresee that while the many do not wish to acquire excessive wealth, that the
misuse of riches by the nobles would inspire in the breast of the plebs a yearning to turn the
tables. Machiavelli warns of the potential for the plebs to be incited over their possessions, as he
reminds elites in both the Prince and the Discourses to leave to the people their meager property
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and their women (see P 19; D III.26.1). In an attempt to put the nobles under the yoke that the
plebs are so used to living under, the latter have recourse to Marius and eventually a civil war.19
Thus, the Agrarian Law is both an example of the balancing act between the humors and
a cause of the ruin of Rome. Although the Agrarian Law under the Gracchi did lead to ruin, the
same Law had once been an instigator of the kind of tumults that kept Rome free. The plebs, not
satisfied by their extension of power through the creation of the tribunes, “began at once to
engage in combat through ambition and to wish to share honors and belongings with the
nobility” (I.37.1). As Livy says regarding the creation of the “land bill,” that measure “from that
day to within present memory, has never been brought up without causing great upheavals”
between the two humors.20 In the Discourses, Machiavelli claims the Law sought to limit the
acreage of land to be owned by any one citizen, and to distribute the lands taken from enemies
amongst the Roman people (I.37). While the land bill is the main subject of I.37, it is important
to note that Machiavelli focuses on the latter versions of the land bill as transformed and
championed by the Gracchi (circa 150BCE). In Livy’s history, the land bill originates with
Spurius Cassius (486BCE) and is immediately controversial, instigating political conflict for
centuries.
The version of the land bill brought forward by the Gracchi was crafted to reclaim lands
from the wealthy Senate class, and to redistribute it to plebeian soldiers.21 The redistribution

The plebs, with Marius as their leader, lose the civil war. This is a fundamental critique of the plebs’
rush to oppress their oppressors. In going as far as to incite a civil war, the plebs insure their further
subjugation and eventually, the rise of Caesar.
19
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Livy (2006), II.41.

Until Marius, soldiers had to own a certain amount of property to fight in the Roman army. This was to
ensure that those fighting for the city had a monetary attachment/financial stake in the well-being of
Rome– this would presumably lead to more loyal soldiers.
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itself was to be done by three members of the Gracchi headed by Tiberius, a plebian tribune. For
obvious reasons, the Senate opposed the land bill reforms, lobbying members of the tribunate to
vote against the bill. The Roman Senate murders Tiberius and many of his supporters in what
Machiavelli describes as the “first open bloodshed in Rome in four centuries,”.22 Ten years later,
Tiberius’ brother Gaius comes to power to further plebeian interests and the land bill as defended
by his brother. The Senate considers Gaius more dangerous, recognizing his pragmatism and
ability to persuade the plebeians is stronger than that of Tiberius. With Gaius appealing to the
people in favor of the Law, it “inflamed so much hatred between the plebs and the Senate that
they [the two humors] came to arms and to bloodshed” (I.37.2).
Prior to the Gracchi, the land bill was, in fact, beneficial to Rome. Although it did “turn
the city upside down” every time it resurfaced, “with patience and industry the nobles
temporized with it, either by leading an army out, or by having the tribune who proposed it
opposed by another tribune, or by sometimes yielding to a part of it” (I.37.2). This accords with
Livy’s account, which shows repeated instances of the land bill’s implementation being delayed
or deferred due to compromise or external accidents that shifted the focus away from domestic
relations to foreign ones. Livy’s history also sheds light on the original land bill created by
Spurius Cassius, who used it to gain favor with the plebs. Cassius’ actions led to suspicion
among both the plebs and the nobles, who suspected him of vying for a return to the kingship by
winning over the plebs.23 In regard to the land bill, Livy relates a comment attributed to Appius
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Claudius, who calms the senators with the observation that the “strength of the office [tribunate]
was the source of its own undoing.”24 The inadequate strength of the tribunate allowed the
manipulation by the Senate, as “they would never lack a tribune who would be willing not only
to seek for himself a victory over a colleague but also to ingratiate himself with the better
element [the senate] for the good of the state.”25 Thus, while the land bill was created and later
revived as a means to empower the people, the tribunes themselves undermined that purpose of
the Law through their vulnerability to the manipulation of the Senate. The Senate was easily able
to defer the land bill for centuries, only acquiescing on minor issues, convincing the plebs to
focus on the good of the state instead of the good of their own class. However, the eventual
servitude arising from the tumults over the Agrarian Law is not enough for Machiavelli to alter
his earlier opinion of the tumults as beneficial to Rome: “so great is the ambition of the great that
it soon brings that city to its ruin if it is not beaten down in a city by various ways and various
modes . . . it perhaps would have been lead into servitude much sooner if the plebs had not
always checked the ambition of the nobles” (I.37.3). While the Law is a cause of the ruin of
Rome, without it the republic would have fallen into ruin much earlier than it did.
Under the Gracchi, the land bill created tumults that were too strong to maintain freedom
in Rome. The Law “lay as though asleep” until the Gracchi took it up, and then it “altogether
ruined Roman freedom” (I.37.2). Although Tiberius’ attempt to push the Law through was
overcome by the Senate, Gaius’ second attempt was successful enough to instigate, at least
partially, the fall of Rome. The ensuing tumults were so disruptive that the Senate was not able
to temporize them, leading to private remedies instead of public ones, and eventually
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partisanship. Thus, the plebs resorted to creating a head in Marius, and the nobles found Sulla as
their leader against the Marian party, leading Rome into civil war over the division of private
property (I.37.2). The Gracchi, instead of temporizing with the nobles, accelerated the conflict
between the nobles and the plebs by supporting an imprudent law that both looked “very far
back” while also attempting to reorder the Romans’ attitudes towards property and honors. The
example of the Agrarian Law shows the problem created by the disunion of the plebs and the
patricians over time. While political conflict was once good for Roman freedom, the later version
of the Law under the Gracchi exemplifies the problem of empowering the people without regard
to their true natures. As the insatiable nature of the plebs was inflamed by their oppression, the
later versions of the Law sought material benefits and to avenge the nobles vis-à-vis their
property, goals that could not be satisfied without the growth of corruption.

Caesar

The plebs show their true colors in their elevation of Caesar as their head, a choice made
from their desire for revenge against the nobles. Machiavelli’s depiction of Caesar is brutally
negative, and he does not hide his judgment of Caesar’s wicked actions. Early on, he states that
any individual, “if he is born of man, he will be terrified away from every imitation of wicked
times and will be inflamed with an immense desire to follow the good” and thus imitate
Romulus’ reordering of the corrupt city of Rome, while avoiding imitation of Caesar who
“spoiled” it entirely (I.10.6). Here, it seems that human nature is to behave, or desire to behave,
as a Romulus instead of a Caesar. To want to reorder a city and return it to greatness, not to spoil
it and further corrupt it. In some ways, this understanding of human nature conflicts with other
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depictions of Roman citizens as insatiable revenge seekers. One can add glory seeking to the
nature of man, mixed with the desire to acquire power and property. Not only is it natural, but
“impossible” to think that any man who has read the histories of the ancients would want to live
in their fatherland as a Caesar instead of a Scipio (I.10.2). Machiavelli goes as far as to outline
the wickedness of the times of Caesar, under the guise of “the times of other emperors,” stating
that Italy’s obligation to Caesar can be found in the burning of Rome, the sea full of exiles, and
the shores full of blood (I.10.5). Yet, despite this depiction of Caesar, which Machiavelli implies
should be obvious of any who lived in his time or after, the plebs turn to him as their leader
against the nobles. Not only are they motivated by their own appetites, but are so deceived by
those appetites that they are incapable of seeing the danger that lies before them in giving
reputation to Caesar.
Given the narrowly selfish motive of the plebs, Caesar’s rise to power was not
understood quickly enough for it to be temporized with effectively. When an individual or a
cause becomes so great “that it begins to bring fear to everyone, it is a much more secure policy
to temporize with it than to attempt to extinguish it” (I.33.2). Most of these causes appear
intrinsically, when an individual happens to acquire more strength than is sensible in a republic.
In the case of Caesar, his power became so great that both the people and the magistrates feared
him. It often happens that the people or the magistrates are not aware of the danger that some
individual poses until it is too late to remedy it. In these cases, it is only through temporizing
with the danger that the republic can hope to remedy it. Caesar was “favored by Pompey and by
others” for a while, but eventually “the favor soon after was converted to fear” once they
recognized him for what he was – an ambitious tyrant (I.33.3). Ambitious citizens in a republic,
such as Caesar, are first and foremost concerned with not being offended by both private
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individuals and magistrates who do not recognize their virtú and thus do not accord them the
proper honors and offices. To acquire these offices, they seek friendships, and “they acquire
them in ways honest in appearance . . . because this appears virtuous, it easily deceives everyone,
and because of this they offer no remedies against it” (I.46.1). It is not until one realizes that the
ambitious citizen is feared by the entire city, including its magistrates, that city is no longer free
(I.29.3). In allowing Caesar to come to power, Rome provides for its own servility and ruin.
Caesar’s manipulation deceived the nobles and the people long enough to embed himself in
Roman political life.
The example of Caesar speaks to the imprudent way in which the Romans dealt with
individuals who came to great reputation within their republics. Machiavelli states early in the
Discourses that freedom is secured by giving reputation to many citizens to prevent any one
individual from acquiring too much reputation and thus, power. Through this mechanism, each
individual can be overcome easily, if need be, by any other citizen (or perhaps an association of
citizens). At the same time, each of the citizens is satisfied in his knowledge that those around
him are similarly “poor” – both in honors and property. Caesar comes to power through the
imprudence of the multitude, which gives him reputation in return for favors – specifically ones
of material gain. As the people are often incapable of seeing for themselves what is best, but
instead are attracted to what provides immediate benefit, allowing the many enough strength to
empower one individual as its head will always present a problem. Instead, when the republic is
in such a situation as to require a single individual with significant power, the only way to go
about this is through the institution of a dictator.
The difference between empowering a single individual like Caesar as distinct from a
dictator lies in the source of their authority, and the end for which that authority is used. The
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consuls (who had lost control over the situation at hand) elect a dictator, not the people of the
republic. In so doing it is not the many, fickle and easily manipulated as they are, who give
reputation to a single individual, and reputation is not granted based on private benefits that
might be had. Instead, it is the elites who reach out to one individual for the sole purpose of
restoring the common benefit of the fatherland. At first glance, this seems like the way in which
Octavian was given reputation, but one must bear in mind two crucial differences. First, the
Senate, not the consuls, gave Octavian power. Thus, the intention behind the power can be
attributed to one of the two “humors” of the city, not the consuls who are charged with the city’s
general well-being. While one or the other of the humors sometimes favors a certain consul, the
consuls do not engage in tumults in the way the Senate does against the people. Second, the
reputation given to Octavian entailed extralegal powers that had not existed prior. While Rome
could have considered naming a dictator, a political institution with well-defined institutional
and social boundaries, she chose instead to give extralegal power to one citizen. Empowering
Caesar, as well as Octavian, was effected out of partisan greed.26 The dictator comes to power as
a savior of the republic in its time of need, while in Caesar’s case, the plebeians empowered one
individual to subjugate the nobles and gain material benefit.
Machiavelli’s indictment of the people provided through the example of Caesar speaks to
their inability to rule themselves. While Machiavelli does insist upon a popular political element,
the example of Caesar shows that the people cannot make political decisions entirely on their
own. The people turned to an external leader to overcome oppression by the nobles. What they
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did not realize, however, was that in enabling Caesar, they were wrapping the yoke tighter
around their own necks. The people are resentful of the elites who govern over them, but when
they have the chance to give reputation to one who could elevate their station in life, the people
resort to an ambitious, partisan individual. In making this decision, the appetites of the people get
the better of them, as their primary concern in finding a strong leader is to find one that can turn
the oppression of the nobles back onto the nobles themselves. Instead of empowering one who
could reorder Roman institutions, or maintain the balance created by the tumults, the people
overlook the common good in an effort to attack the nobles. In so doing, they incite the nobles
into civil war (in the case of Marius, a civil war that the plebs lose), eventually leading to
empowering Caesar and with him the exacerbation of the loss of Roman freedom.
While the people are always resentful of the nobles, whose rule they perceive as
oppressive, it is not the case that the people alone make better choices of rulers. Just like the
nobles, the people are so concerned with maintaining their possessions and power that they are
willing to reach out to a fiercely partisan individual for protection against the nobles. However,
their penchant for revenge and hatred for the oppression they’ve received is even stronger than
their concern with property. When given the chance, the many will give reputation to one
champion perceived as capable of destroying noble rule. In so doing, the oppression they seek to
inflict on the nobles eventually oppresses the entire city, and with it any freedom they once
enjoyed. Thus, to found on the people means to found on corruption – and modernity must find a
way to satisfy both humors to prevent that corruption from becoming insurmountable. Rome’s
mistake was to found on the people without fully comprehending what popular foundations
entail in the context of corrupt and insatiable human nature.
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Conclusion

Machiavelli’s endorsement of Rome is coupled with a significant critique: although
Rome understood the political utility of empowering its people, its failure stemmed from its lack
of true understanding of human nature. Although Rome is initially founded as a kingship, the
tumults between the two humors in Rome lead rather quickly to an extension of popular power.
In extending power to the plebs, Rome is able to create a more stable city, where both humors
are checked and future institutions are created “in favor of freedom.” However, Rome fails in its
inability to understand the true nature of its people. Extension of power to the plebs by the
creation of the tribunate provides a solution to one of Rome’s problems, but also generates the
failure of the city. The tribunate serves to keep Rome free by checking the nobles, and extends
freedoms to the previously unrepresented multitude. Here, empowering the people is not only
necessary, but also beneficial to Rome, as she requires their services in order to satisfy her
imperial objectives.
Rome’s failure comes not out of empowering its people, but its misunderstanding of the
people’s true nature. Corrupt human nature affects all citizens of Rome, establishing a
tumultuous relationship between the nobles on the one hand and the plebs on the other. This
disunity is a benefit to Rome as a checking mechanism, until the balance it creates shifts in the
favor of the plebs, who are incited by the wrongs they perceive have been done to them. Based
on an inaccurate understanding of human nature, Roman institutions are incompatible with the
actual motivations of each humor. Far from being motivated only by the greatness of Rome, both
humors are also motivated by the potential to subjugate the other. Further, as Machiavelli
suggests in I.5, even the desire to maintain what one has is really the desire to acquire, and thus
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human nature is always acquisitive. As the plebs gain a modicum of power and property away
from the nobles, they are further motivated to acquire more. As a result, the constant culture of
acquisition makes maintenance of the empire challenging, both at home in domestic politics as
well as abroad.
The institution of partisan friends to achieve the desired property and power defines the
corruption of the people most directly. The corruption of human nature becomes further
enflamed as the disunion of the two humors becomes stronger and more tumultuous, and each
side reaches out to partisan friends to take away from the others to acquire for themselves. This
is already visible in the examples given of the Agrarian Law and the elevation of Caesar to
power, but will be further explored in the third chapter of this dissertation. In that chapter, I will
argue that the Italy of Machiavelli’s time is embroiled in corruption, and is not likely to return to
the “perfection” of ancient Rome. The partisan benefits that corrupt the people further blind them
to the consequences of their actions. In the case of Caesar, it was enough for the plebs to
empower him based on his strength, as they perceived him capable of oppressing the nobles.
Blinded by the desire to see the nobles subjugated, the people do not realize the danger Caesar
represents until it is too late to reverse it. And in the case of the Agrarian Law, the people are not
fighting for just any land, but specifically land that would need to be expropriated from the
nobles – prime Roman lands.
Roman institutions augment the corruption of the people. While Rome gets it right in
empowering the people, its institutions are predicated on the uniqueness of ancient Rome that no
longer exists in Machiavelli’s time. As such, Machiavelli’s goal is both to understand exactly
what greatness existed in the ancient republic, and also how the modern city might find its own
strength. Throughout the text, it becomes increasingly clear that “greatness” in antiquity must be
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redefined in modernity. Modern Rome is weak, divided and without the institutional supports
that lent strength to its ancient counterpart. Thus, the trick is to discern not only what was great
about ancient Rome, but how to find a uniquely modern greatness for present day Italy.

CHAPTER 2: ANCIENT ROMAN GREATNESS

As Machiavelli speaks to the divergence of modern Rome from its ancient counterpart,
the Discourses provides an illuminating depiction of Rome at its strongest. The peak of the
Roman Empire is Machiavelli’s representation of greatness – an imperial city capable of
maintaining its acquisitions. Machiavelli’s praise for the Roman Empire is woven throughout the
Discourses, as he recalls the histories of virtuous captains and the ancient virtue associated with
the military. Although virtue in its military conquests is a significant part of Rome’s ability to
expand, a city cannot rest its greatness solely on the military, but must use social institutions to
strengthen the military and support the growing empire. In Machiavelli’s own time, Rome has
not only lost its imperial strength but also finds itself weak at home. Much of the Discourses is
committed to the prospective project of restoration of greatness in Rome.
For quite a while, ancient Rome maintained greatness through an appropriate balance of
the humors that were the result of the “perfection” of orders. As the previous chapter states, that
perfection included the empowerment of the plebs as political citizens of Rome. Thus, perfection
came directly from the institution of the tribunate and other orders such as accusations, that
essentially handed political weapons to the plebs with which they could protect themselves from
the oppression of the nobles. Prior to these institutions, the nobility had significant political
influence only exaggerated by excessive wealth which the Roman republic needed to balance
with plebeian power. Such a balance is intrinsically important to the ability of the republic to
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find greatness – without these orders, Rome would have fallen prey to the same problems as do
Sparta and Venice, unable to expand or maintain acquisitions.
The empowerment of the people is both necessary for greatness and the cause of its
deterioration. Although the ancient city was right to empower the plebs, the tumults that
followed became detrimental to the city, as each humor was powerful enough to subjugate the
other. While this chapter will discuss the way in which the ancient city came to greatness and
allude to the inability of modernity to come to the same greatness, the following chapter will
discuss the corruption that resulted from the newly empowered plebeian class. Suffice it to say
that the ancient mores and social supports of greatness discussed here are disrupted when the two
humors of the city succumb to partisanship, and with it, corruption. The relationship between the
humors alters as the plebs take on political power – and both sides seek avenues to empower
partisan leaders instead of preferring the manly virtú necessary for greatness. The ancient city
overcomes the problem of corruption by inculcating a version of civic virtue into its citizens visà-vis ancient orders, Roman virtue, and religion well used. By instilling these mores into its
people, Rome is able to harness the political power of the people and utilize it to achieve
greatness.
Greatness is understood by Machiavelli as the facilitation of the free way of life, by
which a city can acquire and maintain empire. Thus, the great city is characterized by Rome at its
strongest point: where the city is resilient at home and abroad. While Rome maintained this
strength for a long time, Italy by Machiavelli’s time is the picture of weakness. Machiavelli’s
work provides a description of past Roman greatness, alongside some generalized advice that
would help any city achieve something akin to the success of Rome. The study of greatness is
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useful, particularly as a means to understand the connection between the ancient city and its
modern counterpart.
Only by understanding Machiavelli’s praise of greatness can we understand the true
failure of modern Rome. Over time, Rome’s emphasis on strong leadership wanes as unworthy
individuals come to power. Leaders with virtú can successfully navigate all variables they
encounter while ruling, and thus are best positioned to overcome both good and bad fortunes. In
the absence of strong virtú, the powerful plebs can disrupt ancient institutions such as the
consulate, and utilize the resultant destabilization to establish more plebian power.1 As human
nature is self-interested, this is exactly the result Machiavelli expects from the popularizing of
political institutions. Such changes shatter a once perfect city, as a balanced relationship between
the two humors is replaced by tumults too strong to maintain the city.

Roman greatness

Machiavelli often refers to ancient Rome as a “great” city; one that has achieved
“greatness.” The earliest mention of “great” in the Discourses appears when Machiavelli gives
generalized advice about where a republic should settle itself geographically. Machiavelli
provides two options: the first is to settle in a barren place, where men are constrained by
necessity to be “industrious and less seized by idleness” or second, to settle in a fertile place
(I.1.4). Machiavelli chooses the latter option, as since “men cannot secure themselves except
with power, it is necessary to avoid this sterility in a country and to settle in the most fertile
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See McCormick (2011).
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places, where, since the city can expand . . . it can both defend itself from whoever might assault
it and crush anyone who might oppose its greatness” (I.1.4). Even in its first appearance,
republican greatness is connected directly to empire. Instead of being concerned that the republic
might become idle, Machiavelli states that the “laws should be ordered to constrain it by
imposing such necessities as the site does not provide” (I.1.4). In this example, we see an early
indication that there is not only a tie between empire and greatness, but a tie between greatness
and the rule of law.
A more robust definition of greatness comes from the following two chapters. In I.5,
Machiavelli begins with the examples of Rome, Sparta, and Venice to contrast a great city to
other successful cities. In this first chapter, Machiavelli speaks to the “guard of freedom” and
questions which city placed that guard most appropriately – Rome used the plebs as their guard
of freedom, while the other two cities chose the nobles. His conclusion suggests each way has
merit, but if “you are reasoning either about a republic that wishes to make an empire” one
would proceed as did Rome; if a given city is satisfied by maintaining itself, one may proceed as
did Sparta and/or Venice. While Sparta and Venice are successful, Machiavelli does not
categorize them as great, as it appears greatness is connected directly with empire. For Rome to
imitate Sparta or Venice would be to “cut off the way by which it could come to the greatness it
achieved” (I.5.3). In these chapters, Machiavelli states that Rome’s path to greatness requires the
empowerment of the people, as a republic that wishes to expand requires a large army of citizens.
In so doing, Rome creates the foundation for its own discord, as the nobles and plebs are in a
constant state of political disunity (I.6). However, these chapters lead the reader to conclude that
the Roman goal of greatness required such elevation of political status to the plebs. Sparta and

53
Venice are not disparaged for lacking the imperial tendencies of Rome, although neither city is
able to achieve the greatness Machiavelli desires.
This argument appears again in one of the last chapters of the first book, where
Machiavelli debates the wisdom and constancy of the multitude as compared to the prince (I.58).
The argument, on its surface, is that the multitude “that commands and is well ordered will be
stable, prudent and grateful no otherwise than a prince, or better than a prince, even one
esteemed wise” (I.58.3). Although much of the argument here refers to a people shackled by the
laws, Machiavelli makes a general statement regarding the political utility of the people as
prince.2 When the goal of the city is empire, the city is wise to create republican institutions, as
“cities in which peoples are princes make exceeding increases in very brief time, and much
greater than those that have always been made under a prince” (I.58.3). The Roman Empire’s
greatness is classified by its imperial strength, which Machiavelli attributes in part to the
republican institutions that avail the city of an armed population.
In the Discourses, when Machiavelli speaks to the greatness of Rome, it is correlated
with Rome’s place in the world as an imperial power. When compared to other cities like Sparta,
Rome is always the victor, as the city could expand and maintain itself much larger than any
other city of its time (II.3).3 While other thinkers might save “greatness” for a city whose
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See chapter 1 of this dissertation. While Machiavelli states here that a people shackled by the laws is
wiser and more constant than a shackled prince, elsewhere he questions the possibility of a truly shackled
multitude.
The chapter title of II.3: “Rome became a great city through ruining the surrounding cities and easily
admitting foreigners to its honors.” In this chapter, Machiavelli revisits the comparison of Rome, Sparta
and Venice, concluding that Rome became great through warmaking. In the aftermath of war, Rome
expanded by allowing foreigners into the city, but also made “partners” with the losing cities. The
important difference between the partnerships made by Rome and others mentioned in the following
chapter (II.4) is that Rome made sure to keep the seat of command in Roman hands –through a
combination of force and fraud.
3
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institutions aim at a higher good, such as democratic deliberation or even liberal democratic
principles, Machiavelli makes a lesser argument. The great city is one that is feared outside of its
own city walls. As such, after the first chapters that speak to Roman founding and the greatness
of that city, much of the Discourses speak to the military and political institutions that allowed
Rome to continue her path to greatness. One important factor in Roman greatness is the
alteration of Rome’s founding to include popular institutions.

The causes of Roman greatness

Along with this definition of what made Rome great, Machiavelli provides hints
throughout the Discourses that speak to how Rome could expand. While greatness is wrapped up
in expansion, and expansion requires popular elements of a mixed republic, there are other
important supports of greatness in Rome. Part of the puzzle can be solved with institutions – in a
republic that incorporates elected consuls (“princes”) the city should never have two weak
princes back-to-back (I.20). Two strong princes in a row produce “great effects,” and a wellordered, uncorrupted republic has little excuse not to elect worthy candidates in succession. As a
matter of fact, the well-ordered republic should be able to far exceed two virtuous princes in a
row, “as through the mode of electing it has . . . infinite most virtuous princes who are successors
to one another” (I.20).
Other pieces to the Roman puzzle aid in her greatness. The Roman way of war making
aided in the making of a great empire, as ancient virtue and military prowess are emphasized
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until modern times (II.6). The ancient Romans were known for quick wars, fought fast and
furiously, and followed up their victories by sending colonies to inhabit newly acquired lands.
Roman military virtue depended on good soldiers, the “sinew of war” (II.10). Further,
acquisitions by the Romans followed a model that Machiavelli argues must be followed by all
expansionist republics if they wish to succeed in their endeavors (II.19).
More important than these institutional factors are the social supports behind them.
Greatness for Rome is above and beyond what can be accomplished through institutions alone.
Imperative to understanding Roman greatness, is to consider the factors within Roman society
that allow the city to seek imperial goals. As Machiavelli blurs the distinction between
international relations and domestic ones, Rome must be “well-ordered” at home before seeking
to expand its empire. Thus, underlying the imperial republic is a set of mores that allow Rome to
both to acquire an empire, but also to maintain it. Machiavelli early in Book II suggests the crux
of these mores: “it is not the particular good but the common good that makes cities great”
(II.2.1). Machiavelli follows this statement by again advocating for a republican form of
government, as that regime is best at fulfilling the common good. The contrary is government
under a prince alone, without popular elements mixed in, as “what suits him usually offends the
city and what suits the city offends him” (II.2.1).
Although Machiavelli does give credence to the common good, it is important to
recognize that in the Discourses, the common good is synonymous with the common benefit, or
the common utility (I.16.3).5 To put this in another way, there is no altruistic end to
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See Lynch (2012) for a useful discussion of the connection between tumults and military preparedness.

Sullivan (1992); Smith (2006). Sullivan’s article provides a useful discussion of the common good in the
context of her response to Pocock’s Machiavellian Moment. Sullivan argues that while Machiavelli is
5
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Machiavelli’s idea of the common good, nor is human excellence secured by acting in accord
with the common good.6 Instead, it is important for the city to aim at the common good, because
the common good is connected to the free way of life, which in turn produces greatness –
economic and political success of Rome, both at home and abroad.7 The common good can be
understood as the aggregated self-interest of the Roman people – a materialistic and political
benefit that has no exalted aim of idealistic politics or human fulfillment. The city must preserve
the idea of, and adherence to, the common good to preserve and foster its own greatness and to
tie the self-interest of individuals to their city. Only when Rome is able to tie the interest of
individuals to the political success of the city can it hope to expand its territory abroad. In
antiquity, Rome was able to foster dedication to the law (or as Machiavelli sometimes calls it
“good orders”), to religion, and to a mixture of virtue and virtú as a version of inculcated civic
virtue.
Most examples of Roman greatness in the Discourses are tied to one of these causes, and
references to each of these causes are sprinkled throughout the work. The first, observance of
good order, speaks to the perfection of Roman institutions above. It appears that Machiavelli’s
praise of ancient virtue is truly admiration for ancient Roman orders and the rule of law observed
well by its people and fostered with military strength (see I.9). Law and order is not sufficient,
leading Machiavelli to make a strong statement for religion, where he states the “observance of
the divine cult” is the cause of greatness in republics. Finally, at the very beginning of book II,

committed to the “common good,” it is a non-classical version of common good that is wholly compatible
with selfishness.
For an argument that Machiavelli’s common good is truly compatible with republicanism, see de Grazia
(1989).
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Machiavelli opens with the following chapter title: “Which was More the Cause of the Empire
the Romans acquired, Virtue or Fortune.” The conclusion here, and elsewhere in the book, is that
with proper virtue and prudence, fortune can be overcome. The most virtuous man or city knows
how to create fortune, which Machiavelli calls opportunity, which is a necessity for fostering
greatness. In promoting reverence for laws, religion and virtue, Machiavelli creates a supportive
web for the city that allows it to seek the common good regardless of dubious human nature.
However, the discussions these phenomena are not thematic, and must be traced throughout the
work to piece together Machiavelli’s teaching.

Good orders and ancient virtue

A cursory reading of the Prince might suggest that Machiavelli forgoes all law in favor of
a strong (and wicked) executive, but such a conclusion can only be made by ignoring many
references to the orders that bind a people together. The earlier analysis of the perfection of
Roman orders does suggest that Machiavelli gives weight to such institutions, as without them
Rome might never have come to the strength it did. Further, the repeated refrain to return to
ancient virtue is often found in reference to a people no longer bound by good laws.
Machiavelli begins the Discourses with a discussion of the founding of Rome, one he
attributes to Romulus.8 Just chapters later, Machiavelli makes his initial argument for virtú – a
city founded on the best orders will be founded by one virtuous man, alone (I.9). Machiavelli
then uses examples of founders and emperors who are praised not only for their virtú, but also
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Machiavelli leaves open the possibility of Aeneas being the “first progenitor” of Rome (I.1.5).
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their deference to the fatherland. Romulus, along with Moses, Lycurgus, Solon and others who
founded kingdoms and republics are great because they “formed laws for the purpose of the
common good,” something they could achieve because they founded alone (I.9.3). In the same
chapter, Agis is used as an example of returning a city back to its ancient virtue. Agis seeks to
return the Spartans to the “limits within which the laws of Lycurgus had enclosed them” as a
remedy to this loss of ancient virtue (I.9.4). This thread of his argument continues into the next
chapter, as Machiavelli warns the prince he must consider “how much more praise those
emperors deserved who lived under the laws and as good princes” (I.10.4). Machiavelli
compares these princes, bound by law and the common benefit, to princes who ruled to the
contrary. Caligula, Nero, and Vitellius are given as examples of “criminal emperors” who were
unable to be saved by all the western and eastern armies.9
Although Machiavelli does support a strong executive with extralegal power, many more
examples show that the individual cannot subjugate the law, or bend it to his own will, without
any thought to the fatherland. Using the example of Friar Savonarola, Machiavelli states that
everyone – including the prince himself – must follow the law. In this particular example,
Savonarola has created a law that secured an appeal to the people for any person accused by the
Eight and the Signoria. When Savonarola condemned five citizens to death, he withheld from
them the right to appeal (I.45.2). Instead of praising Savonarola for making a prudent decision,
he emphasizes that the ordeal hurt Savonarola’s reputation. This incident exposes Savonarola’s
“ambitious and partisan spirit,” as it was an order contrary to greatness, and irreverent to the law.
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At I.10.5, Machiavelli suggests that any prince who wishes to be remembered well should want to live
bound by the laws, as it fosters a good and strong city. At the end of this section, he compares the good
city to the bad one, lead by the unshackled prince. The passage ends with a nod to Caesar, as an example
of a criminal emperor.
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Had Savonarola’s actions been extralegal but for the benefit of the fatherland, Machiavelli’s
judgement surely would have been different. However, his actions were detrimental to the
fatherland as they were rooted in personal ambition and partisanship.
In the chapter that gives Machiavelli’s strongest argument in favor of popular institutions,
Machiavelli also gives a robust illustration of the importance of the law. Throughout the chapter,
Machiavelli seeks to answer the question advanced in the chapter title, whether “The Multitude
is Wise and More Constant Than a Prince” (I.58). The conclusion reached in the chapter is a
highly qualified one: the unshackled prince, without regard to the law, will be less constant than
a people “that commands and is well ordered” (I.58.3). In fact, while the people might come out
slightly ahead, as a ruling multitude is more stable and prudent than a prince, the most significant
variable is reverence for the law. Any variation between a prince or a people “arises not from a
diverse nature . . . but from having more or less respect for the laws within which both live”
(I.58.3). Thus, while Rome is a lover of glory and the common benefit, it is less important who
rules the city as long as they are shackled by the law, and examples will be found of either mode
of government. Livy, who only uses examples of an unshackled people, underestimates the
ability of the Romans. Machiavelli responds to this assertion by finding the people more capable
of maintaining good orders, and thus more stable than a prince.10
Other references to ancient virtue are tied to the idea of good orders. The example of
Agis attempting to return Sparta to ancient virtue, or within the boundaries of law, is only one
example. Machiavelli further makes the connection between good laws and ancient virtue when
he suggests that laws should retain the shadow of ancient modes and orders to please the people,
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and maintain freedom. To do otherwise is to go against the customs of the city (I.25, I.37). This
is important, as good laws are not in themselves good enough. The whole purpose of a mixed
regime is to be flexible with regard to accidents; laws must also be somewhat flexible. As good
laws require good customs, so too do good customs require good laws. As customs change, the
law must change as well. If the law changes, the customs of Rome must change with it (III.18).
Here, Machiavelli is pointing to a change in the law away from ancient orders, where the
customs of the people have not changed. France is presented as counterexample, as that city is
able to maintain two weak princes in a row, as the ancient orders there remain intact (I.19.2).11
Ancient orders provide for strong laws, but also a powerful military. The modern use of
artillery is useless without being mixed with ancient virtue - and against a truly virtuous army, it
is particularly useless (II.17). The modern military captains, having snubbed ancient virtue,
create a new formation for soldiers, resulting in mass panic and casualties (II.16). Reputation
abroad is an inherent part of greatness, and without it, Rome cannot hope to maintain the loyalty
of its soldiers. Consequently, Machiavelli advocates for a return to ancient orders to return
reputation to the military (II.18.5). While Machiavelli also argues that the people often give
undue credit to the past (II Pref), there must be something worth emulating among the ancients
since he repeatedly connects ancient military orders and greatness.
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In reference to Rome, Machiavelli argues that if the Tarquins had not strayed so far from ancient
orders, they would have been able to hold the city for longer. Instead, the violence of the Tarquins, who
fit under the title of “criminal emperors” caused an uproar in the city (III.5.1).
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Roman virtue and Machiavellian virtú

Separate from ancient virtue, Machiavelli lauds Roman virtue and manly Machiavellian
virtú that is found in individuals. While ancient and Roman virtues are characteristic of Rome as
a city at various times in its history, virtú is a variety of virtue held only by an individual. Virtú
does not extend over a city or a group of people, but speaks only to the ability of one man to
prudently rule or found. The Prince provides a good foundation on which to understand virtú, as
many examples used are of men willing to do wicked things for some benefit. The Discourses
further elucidate the meaning of virtú, giving examples of individuals who should be imitated,
and those who should not.
Roman virtue is a term used by Machiavelli very infrequently – as a matter of fact, he
only refers to this particular strain of virtue three times. The first is in reference to the battle
between the Samnites and the Romans in book I. Here, he argues that the Romans are able to
overcome the Samnites, even after the spectacle put on by the Samnite commanders (I.15). In the
example, the commanders threatened the Samnite soldiers with religious verses to inspire fear,
eventually executing soldiers who refused to go to battle against the Romans. Regardless of the
oaths they swore to their commanders, the Samnites were defeated by Roman virtue and the fear
the Romans had generated from past defeats. While the Samnites had no other option than to
attempt to recover lost virtue by going to battle, the confidence of the Romans was too strong to
defeat with such extreme measures. The virtue of the Romans “testifies in full how much
confidence can be had through religion well used” (I.16). In the same battle, Papirius executes
the prince of the chicken-men, after the auspices are interpreted against a favorable outcome of
Rome. Thus, Roman virtue is linked here with religion as a useful tool, and “one of the most
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important orders of the republic of Rome” as it is used to foster necessity throughout the soldiers
in their pursuit of conquest.
The second example is again related to the Samnites. In II.2.3, Machiavelli references the
strength of the Samnites, who are so powerful with such strong arms that they could resist Rome
up until the time of consul Papirius Cursor. Prior to Papirius, “so much order and so much force
were there [in the Samnites] then that it was impossible to overcome were it not assaulted by a
Roman virtue.” The strength of the Romans, who are able to defeat the once strong Samnites,
comes from the “free way of life then.” In modern times, the Romans are weak, which
Machiavelli blames on a “servile way of life” characteristic of modernity. Where the people are
free, riches can multiply from agriculture and the arts, and people seek to acquire goods as they
are secure in their properties once acquired. Here, Roman virtue is connected to military
strength, derived from a free way of life that bolstered the Roman state. Under a free way of life,
that city could foster economic gains that lead to “public and private advantages” and the
marvelous growth of that city.
The last example appears in the title of II.19; “That Acquisitions by Republics That Are
Not Well Ordered and That Do Not Proceed According to Roman Virtue Are for Their Ruin, Not
Their Exaltation.” The chapter suggests that although one ought to believe that all ancient orders
are true and useful, this is not how governments proceed. Republics and princes both err by
replacing ancient orders instead of maintaining ancient strength. Machiavelli lists the different
facets of Roman virtue as it regards the making of empire, and states that acquisitions made in
any other mode are the ruin of republics. If other cities are not going to follow the example of
Rome, they should forego expansion all together, and turn only to defending themselves
(II.19.1). As a city cannot sit at home quietly, refusing to attack others without itself being
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attacked, the city that wishes to do this must have entirely different customs than Rome, or any
imperial republic. The example used here is Germany, whose ability to live satisfied without
molesting others “arises from certain conditions in that country that are not elsewhere, without
which they could not keep to a like mode of life” (II.19.1). Here, Machiavelli provides his own
reference back to I.6, where the conclusion is that if Rome wanted to prevent the enmities
between the plebs and the Senate, they would have to forego imperial success.
In total, the references to Roman virtue suggest a prudence that allows for a strong
Roman empire. In the first example, the Romans used religion as a tool to create confidence in
her soldiers before battle. As the chapter juxtaposes Rome’s use of religion against the Samnite
use of religion, the emphasis is on the Samnites’ last minute failed attempt to use excessive
religious fear in battle. The second use is in reference to the military strength of Rome, fostered
by a free way of life, and the third and final use speaks to Rome’s prudence in expansion. Roman
virtue aids in the greatness of that city by fostering the military mores required to support the
goals of the empire. With a strong and prudent army, the Romans can make acquisitions abroad,
but also encourage greatness at home. For the Roman people, a strong military and a strong
empire are a sign of the “free way of life” there.
Machiavelli never clearly defines virtue for the reader, choosing instead to express the
concept through examples. By piecing together his praise of Roman virtue, a definition is
implied. Roman virtue is, first and foremost, a fundamentally amoral description of a particular
set of tools employed well by the ancient city. Instead of a singular definition of virtue that
applies in all situations, Roman virtue is necessarily fluid, as it must respond to varying times
and circumstances. Thus, Roman virtue consists of a combination of warmongering, discipline,
good orders and the virtú of the city’s leaders. Together, these tools provide the city with the
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varying nature needed to respond to any and all circumstances it might encounter. The
juxtaposition between the Samnites’ and the Romans’ use of religion speaks most directly to the
difference between having Roman virtue and being without it – the Samnites are incapable of
employing religion well-used and are thus unable to respond to the situation appropriately.12
Included in this understanding of virtue is the ability to suspend a moral judgment over an action,
in favor of a rational calculation of utility. Political decisions should not rest on whether the
action ought to be done, but must only consider the potential benefits and consequences. Should
the city choose a morally virtuous response to a situation, the city may well find itself ruined,
while a calculated response might seem vicious but “would succeed in security and the good” (P
XV).

Machiavellian virtú

Machiavellian virtú is virtue specific to the individual, not the city. Machiavellian virtú is
often recognized as being almost anti-virtue, or at least anti-morality.13 In a way, virtú is both of
these things. However, in the many examples Machiavelli uses to show the application of virtú,
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evidence suggests one cannot use such blanket statements. While Machiavelli does praise the
immoral actions of many historical figures as “virtuous,” he distinguishes between the examples
in important ways. Machiavelli rests his judgment regarding virtue on the aim, or goal, of the
individual. Some, such as Caesar, are virtuous in their ability to act prudently, and for adhering
to “cruelty well used” (I.27). However, Machiavelli vilifies Caesar for his political aim, which is
partisan good instead of the common benefit (I.10).15 Others are lauded for their virtú, when it is
used to promote the imperial goals of Rome prudently.
Machiavelli’s earliest and perhaps most prominent example of virtú is Romulus. Romulus
is the sole founder of Rome, and his single authority is a necessary part of founding a successful
city. This is true of all founders, as “it never or rarely happens that any republic or kingdom is
ordered well from the beginning or refounded . . . unless it is ordered by one individual” (I.9).
With single authority, Romulus can set the modes and orders of Rome, just as Moses, Lyrcurgus,
Solon, and other founders did (I.9.3). As is the case for all founders, one must take into
consideration the aims with which he founds the city in order to assign praise or blame. In this
example, Machiavelli states that the founder must be a “prudent orderer” who intends “to help
not himself but the common good” on behalf of the “common fatherland” (I.9.2). The founder is
probably the most robust example of Machiavellian virtú, but other deeds by Romulus point to
additional aspects of virtú. Romulus killed his brother Remus, and ordered the death of Titus
Tatius, whom he had chosen as a partner in the kingship. Machiavelli’s version of these events
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Major (2007); for a different perspective see de Grazia (1989) who sees Machiavelli as a teacher of the
good and of right conduct. See also Mansfield (2017) for a discussion of Machiavelli’s elevation of
necessity over morality.
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Kahn (2013) rightly points out in her discussion of Agathocles that Machiavelli distinguishes between
princes, not on moral terms, but between ones who succeed and achieve glory, compared to those who do
not.
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suggests that Romulus was prudent in his use of cruelty, as the effect of his cruelty was good for
the city (I.9.2). Romulus’ actions would be considered immoral by others, but Machiavelli
praises the prudence that leads him to commit a wicked deed to perpetuate the common benefit.16
After the example of Romulus, Machiavelli provides advice to the potential founder
throughout the Discourses. The prudent prince is necessary if one wishes to bring a corrupt city
back to its ancient virtue (I.18), but he must be careful about how he proceeds. To destroy a
religion or a fatherland is cause for blame (I.10.1). The prince must use his own arms, and not
rely on the arms of others (I.21). The prince should not put all the city’s fortune in danger, nor
should he risk fortune without using all his forces (I.22). He should reward and punish prudently,
with an eye towards the future of the fatherland (I.24). He should renew everything possible in
the city, but to retain a shadow of ancient orders will ingratiate the people to him (I.25; I.26). He
must know when to be altogether wicked, and when to be altogether good, and never be
ungrateful without being prepared to face the consequences (I.27; I.28). The examples continue –
but the message is the same. While the prince is one alone, and enjoys a significant amount of
authority, the one with the most virtú is the one who can prudently maintain the strength of the
fatherland, including the use of cruelty and wickedness when it serves that end. The advice given
seeks to help the prince not lose his authority through imprudent decisions, and Machiavelli is
quick to point out examples such as Savonarola, who lost reputation by not following his own
laws. Although powerful, the ideal prince should not do as he pleases without concern for any

Green (2011) provides a convincing argument that emphasizes Machiavelli’s emphasis on the
fundamental discontinuity between political ethics and ethics as such (pg. 186). He presents Machiavelli’s
position as that responsible political action requires the violation of moral norms, and depends on the
understanding that politics and ethics cannot be fully reconciled. See also Newell (1987) who emphasizes
that Machiavelli’s originality lies in his rejection of the “conventional Christian” meaning of virtue.
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other but himself. To emulate the true Roman founder, Romulus, the prince must concern
himself with the prudent limitations of his own power as it benefits the city.
Regardless of prudent limitations on his authority, the prince, or any individual with virtú
does maintain significant power, and such men are necessary to the city. The individual with
virtú might be able to return virtue to a city in which it is lacking (III.1.3). In the corrupt city, the
best order is to bring it under the control of one individual, as the prudence of one is more
authoritative than an elected body of many (III.9). Again, here authority is granted to the
individual to redirect orders towards the greatness of the fatherland, and an individual who seizes
such an opportunity to satisfy his own ambition at the expense of the city would be blamed.
Captains with virtú are necessary to a city that wishes to expand, to provide prudent command in
battle and the inculcation of military virtue in their solders (III.13).
For many reasons, Machiavelli places significant weight on the need for a single
ambitious individual to refound the orders of the city. For one, the individual can make expedient
decisions without needing to consult with others. This is indispensable, as Machiavelli
emphasizes the need for the prince, or the city, to respond to all possible circumstances in an
expedient manner. Only by responding appropriately to any and all situations can the prince’s
virtue overcome the “malignity” of fortune – and as most men are unable to use cruelty well and
often fall to half measures, it can only be done by one alone. Further, as the man of virtú is of
great spirit, his ambition will help propel the city to greatness. The ambitious prince is the best
option for achieving the acquisition required for imperial greatness. His own self-interest is best
served by the well-ordered city that can both make acquisitions and maintain them – and such a
founding requires the individual with virtú. Ambitious goals are best achieved through the solid
founding of the city. It is generally not the case that the ambitious individual can meet his own
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goals at the expense of the city. Instead, the solid founding of the city that enables it to seek
greatness and empire is most beneficial to the ambitious individual. Only with a materially and
politically successful city can the individual achieve his own goals of material or political
success.
Modern Rome fails the man of virtú by not recognizing the good he can do for the city.
As was seen in the earlier years of the Roman republic, weak princes insecure in their power
reward virtuous individuals with offense (I.29-30). Avarice and suspicion prevents the prince
from prudently using these individuals, instead choosing to limit their effectiveness by
decreasing their reputation. Captains who have brought victory, and with it lands and status to
Rome, are forgotten or silenced by their princes. Although Machiavelli does admit that one
might consider this treatment of strong captains to secure his own position (I.29), the last book of
the Discourses suggests that this practice has aided in the downfall of Rome (III.16). Governed
by weak princes, Rome is not able to identify individuals who can help generate political
success. Even when Rome shifts away from the strength of one founding prince and towards the
political maintenance of the many, she still has difficulty with how to accommodate virtú.
Machiavelli seems to find it reasonable that rulers would be suspicious of virtú, and it seems that
one must compare the risk of rewarding virtú to the risk of offending it. In the example of the
Roman rulers who offended virtú, they are unwilling to risk the rise of a strong individual who
might take over the reins to the city. Later, modern Rome is similarly unable to utilize virtú,
albeit for a different reason. The people who are powerful enough to empower a virtuous
individual, or similarly to destroy him, are unwilling to reward virtú if it does not come with the
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promise of partisan benefit. Camillus provides an example of a virtuous individual, exiled for
refusing to forsake the good of the city (III.23).17
Ancient virtue, Roman virtue and virtú are all united, to an extent, under the common
good as it pertains to a free way of life and empire.18 Ancient virtue, at least in its usage in the
Discourses, speaks to the orders created by the founders of Rome. Bound strictly to the rule of
law, ancient Rome could conquer her neighbors and achieve imperial success. Similarly, Roman
virtue seems to be a uniquely Roman version of its ancient counterpart. As Rome establishes
herself as a power, it is her virtue that allows for prudent political decisions – regarding religion,
orders and the military. Lastly, individual virtú does not have to be connected to legal boundaries
– in fact, to have virtú, one must be willing to break the law and employ cruelty well used.
However, Machiavelli separates the virtuous individual who acts for the common good (as it
relates to empire) from the one who acts out of partisan ambition, inherently detrimental to the
city. Each of these forms of virtue speak to the ability of Rome to generate a reverence for the
law, and the fatherland, that allows the city to come to “greatness.”

Machiavelli refers to Livy’s account of Camillus, who is exiled by the people when he applies the
goods of the Veientes to the public instead of dividing it as booty; has his triumphal chariot pulled by four
white horses and thus compares himself with the sun; and vows to give ten percent of the Veiente booty
to Apollo but must take it out of the hands of soldiers to do so (III.23). Although Camillus is imprudent in
losing the favor of the people, he is otherwise presented as a virtuous commander, recalled when Rome is
in trouble (III.1.2).
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Orwin (1978) rightly asserts that for Machiavelli virtue is a means to prosperity and security (page
1227).
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Religion

Religion is a necessary component of Machiavelli’s thought, but to determine its place in
Machiavellian Rome is complicated. To attempt to understand Machiavelli’s teaching on religion
in its entirety would be its own project, although the connection between greatness and religion
is useful here. Rome requires the “observance of the divine cult” which is necessary for greatness
in republics (I.11.4). The conclusion of this chapter insinuates that republics that are after
greatness must have some sort of foundation in religion. What Machiavelli does not provide is
the “why” – why do republics require religion to achieve greatness?19 Further, what kind of
religion is Machiavelli talking about? In this chapter, the implication is that republican
institutions that depend on the people must be coupled with a social structure that would limit the
behavior of the multitude. Religion inculcates a fear of god into the people. Such a fear is
imperative to the building of republics, if the goal is to order the city for longer than one
generation. In either a republic or a kingdom, the founder can only preserve the greatness of that
city as long as he lives; to institute religion is to perpetuate the republic or kingdom after the
death of its founder (I.11.5).
This chapter (I.11) begins a series of chapters on the topic of religion. In I.9. Machiavelli
comments that some may be surprised that he has not yet talked about orders that concern
religion or the military, and he will not hold those readers in suspense any longer. Instead of
following this statement with an in depth understanding of either religion or the military,
Machiavelli dives into a defense of Romulus’ actions in killing his brother and Titus Tatius the

Machiavelli provides a possible answer in I.44, partially entitled “A Multitude Without a Head is
Useless.” It could be concluded that the “head” of the “useful” multitude is religion.
19
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Sabine. In the next section, Machiavelli draws two conclusions: that the city is rarely ordered
well at its beginning, and that although Romulus’ deed accuses him, the effect of that deed
excuses him (I.9.2). The gist of this paragraph speaks not to religion specifically, but to the
common utility and to the institution of good orders in the city. Religion takes a backseat to
proper orders and the virtuous individual, who must act in accordance with the good of the city,
even when that means committing wicked deeds.20 In an attempt to reconcile Machiavelli’s
reference to religion, and then the absence of a full analysis of religion in Rome, there are two
possibilities. One is that Machiavelli is simply mentioning religion with the intent to return to it
later, starting in I.11. The second, and more plausible one, is that Machiavelli is connecting
religion in ancient Rome to the common good, or as he perceives it, political success and empire.
Similar to how Romulus uses wickedness as a tool for the advancement of the goals of the city,
religion is a political tool that is used to further perfect the orders of Rome, allowing her to seek
greatness in imperial successes. Moses is mentioned here, not as a prophet, but as a founder who
acted alone for the law and the political success of the fatherland.
The praise for religion that follows in these connected chapters continues to deal with the
necessity of religion for Rome’s greatness. Those who deserve the highest praise are those who
order religion (I.10), and to connect this with the Moses example that comes in the next chapter,
these orderers of religion serve the city and the political good rather than the doctrinal good. In
ordering religion, such founders provide the route to a long-lived republic, by establishing
foundations that might last through multiple generations (I.11.5). Machiavelli’s praise of these
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Tarcov (2013) discusses the connection between religious beliefs and political success and failure in
Machiavelli’s works. Further, he argues that Machiavelli’s own beliefs presented in his works contrast the
beliefs and opinions common at the time.
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“religious” men has much less to do with their piety and more to do with their political ambition
and shrewd use of religion to achieve their goals.
I.11 is also the first appearance of Numa, who succeeds Romulus to the throne and
“reduces it [Rome] to civil disobedience” through the institution of religion in that city. Through
the introduction of the fear of God, Numa reorients the people of Rome, and eventually they are
more afraid to break an oath then they are to break the law. Once ordered there by Numa,
religion in Rome is used to command armies, to animate plebs, to keep men good, and to bring
shame to the wicked. All of these things speak to a civil way of life, not to a doctrinal following
of religion.21 As a political tool, religion is necessary. More than providing these listed mores,
the introduction of religion is useful to the orderer of laws, who finds his authority more
respected with religious backing (I.11.3). Thus, to maintain good orders, the city must also
maintain religion, as it provides an additional authority to the city, and keeps its citizens good
(I.12, see also I.55). Religion, then, serves to reorder Rome (I.13) and to strengthen the
confidence and severity of the military through the auspices (I.14; I.15).
These references to religion point to its specific role in Rome’s quest for greatness. For
Machiavelli, the best use of religion is as a means to political success. The proper use of religion
provides an implicit fear of death, but also a foundation for hope, that can be manipulated into
action that furthers the goal of empire. In the example of Romulus, religion is used to excuse a
wicked deed that advanced the ambition of the city. Wickedness is itself a necessary aspect of
greatness – and religion becomes useful as it helps to persuade the people that wicked actions are
necessary. The use of religion in this sense is twofold, both as to help the people evaluate the

While Strauss and Mansfield have presented Machiavelli’s work as critical of Christianity, Viroli
(2010) argues that Machaivelli is not anti-Christian but actually viewed early Christianity as compatible
with republican political liberty.
21

73
actions being committed by others, but also to influence the actions of individuals, particularly
soldiers, in service of Rome.

Modernity, democracy and the demise of greatness

Rome’s downfall comes when each of these three social supports (the law, virtue and
religion) are modified significantly by the shift of power out of the hands of elites and into the
hands of the people. As Rome gains strength abroad, the people at home become content with
their place in the world, and Roman virtue erodes. Knowing that Rome is one of the strongest
international powers, the city begins to lose its grip on what made it the premier imperial
republic. The people, unsatisfied with their place in life, turn to partisan leaders instead of
virtuous men, as leaders of the city. Without the domestic strength that comes from good orders,
virtue and the proper religion, Rome is unable to overcome these changes, and instead the
common benefit succumbs to partisan rule and leaves the city divided.
Machiavelli’s project is multifaceted, but much of his work can be understood as a
redefinition of traditional political ideas, culminating in a new approach to politics. Prior to
Machiavelli, particularly in the thought of ancients such as Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero, the
common good is held to be a higher end than the individual good. Although each thinker
presents a different teaching and nuances exist throughout, they are united in their idea of a
transcendent common good. For Plato and Aristotle, the common good is bound up in human
flourishing and fulfillment, as well as the ultimate goal of the contemplative life. As they
emphasize both the political and the philosophic aspects of life, much of their thought is
concerned with how these aspects of the city might coexist. Cicero can be understood as
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weighing in to this argument, although from the unique position of a politician instead of a
philosopher, and thus comes to somewhat different conclusions. In all, these ancient thinkers
understand the common good to be more important than the individual good, and thus advance a
model of citizenship that prepares individuals to forego their own pleasures for the good of the
city.
While Machiavelli’s idea of common good does not carry a moral connotation, or a
desire to achieve what a city “ought” to be, it nonetheless remains important. The common good
for Machiavelli is the equivalent of the common benefit – it provides the best conditions to all in
Rome.22 Not motivated by democracy, justice, or even the self-fulfillment of the ancients,
Machiavelli sees a strong imperial Rome to be the common good for all who live within it.23
Instead of an exalted common good predicated on good government or other idealistic principles,
Machiavelli’s common good is whatever conditions are conducive to a free way of life, and thus,
Rome’s political success. Instead of attempting to overcome the selfishness of human nature to
perpetuate the common good, Machiavelli redefines the common good to be entirely compatible
with self-interested human nature. Ultimately, the free way of life cannot be achieved without the
involvement of all “humors” in Rome.
That said, the perfection of ancient Rome that allows it to become great includes a
precarious balancing of republican institutions – a strong executive power in the consuls, a

See McCoy (1943) for a discussion of Machiavelli’s common good and morality. As McCoy notes,
morality is sacrificed for the common good, instead of the other way around (page 636).
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Machiavelli does argue that in republics, those who are well served by the common good are able to
“crush” others who are harmed by the common good. Here, he seems to be providing a majority rule
argument. Immediately after, Machiavelli discusses the Prince, arguing that the self-interest of the prince
is often offensive to the city. I interpret this passage to suggest the “few” that are crushed are not the
power-minority (the plebs) but the numerical minority (factitious elites) (II.2.1).
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Senate, and eventually the plebian tribunes. Over time, the tribunes come to realize the power
they hold, and that they can utilize that power to make political changes – one example of the
power wielded by the plebs is in I.4, where their refusal to go to war enacted a policy change in
their favor. The problem with this shift of power into the hands of the people is twofold: the
people are fickle, and unable to make the best decisions for Rome, but are also inspired not by
greatness, but by their own partisan gain. The nobles, on the other hand, are better able to rule, as
they can perceive the connection between the economic good of the city, and their own economic
standing within it. This corruption in the people leads Rome away from the institutions and
mores that provided for its true greatness. The emphasis shifts away from the rule of law as the
ultimate authority to the arbitrary rule of men, and Rome fails when rule shifts away from a
shackled prince or an equally shackled people (I.58).
Virtue loses its place in Rome as the people pursue their self-interest. Choosing men who
can secure favors for their supporters, the truly virtuous men who might help Rome succeed are
forgotten. In their stead are men who defraud citizens, who deceive the city, and are otherwise
uninterested in supporting the common good of Rome. These individuals, once in power, are
threatened by truly virtuous men, and must change the way citizens perceive virtue to protect
their own authority. By Machiavelli’s time, modern Rome is so far removed from its virtuous
founders and the virtuous captains that came after them, that he argues in favor of refounding the
city, or drawing it back to its beginnings to instill the observance of justice, religion, goodness
and virtue (III.1).
The most drastic shift away from the ancient mores comes from modern religion.
Machiavelli begins the second book with a preface, in which he states that in present Italy, there
is no observance of religion, the law, or military (II Pref 2). Soon after, he says that the
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difference in education of individuals comes from the difference between modern and ancient
religion, as the present religion makes people esteem honor less.
“The ancient religion did not beatify men if they were not full of worldly glory, as were
captains of armies and princes of republics. Our religion has glorified humble and
contemplative more than active men. It has then placed the highest good in humility,
abjectness, and contempt of things human; the other placed it in greatness of spirit,
strength of body, and all other things capable of making men very strong. And if our
religion asks that you have strength in yourself, it wishes you to be capable more of
suffering than of doing something strong. This mode of life thus seems to have rendered
the world weak and given it in prey to criminal men.” (II.2)
The praise of ancient religion is again political – it worships the temporal world, not the heavens,
by revering greatness of spirit, strength of body, and other things that make a person strong –
ancient religion reinforces Roman virtue and with it Roman greatness.
Modern religion does the contrary, as it reveres humility, as well as the contemplative life
over the active one. As such, priests and philosophers become the “most virtuous” men in the
city, instead of those with real virtú. The world under this modern religion is effeminate, as the
virtues it espouses are the opposite of the masculine characteristics necessary to virtú and to
ruling. Heaven is “disarmed” by the cowardice of men, who view religion as teaching idleness
instead of interpreting it as the ancient Romans did. The present religion should be interpreted as
exalting the fatherland, supporting the law and virtue of Rome, and preparing the people to
defend it. Instead, the present religion teaches weakness while diminishing the place of freedom,
which necessitates the demise of a republic.
Thus, the changes to the religious foundations of Rome are so significant that they no
longer uphold the greatness Rome was once known for. Machiavelli implies that the present day
religion is more extreme than the ancient version, but the most salient charge against modern
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religion is its aim. Ancient religion was a means to inculcate what was good for the city – the
24

individual aimed at virtú, and the city aimed at imperial greatness. Thus, religion was used to
support the military and bring confidence to the soldiers and captains, and to give a religious
foundation to Roman greatness. As an example of this, the auspices are used to say that the gods
look favorably down at Rome. Modern day religion focuses not on such things, but on the
afterlife, and honors religious authorities instead of political ones. In so doing, the present
religion relegates the good of Rome to second place, as the first place is reserved to worship of
otherworldly things.

Conclusion

For Machiavelli, Roman greatness is defined by the city’s imperial success. With
greatness so connected to empire, the city must determine what has caused their imperial
strength, and then work to maintain it. In the Discourses, Machiavelli speaks to various causes of
Roman greatness, and points to their demise in the modern age. If Machiavelli is correct, and the
common good of Rome is directly tied to its economic successes, then it is imperative that the
city maintains reverence for the common good as such. To do this, Machiavelli suggests that
present day Rome look back to the ancient model, and imitate it where possible. Ancient Rome

One way in which Christianity is “extreme” is in its use of religious authority to lend credibility to
extraordinary laws. Machiavelli says in I.11 that an orderer of extraordinary laws must have recourse to
religion, and later uses the example of religion used by the Samnites at battle with Rome as an “extreme”
remedy for the things afflicting them. Although religion is itself extreme, he finds that Christianity is
more extreme than the ancient version. Religion operates by making it easier to institute new laws – while
the ancient city used religion to uphold the political goals of the fatherland, the modern religion overturns
past orders in favor of an altered relationship between politics and religion. See Benner (2009), chapter
10.
24
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was well ordered, with devotion to the law, virtue and a politically useful religion. Modern Rome
has forsaken each of these things as the city has turned towards popular control, and the
consequence is the demise of Roman greatness.
Although Machiavelli does not advocate for public civic education, his dedication to
these social supports of greatness suggests an interesting alternative.25 Instead of attempting to
inculcate virtue into the people of Rome, Machiavelli seeks to inspire veneration for the
institutions of Rome. When such veneration is successful, the people of Rome have a healthy
sense of shame that keeps them good but also serves to keep only the best men in politics. A
dozen references to shame throughout the Discourses point to the sentiment being a useful tool
in the keeping of the republic. Religion serves to bring shame to the wicked (I.11), but also keeps
the plebeians in check when they compare themselves to those with virtú (I.48; III.1.3). When
paired with veneration for institutions, shame aids in keeping the republic free of the corruption
that begins when the common good is forgotten.
Greatness as such is not tied directly to any particular regime, but to the goal of empire
and the institutions that support it as a common goal under which to unite the city. In the case of
Rome, the common good translates into imperial success, which places Rome at the forefront of
economic and political powers. As the ancient city morphs into the modern one, Rome loses the
common goal and the domestic institutions that helped her achieve success. The Italy that
Machiavelli lives to see is one without empire and lacking any sort of unity.
Without religion, law, or virtue, Rome finds herself disunited by various factions who
seek partisan gain. Rome suffers under this disunion, as a city in shambles is not a force to be
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reckoned with on the international stage. As each section of the population chooses to seek a
leader capable of pursuing its own needs instead of the needs of Rome as a whole, the situation
only worsens under leaders such as Caesar, Marc Antony or Octavian. Unable to dampen the
domestic turmoil, Rome is unable to maintain her earlier acquisitions, and must instead turn
inward in attempt to repair the root of the problem. Greatness understood as empire requires
acquisition, but specifically, acquisition that can be maintained. As such, the fate of Rome, and
with it the demise of the greatness she was once known for, is sealed as her population loses
touch with the social institutions required to maintain imperial success.

CHAPTER 3: MODERN ROMAN CORRUPTION

One need not read far into Machiavelli’s Discourses to encounter “corruption.”1 The first
book in particular is laced with references to corruption, including (but not limited to) corruption
in both Rome’s orders and its people. Although the use of the word sometimes changes,
Machiavelli is clear in his overall meaning: orders that had once worked “perfectly” in Rome
eventually change for the worse, resulting in the fall of Rome. A closer look reveals a warning.
Not only does Machiavelli argue the city is corrupted over time, but also that all cities that place
political power in the hands of the multitude must recognize the inevitability of corruption.
Faced with the question of how to proceed, one must accept that human nature is inherently
corrupt, and thus must order political institutions appropriately. Rome failed in this regard by not
adapting her institutions to solve their incompatibility with human nature. Without truly
understanding corruption and its inherent place in the nature of her people, Rome founded on an
understanding of civic virtue that its people could not uphold.
Throughout the Discourses, Machiavelli speaks to Rome’s ancient orders and virtue. In
many ways, he is praising ancient Rome, particularly for its recognition that the best modes and
orders would incorporate the rule of one, the few and the many. Further, Machiavelli speaks
highly of certain Roman individuals and the historians who have kept their stories alive. While
Machiavelli does praise ancient times, his praise is not unstinting. Starting with the later years of
the ancient regime, Machiavelli finds the people of Rome unsuited to ancient modes and orders.2

1

The first use of “corrupt” is in I.1.5.
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Admittedly, it may be possible to argue that Machiavelli’s repeated praise of ancient Rome may
point to his desire to return Rome to the ancient republican model. I argue that this is not the
case; that Machiavelli’s advice to modern Rome is to remake itself with new modes and orders
that best accounts for the inevitability of corruption. Machiavelli’s frequent praise of the ancients
calls the reader’s attention to the differences between the modern Roman people and those who
founded the city, instead of advocating the return to ancient orders.3 Corruption is inescapable,
particularly in a regime that invests any of its political power in its people. Even so, it is
important to understand the foundations of that corruption in order to best temporize it through
institutions.
While one cannot hope to overcome corruption, one might be able to transform it, to
create political orders that alleviate some of the evils it may cause. Machiavelli argues that the
catalyst of Roman corruption, or the corruption of any city as he understands it, is the existence
of excessive inequality.4 As different classes exist within the city, insatiable human nature causes
individuals and groups to pursue their own material gain instead of a common greatness. Thus a
city ordered such as Rome, with mixed institutions, will inevitably find itself corrupt as
individuals within it attempt to gain material well-being. To do this, individuals (or groups)
resort to partisan friends, to strong and ambitious leaders who can subjugate the opposing group.
In Rome’s case, when the “perfection” of orders and tumults that upheld the free way of life
turned into an imbalance of the humors, inequality became particularly problematic. In this new
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See chapter 2 of this dissertation.
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See Lukes (2009); Mansfield (1998). Lukes argues that Machiavelli is more interested in the reverence
that comes out of ancient Rome than he is in any particular ancient Roman institution.
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political environment characterized by instability, inequality became excessive and individuals
turned to partisan leaders to further acquire – and to further oppress.
While Machiavelli finds corruption to be an inherent fact of human nature, ancient Rome
proved itself deft at controlling that corruption. Originally ordered as a kingship, ancient Rome
modified her orders over time to include the multitude and leveraged herself to imperial
greatness. To suppress corruption, the city focused on social institutions that could aid the city by
connecting the people to the common good. The ancient city used prudent orders that included
institutions and the military to inculcate Roman reverence for law and order; Roman virtue and
Machiavellian virtú to hold the people accountable to the city’s leaders; and well-ordered
religion as a tool to underscore the importance of Rome’s political aims.5 Through reverence to
each of these social institutions, Rome was united under one goal of greatness.6 Once put in
place, these three factors worked together to overcome the corruption inherent in the nature of
men, particularly the multitude. When left to their own devices, men are unable to see the
general good if it is not the same as the particular good. These institutions allowed the multitude
to connect their own good to the good of the city, which is closely aligned to empire.7
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1982, 213).
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Human “corruption” in its various forms is a significant theme in the Discourses. Often,
the word is used as a description, simply to point out the decay of Rome over time as accidents
and events weaken the city (for examples, see I.2.2; I.6.2; I.10; I.11.3; I.47.1). However, more
salient to this project is the use of corruption to understand the multitude and its role in political
institutions. The analysis in the first chapter of this project shows that Machiavelli praises the
empowerment of the people as members of the political way of life in Rome, while the second
chapter argues social institutions that enabled ancient Roman greatness also maintained the
goodness of the people. Over time these institutions are fundamentally changed or replaced, and
the negative aspects of human nature are able to thrive. This chapter will speak to human nature
and the corruption of the multitude. While Machiavelli remains unequivocal in his support for
(some) popular institutions, he provides a significant caveat to that recommendation: the people
are by nature corrupt, and the regime must apply that knowledge to its institutions.

The Nature of Corruption

While the cause of corruption is explicitly outlined in the Discourses, one must look a
little further to determine the nature of corruption. In its earliest appearances in Book I,
corruption is used as an adjective, describing orders that have degenerated over time.
Machiavelli remarks that Romulus, Numa and others formed the empire in such a way as to
prevent it from corrupting quickly (I.1.5). Later, he argues that Sparta also remained uncorrupt
for a long time, as it observed its orders for “more than 800 years without corrupting them or
without any dangerous tumult” (I.2.1). He further argues for Rome’s mixture of the three
regimes, claiming that no orders could prevent corruption in a city that only chooses one regime
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(I.2.2). Many more examples can be found in the opening chapters, but suffice it to say that the
earliest mentions of corruption speak to a general decline of the city or its orders. In these
examples, the word is used more to describe that decline and how it can be avoided, without
really getting at the heart of corruption itself.
The most robust teaching on corruption comes in Machiavelli’s discussions of the people,
and the decline of the effectiveness of their political role over time. Mansfield points to I.16-I.18
as the section that speaks most directly to corruption.8 In this group of chapters, the corruption of
the people is first referenced, but Machiavelli’s treatment of corruption becomes more thorough
in later chapters of Book I. In these chapters, Machiavelli questions whether a corrupt city can
ever become free again, or if freedom can be introduced into a city that is not accustomed to
living freely. Here, we see the first juxtaposition between the Tarquins and Caesar, where the
multitude is not corrupt in the time of the former, but already corrupt in the time of the latter
(I.16.1). Machiavelli uses this juxtaposition to uphold the claim he makes in the chapter title, that
a people living under a prince can maintain itself free only with great difficulty. While the main
purpose of the comparison between the Tarquins and Caesar is to suggest the people gained their
freedom by expelling the Tarquins, only to lose it by empowering Caesar, it also suggests that
while the Roman republic is founded freely, it becomes corrupt at some point prior to the
emergence of Caesar. Later on, Machiavelli states that once the rule of Caesar has been
established in Rome, there is no freedom left in that city – not under Caesar, and not even after
he’s put to death. At this point in the text, it appears that a people used to living under a prince is
unable to provide for itself, and returns to servitude. The emergence of Caesar comes about when
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the corrupt multitude cannot provide for itself, either through the creation of government
responsive to the needs of the multitude or the pursuit of material gain. In both cases, the
multitude is without the experience necessary to provide for itself without a prince, thus it is a
“brute animal” that becomes prey to the first predator who comes upon it. While the message
here seems to build Caesar up as a predator who preys on an unwilling people, it must be
understood that it is also the nature of the corrupted multitude to seek out a Caesar. Thus,
although Caesar cannot be praised for his actions, the multitude is not blameless in his coming to
power, as they actively seek to satisfy their desire for partisan gain.
The final chapter of this section gives the first glimpse at what corruption truly is. Thus
far, the chapters in this section call into question the ability of a city to return to its non-corrupt
beginnings after it has declined. While certainly important, this emphasis on reordering the city
to its non-corrupt roots is hard to comprehend without the analysis that follows it. Finally,
Machiavelli points to the true issue at hand when he doubts the citizen’s capacity to propose
laws. While this order had once kept Rome free, later generations find it problematic because the
character of laws proposed change (I.18.3). At first, this order allows citizens customarily left
outside of the governing process to propose laws that might shed light on matters the nobles
could not understand from their place atop the social hierarchy. In this way, those laws proposed
benefit the common good by helping “perfect” the orders of the city, by adding laws that may
have been overlooked by past generations. However, later examples of laws proposed are not
laws that protect and increase freedom, but instead seek to provide partisan benefits to
individuals or smaller factions throughout the city (I.18.3). As Machiavelli puts it, “this was a
good order when the citizens were good . . . but when the citizens have become bad, such an
order becomes for the worst.” The order originally institutes equity through new laws to address
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issues faced by the plebs, but Italy of Machiavelli’s time is without the supports to maintain
human nature uncorrupt. As such, the order becomes a means of powerful men and corrupted
individuals to introduce laws to their own benefit.
Although Machiavelli’s discussion of partisan benefit is generally clear in its main points
(that it is private gain instead of public, and not beneficial to the city) he does not specify the
sorts of partisanship of which he is accusing Rome, until late in the Discourses. In III.28, we
finally get a list of partisan benefits: “doing benefit to this and to that other private official – by
lending him money, marrying his daughters for him, defending him from the magistrates, and
doing for him similar private favors that make men partisans to oneself and give spirit to
whoever is so favored to be able to corrupt the public and to breach the laws.” This list comes
after the general statement on public benefits, which is much less specific: “the public modes are
when one individual by counseling well, by working better in the common benefit, acquires
reputation” (III.28). Consequently, any action that serves the fatherland instead of the individual
is a public mode; there is no discussion here about whether that action must be just, virtuous or
moral. Corruption is not a lack of these characteristics, but instead doing benefit to private men
to provide financial or political gain at the expense of the common good.9
Thus, corruption in the people is marked by a transition away from deeds done for the
good of the city to deeds done for the good of the individual or faction.10 In the early years, the
Roman plebs used their political power to expand freedom within the city, including but not
limited to the institution of the tribunate. Later on, once the plebs had achieved political power,
the efforts of the plebeians became negative and self-serving. As the city became stronger, the
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people’s motivation to support the common good begins to wane, as they perceive the city to
have acquired much of its goals. While the empire was still establishing itself, the immediate
focus was to create orders that strengthened Rome, and thus strengthened its claim on
neighboring territories. The emphasis of the growing city is the common good, and in
Machiavelli’s Rome the common good is found in empire, political and financial success.11
Empire, or the drive to empower Rome as an international authority, serves to unite the city
under one goal. Once established, the empire is harmed by the insatiability of human nature,
which wreaks havoc at home as it motivates individuals to continually seek more, even when
such acquisition generates domestic unrest. Domestic instability is problematic not only for the
internal orders of the city, but also as it weakens Roman reputation abroad.
Machiavelli divorces himself from the republican tradition by arguing that part of Rome’s
downfall is the nature of her people, which tends towards corruption. While the republican
tradition attempts to mitigate human nature through inculcation of virtue and civic education,
Machiavelli dismisses these options as ineffective. Modern Roman weakness proves that the
republican solution of inculcating civic virtue in the people will not be a successful enterprise.
Regardless of the orders created by any city whatsoever, the city that founds on the people in part
or as a whole will find itself dealing with popular corruption. Even the Romans, who were
perfected in creating the tribunes, must recognize that with popular power comes corruption as a
means to satisfy one’s insatiable desire for more – whether it be more power or property. The
tribunes of the plebs, while they created a balance in Rome, are depicted as being “always
accustomed to favor what appeared would come to the benefit of the people” at the sacrifice of
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what is good for Rome (III.8.1). The tribunate is further described as “insolent” against the
nobility, so blinded by its own partisan good that it is unable to recognize the good of the city.
Worse yet, the people are unable to identify the way in which the good of the city can be tied to
their own personal good. Unlike the nobles, the multitude does not understand its own economic
well-being as a function of that of the city’s, such that most individuals are unable to connect
their own place in the world as a product of Roman greatness.

Human nature

What Machiavelli calls the corruption of the multitude is really human nature, not a
change or transformation; it appears in every city that attempts to balance two competing,
unequal classes or humors. Nature has created men that desire everything, but are unable to
satisfy those desires with constant acquisition (I.37; II Pref 3).12 Human nature is insatiable, as
“since from nature they have the ability and the wish to desire all things and from fortune the
ability to achieve few of them” (II Pref 3). For this reason, humans remain discontent, as they are
constantly driven by a desire for what they do not already own and disgust for the things they do.
As people continue along in this vein, they find themselves unable to vary with the times, as
people will not vary from the one mode that previously brought prosperity (III.9.3). Thus, the
desire to acquire all things as put forward by Machiavelli reinforces failure through the fear of
people to change their mode when it has worked in the past. As the virtuous individual and city
must be flexible with the times in order to succeed, this aspect of human nature does not bode
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well for the city. The most successful empire will seek to alter its ways as is necessary to
preserve its acquisitive nature. If it is the nature of humans to be inflexible, the city is likely to
suffer as it is unable to respond to any changes in domestic or foreign politics that might hinder
its imperial goals. Although Machiavelli says that people remain the same in all cities and in all
times (III.43), their natures are somewhat malleable. Using the example of the French, who
prove themselves effeminate in combat, Machiavelli finds they can be ordered to remain
ferocious in battle (III.36). Hence, the natures of men will always underlie their actions and
relationships with one another, but can be shackled by the proper orders. When those orders fail,
however, men are easily corrupted away from good order to seek utility from the circumstances
(I.42).
Important to note is the inherent difference between a corrupt nature and an “evil” one.
While some argue that Machiavelli is a teacher of evil, this is short-sighted, and also not a true
depiction of his understanding of human nature. Men are corrupt in their relationships with one
another, as men are motivated by their own self-interest.13 Thus, a well-ordered government
mitigates the selfishness of human nature in the relationships amongst individuals by creating a
common goal. During the height of Roman success, this goal was imperial and political
greatness. In modernity, however, corruption is not held at bay. Individuals are not evil, but
simply unable to see past their own good to understand the good of others, or even how their
own good is compatible with that of others and the city itself. As such, corruption becomes most
problematic when it leads to partisanship, or the extension of private benefits in exchange for
political power or policy making. While Machiavelli’s understanding of human nature is a
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negative one, he does not go so far as to say that humans are inherently evil, but simply
motivated by their own material good.
While the ancient city could temporize the nature of the plebeians for a time, the city
could not change the fundamental nature of her people (I.39). As a group, the plebs are unable to
see more than just the “face” of any given action; they are unable to connect such action to the
good of the city, and thus the overall good of its people. Instead, the “face” makes the strongest
impression, as it appears to provide – or withhold – immediate partisan benefit. Inexperienced in
providing for itself, the multitude is deceived in generalities. Only in “particular things
concerning distributions of ranks and dignities” does the multitude not deceive itself (I.47.3).
Given that the judgment of people is connected not to the good of the city, but to their own
appetites, the motivation of the people is attached to particulars and blind to generalities (II Pref
3). Driven by aspirations for power and property, the people seek immediate satisfaction of these
desires, foremost to prevent their seizure by the nobility.
As Machiavelli sometimes separates the nature of the nobles from the nature of the plebs,
and at other times does not differentiate between the humors, some further analysis is needed to
determine what characteristics are found in all human nature and which are dependent on class.
The nobles engage in class conflict just as the plebs do (I.3; I.5) although the nobles are not
associated with the inconstancy that characterizes the prince and the multitude. As a group, the
nobles are most concerned with property, both maintaining what they have, and acquiring more.
Although the nobles are motivated to acquire as a means of maintaining their possessions and
power, the nobles enjoy an advantage that the plebs do not, which inherently alters their
approach. The nobles are not forced to fight for equality, but are able to defend their possessions
from their position at the top of the hierarchy. Further, it appears the nobility is better able to
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connect their self-interest to the well-being of Rome. As property holders, the nobles must
recognize that without Roman success, their own success is temporary. Consequently, the nobles
are shackled by their own status as the Roman nobility – if Rome should fall, so too would the
reputation of the nobles. In stark contrast stand the plebs, who perceive their lack of power and
property as associated with the status quo in Rome. Rather than recognize that the good of the
city encompasses the good of all individuals within it, the plebs see the city’s political goals as
benefitting only the upper class. In response to this, the plebs’ desire to take property and power
away from the nobles leads to political recklessness that is detrimental to the city.
Given the inherent nature of humans to be unsatisfied with their share of possessions, the
existence of two strong humors in Rome becomes the catalyst of corruption. The differentiation
between the plebs and the nobles leads the former to be unsatisfied when they perceive their lot
in life has been decided unfairly. The nobles are similarly unsatisfied, and refute any attempt of
the plebeians to recover power or property at the expense of their own belongings. Further, the
separation of classes based not only on belongings but also on reputation suggests to the nobles
their right to maintain their possessions against the agitated plebs. Once the plebeians are no
longer kept satisfied by the social institutions mentioned earlier, the resulting class conflict leads
the plebeians into the hands of a partisan individual who might help to achieve equality.

The Cause of Corruption

Once understood, the cause of corruption points to the inevitability of corruption in a
republic. As corruption finds its beginnings in the inequality of the city, it is impossible for any
city to exist without some form of it. Early on, Machiavelli speaks to the two humors, that of the
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plebs and the patricians in Rome. In that city particularly, but in most cities, these two humors
exist – the “haves” and the “have-nots.” Corruption rises “from an inequality that is in that city,”
extinguishable only through the rise of one who “wishes to make it equal” through extraordinary
means “which few know how or wish to use” (I.17.3). Inequality is the root of corruption, and its
only antidote is to establish equality throughout out the city. While equality is presented here as a
potential solution, Machiavelli never makes the argument that establishing widespread equality
in the city is the best choice. Instead, he states only that a city might be able to establish equality
through the power of a strong individual. To succeed, that individual would have to alter the
culture of Rome to accept egalitarianism, which is itself not an easy feat. While Machiavelli does
not suggest that it is impossible to eliminate corruption through establishing equality, he does
speak to the difficulty a city would have in attempting such an undertaking.
Inequality of belongings is only half of the equation; the other half is inequality of rank.
The discussion of equality of belongings in chapter I.17 directs the reader to I.55, where the title
suggests a kingdom cannot be ordered in a city predicated on equality. Here, the example of
Germany is used as a foil to Rome. Roman citizens, when asked to pay a tax to Apollo on their
own recognizance, reacted against the Senate with indignation (I.55.1). In a similar situation, the
German population followed similar orders to raise money for public spending. Unlike the
Romans, the Germans upheld the order, and in so doing show “how much goodness and how
much religion are yet in these men” (I.55.2). The lack of corruption in Germany allows the
people to act of their own volition, and the choices made are attuned with the common good.
This comes about not through “religion” as such, but through equality of rank – “they maintain
among themselves an even equality, and to the lords and gentlemen who are in that province they
are very hostile” (I.55.3). Inequality of rank does not exist for the Germans, as gentlemen and
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lords are not allowed to emerge. In the absence of this particular inequality, Germans are able to
live uncorrupted for a long time, and thus Machiavelli finds “goodness” in these men. The
Germans are hostile to gentlemen or lords as a means to protect their regime against the
influence of men with such titles. When such men come into the city, “they kill them as the
beginnings of corruption and the cause of every scandal” (I.55.3).14 By holding ranks equal, the
Germans can stave off corruption as the insatiability of human nature is held at bay. If gentlemen
were allowed to make a home in that city, the new inequality would inflame vengeance in the
breast of its people. Incited by disparity of both belongings and power, the introduction of a new
rank would bring corruption as the new humors vie for control.
Given the causes of corruption, Rome cannot prevent corruption if her goals are to retain
empire and glory. As my analysis in chapter 1 demonstrates, Rome required popular institutions
if it was to expand. Nonetheless, a purely popular government similar to the one praised in
Germany is not the best regime for imperial states. Without strong commanders, the Roman
people would act as a “multitude without a head” – fickle, short-sighted, and unable to unite
under one common goal. Regardless, the Roman regime comes to what Machiavelli calls
“perfection” during its early years. The regime is created originally as a kingdom, but Romulus
depends on a small group of noblemen to help him rule his city. While their place in Rome is not
institutional at first, the social structure created by their leadership produces what is later
institutionalized as the Roman Senate. Consequently, the early political structures of Rome have
within them the nobility that is prohibited in Germany. Such orders enable Rome to become an
acquisitive republic, as its army depends on the people as soldiers and the nobles as
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commanders. While Germany is able to live largely uncorrupt and to maintain a free way of life,
this existence comes at the expense of greatness and empire. Given the imperial goals of Rome,
to order the city with both elite and popular institutions is not only useful, but also necessary. In
creating these orders, inequality of rank and belongings necessarily emerges. Thus, corruption
becomes a necessary evil, a consequence of imperialism.

Ambitious leaders in a corrupt republic

Any corrupted republic, particularly with enmities between its humors such as Rome
experienced, will find itself a breeding ground for ambitious men who seek to capitalize on the
disorder of the city. A return to the discussion of ambition in the corrupt republic is useful to
assess the proper response from the city in dealing with these individuals. The emergence of
ambitious yet nefarious leaders in a non-corrupt republic leads some to argue that Rome’s orders
should be reconsidered to alleviate the corruption that begins in its leaders and spreads to its
plebs.15 As a potential solution, this proposal has merit. Machiavelli does speak to corruption as a
“trickle down” from the nobles to the people in I.17.1. This solution does not address
Machiavelli’s fundamental concerns given that he argues Rome’s corruption allows Caesar to
emerge, not that Caesar introduces corruption in Rome. Further, ambitious individuals gain
strength through the empowerment of the people, who seek their leadership in order to subjugate
others and expand their own power and property. While an alteration to the ordering of ambition
may aid Rome in preventing corruption, it seems that the nature of the people is a more salient
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problem. Machiavelli himself questions the causal direction of corruption, as he later implies
that an individual like Caesar cannot exist without the culture of a republic changing to accept
corruption. One such as him, who “wishes to be able to offend and to seize extraordinary
authority for himself . . . must have many qualities that in a non-corrupt republic he can never
have” (I.34.2). A non-corrupt republic is focused on the common benefit of the city itself, not the
private gain of its citizens. To gain extraordinary authority, a man must “be very rich and have
very many adherents and partisans, which he cannot have where laws are observed” (I.34.2).
Thus, while a Caesar could certainly exist in a non-corrupt republic, if the republic were wellordered he would find a city whose mores did not allow for the extraordinary authority he hoped
to gain. The orders of the republic would temporize the threat of this ambitious individual,
averting the ruin of the city at his hands. While to temporize with Caesar, the city may have to
provide him with some of the power he wanted, to do so proactively is to prevent the sort of
partisan power that Caesar eventually takes for himself. To satisfy partisan ambition in this way
is a useful means to ameliorate its most detrimental effects.
The Discourses provides many helpful examples of ambitious leaders who seek partisan
gain, and how their individual fates are connected to corruption (or lack thereof) in the people of
Rome.16 Spurius Cassius and Manlius Capitolinus are both defeated in their quest for
extraordinary power, as the non-corrupt Roman republic proves to be enough to prevent a
nefarious leader from coming to power (III.8). In the example of Spurius, he schemes to take
authority by gaining the plebs to his side by providing them with land benefits. His conspiracy is
exposed by the Fathers, who are suspicious of his actions and relate their suspicions to the
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tribunes. By the time Spurius attempts to gain the plebs to his cause, they are aware of the
conspiracy (III.8). The example shows that the plebs and the Senate are able to cooperate to
expel a threat to the city, which in itself speaks to the lack of corruption in these times. The two
humors collaborate further under the threat of Manlius Capitolinus, whose efforts are aimed at
creating tumults to weaken the Senate and the laws of Rome.17 Here, the tribunes fall in line with
the nobles who refuse to favor Manlius. The tribunes, “who were always accustomed to favor
what appeared would come to the benefit of the people . . . in this case united with the nobles so
as to crush a common plague” (III.8.1). Although Manlius is described as being “full of every
virtue” and having “publicly and privately performed very many praiseworthy works,” the two
humors unite to overcome his attempt at conspiring against the common benefit of the
fatherland. In this example, to be non-corrupt requires the people and the nobles to put aside their
obvious conflict to better the city. This is significant, as Machiavelli suggests it is not the nature
of the people to act this way. Normally, human nature would lead to the empowerment of
Manlius or Spurius Cassius, as a means of obtaining private good. The lack of corruption in
Rome in these times suggests that at least for a moment, the people are able to avoid succumbing
to the particular benefit for the sake of the general one.
This section of the Discourses further highlights the causal relationship between the
people, the city, and the corruption thereof. Machiavelli speaks to Marius and Sulla here, who
historically come to lead the plebs and the nobles, respectively. After the tumults surrounding the
Agrarian Law in the time of the Gracchi, Rome came to civil war as the plebs fought to acquire
lands that were currently owned by the nobles. Marius and Sulla are partisan minded, and aid in
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the decline of Rome by further escalating the conflict and emphasizing the potential for
individual benefits. Machiavelli uses these two as a foil against Manlius, explicating that without
the corruption that had started in Rome, Marius and Sulla would have found similar ends as
Manlius – they would have been stymied in their pursuit of personal gain. If Manlius had been
born after the Gracchi tampered with the Agrarian Law, he may have been successful in his
plight for extraordinary authority given the widespread corruption of the people. Regardless,
Machiavelli says of Marius and Sulla that while “a man can indeed begin to corrupt a people of a
city with his modes and his wicked means, for him it is impossible that the life of one individual
be enough to corrupt it so that he himself can draw the fruit from it” (III.8.2). Just as it is hard to
reorder the corrupt city, it is hard to introduce corruption where it does not yet exist. A wellordered city does not corrupt quickly, but in stages over a lengthy period of time. While, as
Sullivan suggests, there might be evidence to prove that the leaders of a city initiate corruption,
an individual who is himself corrupt will not reap the benefits of the corruption he has sown.
Thus, to best temporize with corruption one must look to the people instead of their leaders.

Camillus

One of the most significant and fatal consequences of corruption in the Roman republic is
the denigration of honors and command. In the early years of Rome, consulships and honors
went to individuals who acquired honor in the city through their virtue in military conquests and
domestic politics. As the empire grows, the Roman people become complacent about the
perceived stability of the large republic. This false security causes a transition away from
rewarding those who can strengthen the republic to those who can strengthen individuals through
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private benefits. Elevating unworthy men to political office is problematic for the city, as it
weakens Rome’s ability to defend herself and her acquisitions, but also changes the foundations
of praise and blame within the city. Elevating individuals not for their political or military
experience but their promises to spread wealth is a significant departure from the orders that
made Rome good, orders that allowed the city to become a successful empire. In filling political
posts with unworthy candidates, the city either ignores those within its boundaries that are
worthy of political office, or in the case of Camillus, removes them from the city. The story of
Camillus highlights both the consequences of Roman corruption and the failed attempt to return
the city back to its non-corrupt foundations.
Camillus’ service to Rome was honorable, as he was both a prudent military commander
and political leader. His orders aimed at the good of the fatherland, and the honors and reputation
he received were vast. Only when Camillus refuses to follow the people away from the good of
the whole to partisan benefit does he find himself exiled from Rome (I.29.3).18 The people,
unsatisfied by the lack of benefit they reap from the rule of Camillus, turn to exile as “to satisfy
their perversity of sprit, they would be content to see the ruin of their fatherland” (III.30.1). The
example of Camillus shows how far people are willing to go in order to secure partisan benefits,
as his exile comes regardless of his great deeds and the abundant reputation he secured.
Machiavelli weaves this example throughout the Discourses, and while often he is referring to
the corruption of the multitude and the resulting exile of Camillus, he also uses Camillus’ deeds
to describe the goodness of the Romans under proper orders. The actions of Camillus appear as
models of using religion well to establish a strong fatherland (I.12.1; I.13.1; I.55.1). He prudently
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deals with a corrupted individual in the city of the Falisci, where Machiavelli praises his
“humanity” that leads to the people handing over their city (III.20). Camillus is described as
being full of “virtue and goodness” (III.1.2), enough virtue that “soldiers both hated and
marveled at his virtue” (Livy quoted by Machiavelli, III.23).
Yet regardless of the good deeds done by Camillus, the people’s perception of him is
tarnished as they become motivated by partisan benefits. Although the soldiers marvel at his
virtue, he also inspires “hatred” due to his “being more severe in punishing them than liberal in
rewarding them” (III.23). Machiavelli provides two examples from Livy to make his point. In the
first, Camillus uses booty drawn from the Veientes for the public treasury instead of disbursing it
to the people. Second, after the same conflict, Camillus’ triumphant chariot is pulled by four
white horses, which makes him appear prideful.19 Although both Camillus’ pride and depriving
the people of booty arouse ire, “the principle” act that inspires hatred is to “deprive it [a people]
of something useful” (III.23). Instead of perceiving Camillus’ act as for the good of the
fatherland, the people take the denial of booty as a personal insult. Thus, in the case of the
Romans, but also generally of all peoples, “when a man is deprived of things that have utility in
themselves, he never forgets, and every least necessity makes you remember them” (III.23).
Camillus’ only mistake is his refusal to compromise with the corruption of the people, as he
continues to put the common good ahead of personal benefits.20

19

The four white horses lead the people to accuse Camillus of perceiving himself equal to the sun. Also,
reiterated here is the example of Camillus vowing to give a tenth of the booty from the Veientes. The
issue at hand is not that Camillus offered the duty to Apollo, but that in order to fulfill his vow, he sought
to take booty out of the hands of the people who had already seized it.
20

Though the people cannot lawfully exile Camillus on the basis of this charge, he is exiled by an
accusation. Camillus is accused of keeping for himself booty from war against the Etruscans. This speaks
further to the corruption of the people in this time, as the multitude manipulates good orders for bad
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Famously, Camillus does not live out the rest of his life in exile, but is brought back to
the city to serve it when circumstances necessitate such a leader. When Rome finds itself warring
against the French, Camillus is restored as dictator, and leads the city to victory.21 As dictator, he
is described as always ruling for “public usefulness and not for his own utility;” he “made men
not fear his greatness; and because he was so great and so reputed, they did not esteem it a
shameful thing to be inferior to him” (III.30.1). However praiseworthy Machiavelli deems
Camillus, one must remember the reason for which Camillus is exiled and the reason he returns.
Camillus is not exiled for committing a crime against the city, but for refusing to do so. Dire
conditions in Rome necessitate his return; he is not restored due to the people realizing their
grave mistake. The people’s praise and blame of Camillus is born out of his partisan utility or
lack thereof. He is blamed for depriving them of partisan benefits, and later praised for his ability
to save them from sure ruin. The decision to recall Camillus demonstrates the potential of the
people to be effective rulers under the correct circumstances. Here, the imminent threat to the
city brings the people to their senses, as both their personal interests and the interest of the city is
in danger. This example shows the potential of a people not yet entirely corrupted by the lure of
partisan gain. At least until this point, when faced with sure defeat, the individuals are able to
connect their own well-being to that of the city in a meaningful way.

reasons. Thus, here the people are not restrained by the punishment for calumniators, as they are aware of
the inability of the city to punish such a large group (see I.8).
In Machiavelli’s telling, which is derived from Livy, Camillus appears just as Rome is about to buy
itself off from the French, due to starvation in the city. Thus, Livy attributes the timing of Camillus’
return to fortune, so that “Romans should not live redeemed by gold” (II.30.1). Machiavelli also suggests
the story of Camillus has much to do with fortune, as it is due to fortune that Camillus is only exiled, not
killed, for his refusal to shower the people with benefits (II.29.2).
21
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Camillus’ story demonstrates the consequences of allowing the people to share in the
ruling of a city, as the corruption of human nature prevents individuals from making policy based
on the good of the fatherland. Camillus himself seemed to understand this tension, as while
“many” would leave the Roman people, armed as they are, at home to protect the city, Camillus
“judged it otherwise; for he never permitted a multitude to take up arms except with a certain
order and a certain mode” (III.30.2). Without leaving a commander to direct the people, Camillus
is unwilling to let that class defend the city on their own. Machiavelli generalizes this advice,
stating that “one individual who is put in charge of the guard of a city ought to avoid like a reef
having it arm the men tumultuously” but should instead choose those who should be armed,
whom they will obey, where to meet and where to go. Camillus’ insights in battle point to the
deeper insight, that the people are unable to unite in order to achieve a common goal. In the
absence of a leader who provides the modes and orders for a people, they are apt to sacrifice the
good of the whole for the particular good; the good of the fatherland for partisan benefit.
The example of Camillus serves two distinct purposes as regards Machiavelli’s
presentation of corruption. First, the corruption of the people is responsible for the expulsion of
Camillus, regardless of the good he brought to the city. In fact, it is the goodness of Camillus that
separates him from the corrupt Roman people. Unwilling to sacrifice the common good for
partisan gain, Camillus is punished by an unruly multitude able to manipulate Roman orders. It is
clear, at least in this example, that even a virtuous leader will not successfully disarm the
insatiability of the people. Even a citizen such as Camillus, who is praised far more than blamed
by Machiavelli, cannot maintain a city non-corrupt or bring the city back to its good foundations.
The best course of action is to recognize that the multitude has a significant amount of
institutional power that easily turns into mob rule when focused on partisan gain.
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Acknowledgment of the true nature of men may allow a city to create orders that will work, even
with a corrupt citizenry. Secondly, the example of Camillus asks the reader whether virtue,
Roman or otherwise, is the appropriate foundation for the city. While Machiavelli describes
Camillus as virtuous, his virtue does little to save him from exile. Further, while exiled, his virtue
is of little help to the city. If the people are unable to recognize and reward virtue, creating orders
that depend upon a virtuous individual to reign in the multitude seems problematic. Machiavelli
has also previously rejected the idea of rule based on heredity or wealth, and virtue is yet another
problematic foundation of political power.22 To the extent that virtue in the people, or their
leaders, is useful to the city, that virtue must be complementary to partisan self-interest. Italy in
the time of Camillus is presented as at a midpoint between civic virtue and an advanced state of
corruption. The people have allowed their partisan natures to take over, but when faced with
imminent danger, are forced to return to ancient modes and orders. Without such a link to the
well-being of the city, orders founded on virtue and a citizenry that is by nature corrupted by
partisan benefits create an unmanageable relationship. The citizens are unnaturally tied to virtue,
a connection that fails over time as virtue fails to adapt to the citizens it tries to educate.23
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Sullivan (1992).

See analysis in chapter 2 of this dissertation. Skinner (1981) and Pocock (2003) argue that Machiavelli
is calling for a return to the virtue of the ancients, demanding individuals renounce their self-interest as
the only response to corruption. While this fits within the lens of Machiavelli as classical republican, it
ignores the underlying human nature put forth in the Discourses. Coby (1999) seems to suggest that civic
virtue and the inculcation thereof is necessary to keep the people uncorrupt. Jurdjevic (2007) argues that
to the extent that civic virtue exists in Machiavelli, it is a different form of civic virtue.
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Rome’s mistaken foundations

Ancient Rome is able to cultivate imperial greatness through creating the perfect
republican institutions and inculcating a reverence for law and order, virtue and religion. These
supports worked well for Rome, until the city became so large it could no longer maintain its
acquisitions. As Rome expanded, it took on foreigners and extended citizenship to more
individuals in order to maintain a strong military. While these orders were the correct ones for
empire and greatness in the ancient state, they fail to consider two things. First, these institutions
do not take into account the strength of the corruption of the people when they acquire political
strength and change the balance of the humors within the city. Second, Rome’s institutions
inherently change as her citizens change – as the city welcomes foreigners, her own mores alter
as they are influenced by outsiders. Rome is unable to address the incompatibility between its
ancient modes and orders and the changing state, and as such, the city declines from greatness to
weakness.
Rome’s ancient foundations are predicated on the ability to maintain the people
uncorrupt. For a time, the accidents within the city are beneficial, as it adapts to the changing
times.24 The first instance of civil strife comes early, as the Tarquins are expelled from Rome and
with them, the kingship. The reign of the Tarquins is so oppressive that the nobles and the plebs
are able to come together to expel them – and then replace the kingship with a pair of elected
consuls. In the next years, the nobles exert their influence over the plebs; “they began to spit out

See Mansfield (1981, 302) for discussion of Machiavelli’s favored regime. The preferred regime is not
a true mixed regime but one that can respond to accidents, without preference to the institutional format.
For Rome, that regime must empower the people while maintaining a mechanism to keep them shackled
(as I argue, the prince). In the event that circumstances cannot be accommodated to the law, the law must
be able to accommodate the circumstances (McKenzie 1982).
24
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that poison against the plebs that they had held in their breasts, and they offended it in all the
modes they could” (I.3). The resulting tumults between the two humors led to the expansion of
power to the plebs, who gain representation through the tribunate. From this point forward,
Rome is truly a republican state, and the desires of the people can no longer be ignored.
As referenced in chapters 1 and 2 of this dissertation, the extension of power to the plebs
is not in itself a problem, as republican institutions are a necessary part of greatness and
empire.25 Such reordering of the state is a mechanism through which Rome is able to come to
greatness. This reorganization of political power is not without its drawbacks, however. Human
nature is self-interested or corrupt, and modern political institutions are ill equipped to prevent
partisanship as an expression of this nature. The plebs rightly perceive themselves as oppressed
by the nobles, who withhold power and property, and plebeian self-interest becomes connected
to reversing this relationship by taking away reputation from the nobles. The nobility, on the
other hand, recognize that their self-interest is tied to the good of the state, but are also motivated
by the acquisition of more property, which is the only way to maintain what one already has
(I.5). As inequality between the two humors increases, that inequality becomes the catalyst that
tears the people away from observing the common good in favor of partisan gain. The most
significant divergence between the two groups is the perception of self-interest. The plebs see
partisan leaders as the only way to reverse the relationship between oppressed and oppressor.
The nobles, however, can recognize that the greatness of Rome is the mechanism through which
they can acquire more – until they also resort to a partisan leader to pit against the plebs. Ancient
Roman reverence for social institutions cannot foster a plebeian desire for greatness that is strong
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enough to withstand centuries of noble oppression. Instead of maintaining the reverence for these
social institutions and their role in the Roman city, each refounding of the republic alters these
institutions. The people choose leaders without virtue; they no longer respect the boundaries of
the law or the strength of the military, and change religion such that it is no longer a useful
support to the republic’s political aims.
Machiavelli’s conclusion is that the ancient Roman orders did not maintain Rome’s
greatness for very long, and the corruption of the people was enough to subjugate greatness to
partisan gain. The question, though, is where we might find Machiavelli’s solution and a
potential for a new, modern greatness. One option is to found on human nature and forego
greatness entirely, as greatness requires foundations that the people have rejected over time. To
found on corrupt human nature would require Rome to find another way to inculcate notions of
the common good into the multitude, or alternatively, to change her political institutions to
disenfranchise the multitude. Either of these options would prevent Rome from achieving the
greatness found in her history, but might allow the city to remain uncorrupt for a longer time. If
Rome were to do this, it would prevent the city from being caught off guard by its own inability
to adapt to the changing times. However, Machiavelli is unequivocal in his praise of greatness –
even if it could not be maintained, or if the city cannot return to its great past, it is clear that for
at least a moment in time, Rome was to be praised as a great republic.26 In continuing to hold
greatness as the political goal, Rome must still extend political power to its people as an
important ingredient to greatness.

If longevity were Machiavelli’s goal, it seems he would praise Sparta more than he does. Instead,
regardless of longevity, he criticizes Sparta for the actions the city takes that prevent greatness from being
achieved there (I.5).
26
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A second conclusion lies not with the people but with the nobles. Machiavelli gestures
towards the problem of the nobility in further references to modernity.27 He points to modern
republics, including Venice, where individuals are unwilling to take lesser honors after having
great ones (I.36). Here he specifically points to consuls who refuse to aid the city once their
consulship is over, but the argument can be expanded to include the nobles. While the nobles
were once satisfied with their place atop the social structure, in modernity the plebs have
expanded their institutional power in ways that limit the power of the nobility. As such, the
honors of the nobility have been lessened, a fact that does not sit well amongst those used to
having the highest honors. Further, in his discussion of Germany, Machiavelli is unambiguous in
saying the city has retained greatness by removing the nobility from within its borders (I.55).
The rule of the few is prevented by the mores of Germany, as they are openly hostile to any who
attempt to bring introduce inequality of rank. His description here of gentlemen points to the
problematic aspect of noble character: “those who live idly in abundance from the returns of
their possessions without having any care either for cultivation or for other necessary trouble in
living” (I.55.4). Titles of nobility are not in themselves problematic, but the idleness and
oppression that is part of the noble character is. While there are intrinsically important aspects of
an aristocratic class, such a class established on titles of nobility is problematic when the city is
corrupt. As human nature is restrained in the ancient city, the nobility is well poised as the
engine of greatness and empire in the city. In modernity, however, the resurgence of corruption
allows a landed nobility to take advantage of partisan gains.
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See Hunsiker (2006); McCormick (2011; 2001); Sullivan (2004). Each of these authors recognize the
suspicion Machiavelli holds for the ambitious nobles.
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One last possible reference to marginalize the role of the nobles in the best possible
modern state comes in the middle of book II, as Machiavelli discusses modern warfare. In these
chapters, Machiavelli makes the claim that the modern dependence on cavalry is incorrect, that
the best military must found on its infantry (II.18). The most virtuous infantry will be essentially
unstoppable – particularly by a cavalry. Important here is the distinction between two segments
of the military. The cavalry is mounted on horseback, thus made up entirely of Romans of noble
birth. By suggesting that success is found by strengthening the infantry, Machiavelli is arguing
that the foundation of Roman greatness must be on a more egalitarian understanding of its
people, not on a landed nobility.28
It becomes clear throughout the Discourses that regardless of the fickle character of the
multitude, the prince requires their support for his own success, and of course the success of the
city.29 The nobility served ancient Rome by coming to the aid of the earliest of kings, helping
Romulus maintain the new city he had ordered, but the modern nobility is quite different. As
underlying human nature is the same for both classes, the nobles are of the same nature as the
plebs, both self-interested and corrupt. Further, the political power and wealth of a noble class
makes it better able to take advantage of others while satisfying that self-interest. Although
Machiavelli recognizes that the ambition of an aristocratic class is a necessary component to
Roman greatness, he is equally skeptical of their motives. The problem with the modern nobility
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See Mansfield (2001, 243).

Sullivan (2004) argues that the ultimate solution to corruption is the harsh punishment of elites who
wrong the city in some way. While punishment is certainly a strong theme for Machiavelli, this solution
might reverse the causal mechanism of corruption. If the people are by nature corrupt, the punishment of
ambitious partisans will only provide a Band-Aid for the city. Further, if the prince can found a symbiotic
relationship with the people where he is able to provide for both their desires and the success of the city,
punishment would be an additional check instead of the main mechanism of alleviating the problem of
corruption.
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is their focus on beating down the people to assert their dominance all the while acquiring
partisan benefits. While the nobility was once an ingredient of Roman perfection, the continued
emphasis on inequality incites the people to corruption, as they are left with no other choice than
to empower an individual who can help beat down their oppressors. The creation of the Ten
offers one particular example of the danger such conflict brings to Rome, as the nobles are
willing to watch Rome be overcome by a tyrant if it might mean the plebs were beaten down
once and for all (I.40.5). While the prince requires the favor of the people to maintain his rule,
the nobles are unsatisfied by the relationship between the people and the city – and thus continue
to inflame the passions of the lower class (see for examples I.3, I.13, I.40.5, II.1, III.11). To
understand greatness, Machiavelli presents a different perspective. Even with a strong nobility in
ancient times, Rome required a strong multitude to achieve greatness, and the modern city must
find a way to facilitate a similar strength in its people.

Conclusion

Machiavelli sees corruption as a problem coeval with human beings in politics. Humans
are by nature corrupt, and any attempt to overcome corruption will fall short of an eternal
solution. While ancient Rome managed to overcome the problem of nature for quite a long time,
the city was unable to adjust along with the people as times and circumstances changed. As a
result, the social institutions that once kept the people tied to the common good of the city were
unable to adjust themselves to fit the times. The new city has to revisit the same problem, but is
tasked with finding a modern solution that does not attempt to inculcate virtue to the citizenry.
As human nature prevents people from being inherently tied to the common good of the city, a
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modern solution must take this for granted, and provide a solution that does not try to change the
nature of people but instead manipulate it in favor of political greatness.30
The solution Machiavelli provides is perhaps obvious, but much more nuanced than is
usually assumed. While a mixed regime must exist, Machiavelli’s mixed regime is inherently
different from those of the ancient philosophical tradition. The emergence of a strong executive
is one way in which Machiavelli’s mixed regime differentiates itself from others; but that
executive is not entirely without institutional and social constraint. Machiavelli’s Prince takes
for granted that the prince a required aspect of ruling, but does not develop the ways in which the
people and the prince cooperate for the greatness of the city. Human nature leads people to desire
everything, but on their own, they cannot satisfy this desire. With a prince, the success of the city
provides the possibility of satisfying such desires – at least to a higher level than the people can
achieve without help. Although Machiavelli says that the multitude desires vengeance and to
“recover its freedom” he immediately qualifies this statement to say that the plebs’ desire for
freedom is really “so as to live secure” (I.16). By empowering a prince that is shackled by the
law and the strength of the people, a relationship is fostered that benefits both, as the people must
favor the prince in order for him to maintain his position (I.10, I.33, I.40.1, I.51, I.52, II.24, III.8,
III.28).31 In a way the prince and the people provide necessary checks on one another – the
prince is required to maintain the favor of the people through good works or he will lose his
principate, and the people are kept good by the strength of the prince.32 When the city is well
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Jurdjevic (2007).

Duff (2011) argues that ambitious partisans such as Octavian, Caesar or Cosimo would be best opposed
by an individual who gained the favor of the people. Given the strength and size of the people, the most
significant political tool they have is their favor. Such favor is an integral piece of any attempt to
overthrow an ambitious partisan.
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governed, the prince and the people are united under one common goal, and the people do not
wish for any other freedom than is provided for them by the prince (III.5). Under the good
prince, the people’s insatiable nature is dormant, well-ordered by the institutions of the city.
Although he is not with absolute power, as Machiavelli envisions a prince limited by the laws
and his own desire for reputation, the highest of princes will be able to order the people properly
towards the common good of the city.33
Most importantly, the prince’s utility is in the distance he maintains from the people and
the nobles. The prince belongs in neither humor of the city, as he is elevated to his position on
virtú alone. In Roman history, consuls often came from the upper class of society, but
Machiavelli praises those who could divorce themselves from that association and rule for the
good of the fatherland. Examples such as Cincinnatus, who come to power from the lowest
classes, are equally praised as those who began their careers from positions of wealth and power.
As Machiavelli reimagines the executive element of Roman institutions in creating the “prince,”
so too does he emphasize the separation of that individual from the animosity between the two
humors of the city.
As a group, the multitude either serves humbly or dominates proudly (I.58). The goal of
the prince must be returning the multitude to serving the common good instead of partisan wellbeing through its attempt to dominate the nobles. The prince must consider the role of the two
humors in accomplishing this, as the nature of men is to take sides in anything divided, and thus
the when the city is corrupted its people are the most divided (III.27.3). While the earliest
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Bookman (1983) rightly argues that the self-interest of princes is only satisfied through the realization
of public interest.
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McCormick (2001) argues that other mechanisms by which the people control the prince are election
and active confrontation and distrust of nobility.
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tumults in ancient Rome are good for the city, later tumults become problematic as the people
gain more power and can contend with the nobles for the first time. The few threaten the balance
between the prince and the people as they see their reputation diminishing and their own
possessions at stake at the hands of the multitude. As such, Machiavelli’s modern solution seems
to turn away from the focus on the nobility as the necessary component to greatness, as their
excessive defensiveness against egalitarianism threatens to incite the people away from the good
of the city and into the hands of a leader who can provide partisan strength and favor. Of course,
there is not enough evidence to suggest that Machiavelli completely rejects the role of the
nobility in modernity – instead, Machiavelli’s modern “nobility” is redefined as a meritocratic
grandi without concern for birth or noble status. These examples suggest an attempt to soften the
city’s reliance on an ambitious landed nobility in favor of a strong multitude and the emergence
of a grandi without the characteristics of a true noble class. In doing this, Machiavelli redefines
the mixed regime to one that utilizes a new form of aristocracy and a strong executive
component.34
One modern in particular responds to Machiavelli in ways that are useful for
understanding the role of the people in modern democracy: Hobbes. Although Hobbes is
traditionally considered the beginning of modern political thought, many of his ideas can be
traced back to Machiavelli’s works. While in many cases, Machiavelli does not elaborate on such
ideas but only alludes to them, the strands are rehashed and revised in Hobbes’ political thought.
Both authors dismiss concern for human fulfillment, which fundamentally changes the nature
and goal of the political society in modernity. Neither author attempts to educate the soul or

Francese (1994) points to Machiavelli’s preference of strong leaders who are not of noble birth or high
socio-economic status. Machiavelli downplays aristocracy in favor of meritocracy, which comes across in
his plays. Particularly in the Mandragola, the “fox” appears to be Callimaco, who manipulates a noble.
34
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persuade individuals to morality. Where Machiavelli gestures towards self-interest keeping the
35

people good (when it can be connected to greatness), Hobbes is quite clear that political societies
are created for peaceful self-preservation. By transitioning the common good to a means instead
of an end, both authors reinvent politics and the role of the people within it. Hobbes shares with
Machiavelli the distrust of the aristocracy, as he finds it a regime that can easily lead to conflict
and ultimately the state of war. Here, he responds to Machiavelli’s support of the tumults that
once kept Rome free but become a source of civic strife in later years. Hobbes rejects the
potential benefit of such conflict, as he is suspicious of any institution that might lead to discord
and eventual civil war.
Machiavelli becomes the first of a long line of modern philosophers that are hostile to
aristocracy. The perfect regime for Rome does not have to comply with specific institutions laid
out by Machiavelli – the preferred regime is one that is able to respond to “accidents” and
“necessity.” For this reason, any regime is plausible, and Machiavelli praises authoritarian
elements of the Roman regime just as highly as popular ones. In the Roman case, it appears that
the best regime is a republic with a significant amount of popular control, but one that retains a
strong elite element. In so empowering the people, Machiavelli separates himself from ancient
thinkers who did not consider democratic institutions to be part of the preferred regime. But he
also deviates in his view of the nobility. Although the ambition inherent in the nobility is a
necessary part of Roman success, Machiavelli emphasizes the noble character that is more
problematic in the later years of Rome. As the nobles and plebs engage in tumults dangerous to
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the city he is forced to side with one or the other, and it seems that the resounding answer for
modern Rome lies in the hands of the people and the rejection of noble titles.

CHAPTER 4: MACHIAVELLIAN LIBERALISM

In Machiavelli’s time, Roman greatness has given way to weakness, and part of his
intention is to diagnose the political situation to provide those with political power “everything
he knows” to remedy the problem. To understand Machiavelli’s proposal for a refounding of
Roman greatness in modernity, one must turn away from his diagnosis of the past and towards
his prescription for the future. While the tumults between the humors provided a certain stability,
they led the city into eventual corruption as partisanship superseded the goal of imperial
greatness. Still, Machiavelli does not suggest the city was wrong to extend power to the people.
On the contrary, Machiavelli seems to desire a reworking of the entire political system to include
the people and their self-interested natures to overcome the dangers of corruption. As greatness
is a material goal more than it is a transcendent one, it is not incompatible but inherently tied to
self-interested motivations. The proper political regime for Rome, or a city that wishes to be like
Rome, must be one that empowers its people and utilizes the self-interested nature of humans to
propel the city toward greatness.
As the people become increasingly important to Roman greatness, it is reasonable to
suspect that other aspects of the traditional mixed regime would also be altered in modernity.
Italy of Machiavelli’s time is in a fundamentally different position than the ancient city, and
cannot recreate ancient virtue to pursue modern greatness. Machiavelli understands ancient
virtue and human nature to be incompatible, particularly when human nature has been left to its
own corrupt devices, as it has in modernity. Much of Machiavelli’s work is understood to

115
redefine politics and morality, and it is worth considering whether he redefines the republican
ideal, turning it into something distinctly modern and compatible with his understanding of
human nature. While Machiavelli certainly praises the Roman republic, and often his praise is
directly related to aspects of the city inherently tied to republicanism, there is a significant
disconnect between what Machiavelli praises in the ancient city and what he proposes for the
current city.
Machiavelli notes that human things are unchanging and such things are in all times and
places the same, but the implications of human things on the modern city have proven distinct
from any such implications in antiquity. While the nature of peoples is generally unchanging, the
modern city is without the societal supports that maintained ancient Rome (see chapter 2) and as
such the city has largely succumbed to its corrupt nature (see chapter 3). As modern Rome is
working with different variables, the political solution must also be predicated on a new
understanding of political life. The new solution comes partly through embracing self-interest as
a useful political tool, but also through the suppression of the nobility that was integral to the
ancient mixed regime. Later moderns would capitalize on the disjuncture between Machiavelli
and the ancients, pushing forward a modern agenda for political science. While Machiavelli’s
proto-liberalism is less noticeable, particularly due to its mixture with praise for antiquity, later
moderns such as Hobbes help advance the modern trends within Machiavelli’s works.
Most significant to his modern project, the emphasis on the nobility and the plebs as two
separate groups in constant conflict begins to fade throughout the Discourses. The last few
references to the nobility that appear in book 3 are references to the loss in status of the nobility
– including the increased equality between the nobles and the plebs and the inability of the
nobility to command the plebs with the coarseness it had once used (III.19.1). As such, while
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Machiavelli would not understand the nature of these individuals to have changed, he certainly
recognizes a difference in their relationship to one another in modern times. I argue that
Machiavelli does not see a nobility as a workable social hierarchy in modernity. Thus,
Machiavelli’s intention is to lessen reliance of the modern city on a nobility; to instead blur the
distinction between the nobles and plebs in modern times. In so doing, he ultimately suggests
that the modern city is founded on only two institutions of mixed government – the prince, and a
much broader understanding of the people, which includes a grandi - a class of individuals
elevated to a higher status on merit alone and a “plebeian” class. While it is not the case that the
tumults are completely useless in modernity, they are between a grandi and a multitude in place
of the patricians and the plebs. This is an important development, as the removal of titles of
nobility will ideally help to alleviate the corruption that ensues when public modes are conferred
in private.

A modern solution to an ancient problem?

In the attempt to place Machiavelli amongst various traditions of political thought, it is
tempting to look to Machiavelli’s praise of ancient Rome. That praise is centered around the
greatness that Rome achieved as it “perfected” its orders – by becoming a republic. With
expansion as its main goal, is it quite clear that republicanism was the correct means to an
imperial end. By tracing Machiavelli’s praise for greatness back to the praise for republican
institutions, one might argue that he is indeed a republican, favoring the traditional mixed
government that comes out of ancient political thought.
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However, this is not the only, nor the best way to situate Machiavelli’s thought in the
history of political philosophy. For the modern city to return to its ancient roots, it would have to
be transformed through something akin to a Machiavellian “refounding.” Although there is the
potential for the perfect “founder” to return the city to its ancient glory, Machiavelli is skeptical
of any real ability to do so (I.16; I.17). Machiavelli praises individuals from antiquity for their
ability to return a city to its beginnings, but the corrupt city is highly unlikely to ever refound
itself uncorrupt. He does stop short of saying it is impossible to return to an ancient, free way of
life, but the text seems to rule out a refounding as a feasible option to solve the modern weakness
in Rome, Italy, and the rest of the world.
The modern city is truly in a different situation than its ancient counterpart. Machiavelli
lives in an Italy he calls “weak,” “divided,” and lacking its own arms (I Pref 2; I.12; I.18; I.21).
Modern men are lacking in education and knowledge, which prevents them from utilizing the
history of the ancients to their benefit. As men have stopped relying on historical accounts of
greatness and virtuous men, they have also stopped imitating the actions that facilitated such
greatness. Thus, part of Machiavelli’s intention must be to educate the reader to better judge the
present based on a knowledge of history. In the dedicatory letter, Machiavelli states that his
objective is to make Livy’s history of Rome a useful tract for modern times. Here, Machiavelli is
prefacing the text to follow by disconnecting modern times from ancient ones. Although the
history of Livy provides useful knowledge of the ancient past, it is not something that
Machiavelli is going to attempt to replicate in modernity – as, in fact, Machiavelli often does not
quote Livy accurately or present historical events as they actually happened.1 The modern prince
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who studies history from Livy and other sources can implement new remedies while utilizing
knowledge of similarities or patterns among accidents (I.21.1). Knowledge of the past becomes
preparedness for the future, as “in all cities and in all peoples there are the same desires and the
same humors, and there always have been” (I.39.1).
Machiavelli does include advice in many of his descriptions of the past, although that
advice often speaks to where Rome went wrong, instead of suggesting modern Rome should
return to these orders. Early, in book 1, Machiavelli argues that “whoever wished to make a
republic in present times would find it easier among mountain men, where there is no
civilization” as opposed to in the modern cities, where the “civilization is corrupt” (I.11.3).
Later, Machiavelli argues that things are easily conducted in uncorrupted cities, and that a
republic cannot exist where there is inequality (I.55). As the corruption of modern Rome is a
direct result of the inequality there (see chapter 3 of this dissertation), it would be impossible for
the modern city to be refounded in the image of the ancient republic.
Even if it were possible to return that city to republican greatness, Machiavelli implies
that one should not attempt to do so. The ancient city was great, but the modern city has failed –
and at some point, the ancient greatness gave way to the orders and corruption that allowed the
modern city to form. As ancient Rome continued to expand, it accepted many foreigners into the
city and continued to empower them as a means to greatness. With foreign people came foreign
gods, and with popular political institutions came Christianity. Machiavelli points to the
incompatibility between the Roman virtue required for greatness and the doctrine of Christianity,
thus suggesting the reader might need to find a new teaching amongst his praise for the past. 2
Sullivan (1993) puts forward a thesis that Machiavelli is “neither Christian nor pagan,” as he also
criticizes paganism for leading to Christianity, and reworks Christianity to be devoid of its doctrinal
teaching.
2
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The modern city cannot simply refound itself into an image of ancient Rome. The city itself is
inherently different, and ancient Rome, for all its praise, lacks sustainability. Although one could
certainly argue that no political regime lives forever, the Roman Empire not only failed but
succumbed to the corrupt, weak state of modern Italy where none of the virtue of antiquity can
be found. To return to ancient republicanism without significant amendments is to begin the
cycle anew.
Christianity’s influence on Roman greatness and modernity is significant; far too
substantial to be discussed here in its entirety. On one hand, Christianity inherently changes the
ancient state and weakens Roman virtue. On the other, it institutes equality in an interesting way.
While Machiavelli certainly finds the modern city corrupt from excessive inequality, Christianity
influences the city by leveling the elitism of aristocratic orders, while simultaneously instituting
a church predicated on an internal hierarchy. Equality of rank appears amongst the Roman
people as the city transitions away from pagan to Christian religion, although past inequalities
have already encumbered the city with corruption and partisanship. The hierarchy of the Church
mimics the aristocratic structure of the city, and the priests enter into an alliance with the
political elites to further entrench the Church in political life.3 At the same time, the Church
teaches the people that they are unable to imitate the ancients, thus engendering weakness and
“ambitious idleness” (I Pref 2). As the political distinctions between peoples and groups lessen,
the aristocratic nature of the ancient mixed regime fades. The entrenchment of such equality
prevents political particularism from being reinstated without significant difficulty. This provides

One of Machiavelli’s critiques of the Church is the hierarchical structure, where believers follow the
priests instead of the religion itself. Christianity is not ordered towards the preservation of the state in the
way the ancient religion was, as Christianity has its own political authority within the inner workings of
the Church (I.12).
3
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another layer to Machiavelli’s argument that one should not simply repeat Rome’s history; he is
attempting to push the reader to consider a solution entirely new, and appropriate for Rome in
modernity.

Modernity’s response to nobility

To address a solution for modernity, Machiavelli redefines both the place of the people
and that of the nobility. Up until this point, this project has focused on the role of the people, as
Machiavelli’s innovation is largely connected to the expansion of popular political power he sees
as necessary. However, as Machiavelli views the success of the ancient city bound up in the
balance between the two humors of the city, it is impossible to discuss the role of one humor
without addressing a change to its counterpart. To replace popular civic virtue with something
more modern, such as self-interest, has implications not only on the role of the people and their
political power, but also on the nobility. Ultimately, the implications for the nobility are even
more damning than for the people, as their position in society must fundamentally change in
modernity. This does not, however, detract from the need to shackle the multitude in their
political dealings, but simply recognizes the role of the nobility in modern corruption.
In antiquity, the great are distinguished from the many not only by their belongings but
also their virtue. These individuals are the heart and soul of the ancient republic, a model unto
which the people should look. In its emphasis on aristocratic virtue, classical republicanism is
intrinsically partisan, as the nature of aristocracy is itself inherently partisan.4 Partisanship is an
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See Bluhm (1962). Bluhm argues that the tensions best regime and the ideal regime are largely
unresolved in Aristotle’s thought, and it must be at least considered that Aristotle explicitly calls an
aristocracy the best regime. See also Cherry (2009) who discusses the tension between polity and
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accepted characteristic of a nobility in the classic model, as the ambition of the few fuels the
republic towards greatness. The old way, then, acknowledges the partisanship of the nobility but
finds it a reasonable method of propelling ambition and greatness. Beginning with Machiavelli,
modernity rejects this formulation, eventually altering republics to acknowledge the necessity of
executive power to combat the partisanship of a noble class.5 Even further than this,
Machiavelli’s project elevates the plebs to a new position, while also discrediting the ancient
claim to aristocratic virtue.6 It is not the case that virtue exists only within the upper class of
citizens – Machiavelli goes out of his way to provide examples of virtue that have very little to
do with wealth and focus entirely on political and military success. Far from arguing that landed
wealth is a positive addition to republicanism, Machiavelli’s modern grandi are elevated to that
position by their merit, as their virtue and success recommends them to a place of honor. This
maintains an ambitious few that can further the imperial goals of the city, while ideally
undermining the partisanship that once went hand in hand with the few. While ambition remains
part of a healthy regime, the partisanship of a landed nobility is a sure route to corruption.
For Machiavelli, distinctions between the nobles and the plebs begin to wane in
modernity as the universality of human nature is understood. All humans are susceptible to
corruption; the plebs are certainly not unique in their corrupt actions. More accurately, the
people’s corruption is provoked as a reaction to oppression from the nobles. As earlier discussed,
Machiavelli views republican corruption as partisanship, or the shift of public modes and orders

aristocracy in Aristotle’s thought. Coby (1988) provides a useful analysis of Aristotle’s “three cities,”
including that of the aristocracy.
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into the private sphere. Although all individuals have this partisan nature, the nobility is perfectly
poised to utilize private benefits for their own self-interest at the sake of the city. The earliest
clamors for popular political institutions arise to empower the people against their noble
counterparts. Once powerful, the people are able to protect themselves from noble oppression –
but as the tumults grow ever stronger, the nobles are most capable of turning to private modes to
gain partisan benefits. Eventually this privatization of politics leads the plebs to their own
partisanship, as they are forced into the waiting arms of an individual such as Caesar who
promises to save them from persecution.
Machiavelli’s solution to corruption is twofold, but both solutions present a mechanism
for checking the power nobility to recreate a balance amongst the humors. First, the nobles must
be prevented from using the private benefits to which they have become accustomed.7
Empowering the people is one way to accomplish this, as institutions that provide political power
to the people force the nobles to deal with politics through public modes. By instituting a popular
layer of government through the tribunate and election, the people are empowered to assert a
veto in cases of new public policy, and can voice their objection to potential acts of political
corruption. With the introduction of accusations, any individual can press charges of corruption
against any other individual, regardless of class. Through each of these institutions, the people
are given the tools necessary to subvert the corruption of the nobles, or at least counter it with
political power of their own.
A second solution is a redefinition of citizenship that expands the population of citizens
while shrinking the notion of duty. In speaking of the multitude, a group powerful when united,
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See Maher (2016); McCormick (2015).
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Machiavelli is specifically talking about the lowest class of individuals in the city. In antiquity,
aristocratic societies certainly did not extend political power to those without some sort of
property ownership. Machiavelli, however, envisions a significant role for these individuals - so
much that he recommends they be the “guard of freedom” in a republic.8 In so doing, the
strength of the nobility in society most generally is balanced by an enlarged multitude, but
Machiavelli is also bringing a new humor to the political regime. While the humors have always
existed in cities, it is not the case that they have always shared in governing. By enlarging the
multitude, Machiavelli strengthens the popular institutions through sheer numbers. This is
particularly important, as Machiavelli refers throughout the Discourses to the strength of
numbers when it comes to the people. Here, Machiavelli’s emphasis on the people as political
actors provides recourse to the city in shedding its noble corruption.
While extending power to the people certainly presents its own difficulties, and
Machiavelli does not pretend otherwise, it is not the case that the nobility rule without issue. On
the contrary, the nobles are truly the hotbed of corruption in Machiavelli’s understanding of a
republic – it is not the people who are easily bought by partisans, but the nobles.9 The people
view their own liberty as the security of their belongings and a guarantee of their place in the
city, and thus resort to partisans only to overthrow their oppressors. The nobles, on the other
hand, have not only ambition but also the social connections needed to best utilize private
benefits. In a way, classical republicanism itself motivates individuals towards partisan solutions

In his analysis of the Art of War, Winter (2014) convincingly argues that Machiavelli’s understanding of
the size of an army needed in a modern republic would require any of the Italian cities considered to
expand their idea of “citizen soldiers” to include the plebs. This corresponds to Machiavelli’s many
references in the Discourses to not only empowering the plebs, but arming them.
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instead of public ones, facilitating relationships that challenge one’s ability to be secure in his
liberty, particularly in its reliance on the traditional mixed regime.10 The ancient republic could
control such partisanship by expanding its modes and orders to secure a free way of life – but
ancient republican virtue is an insufficient solution to the corruption of modernity. Unfortunately
for Machiavelli, some sort of nobility remains an important aspect of the regime, as a
government entirely predicated on the desires of the uninformed, unshackled multitude is akin to
the Caesarism he vilifies.11 Thus, the solution must be found by reforming the nobility to address
the modern concerns of partisanship and the early threads of democratic rule.

The mixed regime

The progression of the Discourses points to Machiavelli’s critique of the ancient mixed
regime. In the first book, Machiavelli begins by discussing what republics are, and how Rome
came to be founded. Through the first few chapters, Machiavelli speaks to the progression of
Rome from a kingship to a republic, and the success that Rome would come to under that model.
Later chapters speak to “accidents” that arose in the republic and the (good) orders that came out
of those accidents. Further, Machiavelli speaks to institutions that made Rome great, such as the
disunion between the plebs and the nobles, the extension of power to the people through the
tribunes, the dictator, accusations and calumnies. Rome was careful to avoid ingratitude, knew to
draw itself back to its beginnings often, and was supported by the virtú of strong men. In sum,
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For a discussion of the relationship between the people and the nobility, see McCormick’s many works,
but especially Controlling the Elites with Ferocious Populism (2001).
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the first book presents itself as a description of the Roman republic, educating the reader on the
many successes and few failures of that city.
In the second book, the theme shifts significantly. Many of the chapters here speak to
military virtue and the captains that upheld it in Rome and in other cities. Here, Machiavelli
gestures towards one of the significant problems of modern Rome: that the city does not depend
on its own arms, and is lacking in many kinds of virtue. However, in the preface, Machiavelli
does tell the reader to be careful not to associate “good” with “ancient” and “bad” with
“modern.” Thus, amongst all the bad in modernity, one should look for some good.
This book also changes the course of the republican narrative. Here, Machiavelli begins
to blur the distinction between a republic and a principality. As a matter of fact, almost every
time that Machiavelli gives advice to a republic, it is followed with “or a prince.” Although this
is not the first instance of Machiavelli equating a principality to a republic, he continues to
address the two regimes together, suggesting that there is no significant difference between the
operation of one or the other.12 The ambiguity is useful to his project. The equivocation of the
two regimes allows Machiavelli to legitimize a principality, by first speaking to the success of
the Roman republic and then dismissing any significant differences between the two regimes.
Both regime types can be successful, and are necessary in different times and circumstances. It is
not so important the distinction between regimes, and the careful reader is to understand politics
in terms of power and success instead of a categorization of regimes.
The last book continues in the same vein as the second, further questioning the viability
of the republic. By the last book, Machiavelli argues that republics cannot be perpetual as they

In I.2.1, Machiavelli speaks of cities governed by their own will “either as a republic or a principality.”
Here, he first speaks to the two regimes as the same, but importantly does not distinguish a principality as
being incompatible with a free way of life.
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come to ruin in so many ways (III.17). He argues that although a republic might live longer than
a principality, that republic is also likely to come to ruin if it does not vary its orders with the
times (III.9.2). Here, and in other places, Machiavelli questions the ability of the republic to take
advantage of its great men (II.22; III.16) Lastly, he suggests that once the city is divided, it will
end up corrupt and can no longer be united (III.27). Each of these comments point to
Machiavelli’s final goal: to gesture to the reader why Rome cannot simply return to its
republican ways. For modern Rome to attain greatness, it must model itself after a different sort
of regime. Further, the exact model of greatness itself may differ in modernity. While ancient
Roman greatness found political success by way of empire, modern Rome may have to redefine
political success to achieve greatness in modernity.

Machiavelli’s critique of the ancient mixed regime

Machiavelli’s analysis of the Roman republic begins as a standard depiction of the
ancient mixed regime. He classifies the different humors of the regime as popular, aristocratic
and principality (I.2.1). He argues that Rome perfected its orders by broadening itself from a
kingship to a republic, and he finds that the republic is best able to respond to the varying
circumstances all regimes encounter as it can rely on one or more of its humors as necessary.
Thus, as the virtuous prince must have a mixed nature that enables him to adapt to the times, so
too does a republican form of government allow the city to act in the most diverse of
circumstances. Here, Machiavelli’s justification of the mixed regime deviates from Aristotle’s.
While Machiavelli speaks of the political utility of combining the various regime types to
employ each as necessary, Aristotle argues that the mixed regime will prevent the degeneration
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of each individual regime type. Although in Machiavelli’s formulation the mixed regime is
effective for ancient Rome, he does not go as far as to say the mixture perfects each of the
humors – only that it perfects Rome by enabling the city to respond as a principality, democracy
or an aristocracy might at any given time.
One aspect of Machiavelli’s republic attempts to preserve that perfection. A necessary
component of republican institutions is a repeated return to its beginnings, a reorientation of sorts
that resets the modes and orders of the city (III.1). Only a true founder is virtuous enough to do
this, but the renewal of orders is essential to the survival of the regime. True “goodness” is found
in the early stages of a republic, a goodness that is corrupted overtime without renewing modes
and orders.13 In Rome, examples of these renewals included the creation of the tribune, the
censors, and other laws that checked ambition and the insolence of men, returning politics to the
public sphere from the private (III.1.3). As one strong founder is necessary to return a city to its
beginnings, modern Rome is unable to utilize the renewal of orders to maintain itself uncorrupt.
The modern city has turned away from the virtú necessary for such renewals, honoring weakness
instead of strength (I.21; II.16.2; II.30; III.16; III.27). Instead, modern Rome has empowered
partisans who reward factions within the city, not realizing until too late that these men cannot
bring the city to greatness, but instead will further its ruin (II.22). Thus, to the extent that Rome
was ever able to return itself to its beginnings in ancient times, the prospect of renewing the
republic in modernity is minimal.
A second aspect of Machiavelli’s mixed regime is the ability of the humors within it to
act as a check against the others. Republics are more stable than other forms of government, but

Warner and Scott (2011) argue that Machiavelli’s emphasis on the constant reordering of the republic
to keep corruption at bay is a significant departure from the civic humanism to which many (e.g. the
Cambridge School) attribute his work.
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only so far as there are guards against each class (I.2.5). The ancient Roman republic
accomplished this task exceedingly well through the tumults that perpetuated the animosities
between the nobles and the plebs (I.4.1). The tumults provided a public means of venting
ambition, and the two classes found themselves in constant clashes over time that served to
maintain a free way of life in the city. As neither class could get too strong, the ambition within
the city was propelled towards political greatness for Rome. The result is a system where
alterations in orders happen slowly, as a result of significant tumults between the humors giving
way to newly implemented institutions. Just as modernity cannot support the virtú necessary to
maintaining an imperial republic, the humors in modern Rome are no longer in the vicious
tumults that once maintained freedom. The tumults, an exceedingly public method of political
deliberation, have been supplanted by pursuit of political gain through private means. At the
same time, the plebs have gained strength over time, and the legitimacy of aristocracy in
Machiavelli’s modern Rome is waning. The separation between the two humors has blurred
enough to end the tumults that checked each humor, and with it the ambition that propelled the
city to greatness.
Institutionally, a republic does not fit in Machiavelli’s modern Rome. The necessary virtú
is lacking in the modern city, as for generations the characteristics of virtuous men have been
blamed instead of praised. As such, the virtuous grandi needed to hold the republic together and
renew it back to its original orders is missing. Secondly, the tumults that checked the humors of
the mixed government are also largely gone from modern Rome. Even without institutional
issues that have arisen in modernity, Machiavelli points to the mixed regime as one that cannot
be perpetuated, as it comes to ruin in varying ways. In part, Rome came to ruin as she was unable
to maintain her acquisitions, and eventually became too large to control. Thus, a vital part of
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ancient Roman greatness also facilitated its demise. The ancient state was united by fear and
warmongering – a culture that has waned between the glory of ancient Rome and the weakness
of modernity (II.25). Further, all regimes must vary with the times to maintain. Unable to do this,
Rome continued an imperial path until she could no longer support the vast territory under her
control. Just as ancient Rome was wrong not to vary with the times, modernity would be wrong
to try to apply ancient orders to an entirely different time.

The modern mixed regime

If the ancient mixed regime is incompatible with modern Rome, then what regime is
Machiavelli trying to support? Machiavelli understands the ancient republic to rely heavily on
the aristocracy as an institution (I.2). Without the aristocracy in the modern state, there is no
check on the plebs, but also no ambition to propel the city forward. While there is some ambition
in the people, Machiavelli also suggests that they are motivated only by their own security – and
are thus only agitated into political life when oppressed by the nobles (I.16; I.18). The nobles, on
the other hand, have a similar nature to the imperial republic itself. Insecure in their possessions,
the nobles view further acquisition as the only way to protect what they own. Similarly,
Machiavelli argues that the imperial republic must make acquisitions to defend itself from others.
The aristocracy is inherently tied to this nature of republics, and as such is a necessary facet of
the mixed regime.
The characteristics of the nobility are important, and Machiavelli praises them as
important to the glory mongering of Rome. However, mixed with this ambitious nature of an
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elite few is the partisan nature of the nobility. With a significant amount of property and power,
14

the nobles capitalize on their position by making deals in private that serve their own selfinterest. Self-interest itself is not problematic, as it is an important factor of material ambition,
but retreating from public modes of political discourse is the epitome of corruption. Thus, the
modern grandi must maintain the ambitious nature of the few while shedding the landed nobility
– and the private benefits that come with it. In modernity, fewer distinctions are made between
the two humors in the city. The modern grandi is still the wealthy few, but is not differentiated
by birth or legitimate political rule through the inheritance of landed wealth. The humors, instead
of the nobles and the plebs, become simply the rich and the poor.
Machiavelli supports the strengthening of the multitude overtime, although he does
conclude that one must accept the inevitability of corruption and partisanship. As such, the
regime must be redefined to accept this expanded role of the people, and ordered to withstand the
corruption of modernity. As the role of nobility is significantly lessened in Machiavelli’s modern
mixed regime, the people are no longer checked by a strong aristocratic component. However,
maybe more importantly, the ever-corrupt nobility is much better checked by an expanded notion
of the people in modernity. The regime itself must check the actions of the people by being
founded on self-interested motivations.15 The modern state assumes the corruption of the people
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unlimited material gain. See also Saxonhouse (1981) who argues that for Machiavelli, where glory does
not appear as a part of aristocracy, it is addressed as a positive force.
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while forming institutions that encourage a public commitment to self-interest instead of a
private, and eventually partisan, one.
Machiavelli abandons the ancient tradition by supporting an expansion of executive
power comprised of one ruler. With corruption and self-interest so entwined in the political
regime, the executive plays a more important role than ever. As corruption can no longer be
eradicated, the only solution is to revisit the modes and orders of the city, refounding them
periodically when necessary (See I.9; II.18). Only by doing this can the city reorient itself to its
goals and inspire the people with spontaneous acts of executive power.16 Later moderns such as
Hobbes and Locke will further expand the notion of such power, advancing Machiavelli’s work
by institutionalizing the executive. Machiavelli’s own understanding of executive power is
somewhat complicated, as he stops short of defining exactly what the individual (individuals?)
can do. In some instances, Machiavelli’s executive is shackled by the law, particularly ones that
he himself created. In other examples, Machiavelli’s prince must expertly side-step the law,
legitimizing extralegal displays of power so long as they further the goals of the city (I.49). In
this way, the prince is authorized to act within or outside of the law, as his virtue is characterized
by his ability to use prudence in political matters.
With an exaggerated role for the prince-state and the people, Machiavelli situates himself
at the beginning of the transition to modern political thought. Without relying on an aristocracy,
Machiavelli is providing a precursor to the modern argument against the nobility as a legitimate
source of authority. Further, Machiavelli sees the prince and the people as institutions that
require one another to succeed (II.10). Even in the Prince, the successful prince requires the

Mansfield’s Taming of the Prince (1989) provides an enlightening understanding of the modern
executive, but also argues that Machiavelli interprets the power to “execute” in various ways, including
but not limited to the public, spontaneous executions advocated in the Prince.
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benevolence of the people if he is to rule for any length of time. Without the people on his side,
the prince opens himself up to conspiracy, and to the people empowering a partisan who will
advocate their desires against the current regime.

Machiavelli’s influence on Hobbes

As debate continues to swirl as to whether Machiavelli is a vestige of the ancient political
thought tradition or a precursor to modernity, some connections must be made between
Machiavelli’s thought and early liberalism. Authors like Rousseau mention Machiavelli by
name, and scholars point to the influence Machiavelli had on important political figures during
the American founding.17 The Discourses in particular put Machiavelli in an interesting place –
at the same time that he is introducing new, liberal ideas, he is also praising the ancient
republican past of Roman greatness. However, the emphasis Machiavelli places on “new modes
and orders” for modernity, and the eventual failing of republicanism, lends credibility to the
strands of his thought that are entirely modern. Further, authors such as Hobbes used
Machiavelli’s work to influence their own ideas on the proper regime for modernity.18
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See Saxonhouse (1981) who argues that the second half of the Horae Subsecivae, which she attributes
to Hobbes, employs the same form as Machiavelli’s Discourses. While Machiavelli was not the only one
writing in such a style at the time, she argues that the content and structure of the Horae suggest a
reliance on Machiavelli’s political works. See also Whelan (2004) on the connection between
Machiavelli’s liberalism and that of Hume.
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The modern regime

Hobbes provides a new understanding of politics influenced by Machiavelli’s
innovations.19 As stated, Machiavelli’s overall project can be distorted in trying to understand the
difference between ancient Roman greatness and modern weakness. Throughout his writings,
Machiavelli entangles discussion of republics with support for principalities. Thus, many
possible threads exist in the Discourses, and many take the reader in very different directions.
One direction, the modern principality, is advanced by Hobbes, who transforms Machiavelli’s
executive into an institutionalized version in creating a “sovereign.”
As Machiavelli downplays the role of a nobility in the modern city, Hobbes vehemently
critiques it as factitious. The Hobbesian commonwealth is predicated on only two aspects of
society: the people and a sovereign. In order to create peace, the people come together and
establish a sovereign, who will protect the people.20 This alleviates the need of the people to
protect themselves, and creates a single understanding of justice and legality stemming from the
sovereign himself. Prior to the creation of the sovereign, the rule of law is in the hands of
individuals, and is thus not an authoritative element of society. As the only reliable way to enter
a peaceful society with others is to establish one ruling element, the people choose to relinquish
some of their right to the sovereign and from it, reap peace.21 With such strength in the executive
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office, Hobbes’ commonwealth does not rely on an informal or formal grandi for the generation
of political ambition and strength. As the people’s only role is to be obedient to the sovereign,
there is no place for ambition in the city. In this formulation, there is no need to deal with
competing social class amongst individuals, as ambition does not need to play a role in the
regime.
Much of Hobbes’ thought is concerned with civil discord and its ability to promote civil
war.22 Machiavelli understands the tumults to be an important part of the Roman “free way of
life,” as it facilitates a means for each humor to protect itself from the other. On the contrary,
Hobbes is concerned with the prospect of two or more factions in contention with one another, as
he perceives discord to be the arbiter of civil war, and in his own experience, the English
Revolution.23 He goes as far as to suggest that the commonwealth is “diseased” when it is
comprised of many smaller commonwealths or factions.24 In the presence of multiple factions, an
individual’s obligation to the sovereign is divided as he attempts to obligate himself to various
groups and associations. While Machiavelli finds the discord between two humors to be an
important aspect of freedom within the city, he does redefine the ancient nobility to be a grandi
based on merit. Machiavelli’s hope is that removing titles of nobility from an aristocratic class
will reduce the reliance of that class on private modes and orders, and thus ameliorate the effects
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of corruption. Hobbes, on the other hand, entirely dismisses the prospect of civil discord as
useful to the creation of robust political society.
The Hobbesian commonwealth thus has two elements: the ruling element and the people.
The people have significant power in the state of nature, and with that power establish the ruling
element.25 Once established, the ruling element becomes the only executor of the law, and the
people return to their nonpolitical daily lives. The people do not return at regular intervals to
select a new sovereign, nor do they vie for expanded political rights. Instead, the people
understand their self-interest is best served by a sovereign who legislates for them.26 Even
though the people are not upholding the rights they once had in the state of nature, they are
protecting their self-interest as best they can. The sovereign or ruling element, in its own right,
exists only by the decision of the people. Although Hobbes rejects the right of revolution, he
must recognize that the people could overthrow the ruling element should it disregard their
desires. Ultimately, as Hobbes argues that men are born equal, other than reasonable strength and
intelligence inequalities, there is no noble class existing as a third element of the modern state.
Machiavelli’s thoughts on the nobility are sprinkled throughout his works, forcing the
reader to find and interpret references to deduce a coherent teaching. In so doing, his various
mentions point to both good and bad natures of a nobility in the city, ultimately arguing that the
institution of a modern grandi will facilitate the good natures of the nobility while mitigating the
bad. Hobbes also tackles these questions, providing a more direct critique of nobility. Building
upon Machiavelli’s early attempts to delegitimize landed wealth and the ancient republican
tradition, Hobbes can shed all pretenses in favor of a thought experiment that enhances the
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executive while negating a nobility entirely. Further, where Machiavelli both argues that the
people are important political participants but also that they seek liberty only to be secure,
Hobbes revisits this tension and clarifies it by only including the people as participants in the
initial creation of the social contract. Even then, the people are not always an important feature
of the establishment of the social contract, as the contract can be established by conquest. As
such, Hobbes’ work looks back to distinctions made first by Machiavelli, but institutionalizes
and expands the cleavages to fully transition to liberalism and away from the ancients and
republicanism.

Liberty as security

Throughout the Discourses, Machiavelli often refers to freedom in terms of Rome’s
freedom, or the ability of peoples to free themselves from other nations. Mixed into these
discussions of freedom is an understanding of the relationship between the people and liberty. In
this respect, the people are far removed from the nobles, as their desire for liberty is significantly
different. The multitude desires liberty insofar that liberty is security; their desire to be free is a
desire to be protected from others. The people do not desire political rule or other forms of
participation in the political realm, but are satisfied insofar as they are left alone. Early in the
text, Machiavelli states that Rome was correct in making the plebs the guard of freedom, as free
peoples are rarely pernicious to freedom as their desires arise from being oppressed, or suspicion
that they might be oppressed (I.4). Here, self-interest aligns with freedom because the plebs are
less ambitious than the nobles, and thus less able to attempt to acquire what they cannot
maintain. Further, the plebs are unable to seize property or capitalize on partisan benefits as
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easily as the nobles, an inherent limit to their actions (I.5). Ultimately, the plebs want not to be
dominated, and to secure that freedom they will not look to seize the freedom of others, or
empower a third party to do so. At the end of the day, the underlying desire for freedom is truly a
desire for security (I.16). The prudent prince understands this desire for security, and honors it.
He is unable to provide his subjects with liberty, but by providing security (through not taking
their possessions and women) he has satisfied the desire nonetheless. Men “fling themselves into
your lap” the more a prince seems averse to seizing their freedom, as it gives them less cause to
fear for their own security (II.21.2). When the city is well ordered, and with it, the men well
governed, they will not seek or wish for any more freedoms (III.5).
The problem with modern Rome is that freedom and corruption cannot exist together. A
corrupt people cannot live free, even for a short period of time (I.16). Once corruption has taken
hold, the people are no longer united under a common goal, but are attempting to satisfy their
own self-interest. Only with a single virtuous individual does Machiavelli ever argue that a
corrupt city can become free, and even then, he qualifies the statement by saying it is only with
the “greatest difficulty” (I.17). Important here, however, is that the “single virtuous individual” is
not the founder of a republic. The individual Machiavelli claims might return freedom to a
corrupt city must order a kingly state, and not a popular one, as the corrupt people require a
kingly power to reorder them (I.18). Only one other option appears in the text, and it is to make
new everything in the city, a solution particularly useful when foundations are weak and a free
way of life is not possible (I.26). Machiavelli’s own project seems to do just this: to offer an
entirely new way of approaching politics that is appropriate for human nature which is “corrupt”
in modernity.
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Machiavelli’s argument speaks both to the capability and the desire of the people to be
involved in political life. As their desire for liberty is only such that they be secure, the people
are only actively engaging in politics when they are oppressed. This is a seamless transition from
the Prince, where Machiavelli reminds the prince to leave his subjects’ belongings alone – to
oppress the people will lead to hatred, and the prince who is hated is not prince for long. The
ancient Roman republic could get around this problem by inculcating civic virtue and religion
well used, but the modern city cannot utilize the same tools. Instead, corruption has inherently
altered Rome, and a particular, modern solution is necessary. In antiquity, the people were forced
into political life as the disunion between the plebs and the Senate gave many reason for the
people to fear their security and their oppression. In modernity, the people are contented, as their
new “equal” position in life has removed the imminent threat of noble (or any other) oppression.
Thus, modernity must recognize that the people’s love for their own liberty is truly the love of
their security, and therefore must motivate the people into political participation and ambition
using motivation based on their own self-interest. In so doing, the new modern grandi is
composed of individuals with ambitious natures, who are motivated by their own self-interest
and the prospect of glory. These individuals are best poised to bring the city to greatness, but are
also without the expressly partisan nature that comes with an entrenched nobility elevated to a
position not by merit but by birth.
Although Machiavelli never goes so far as Hobbes, this element of liberty as security
certainly finds its way into Hobbes’ regime. Both authors are writing in response to a political
circumstance of their own time, and are thus attempting to use history to understand a real
regime. In creating the Leviathan, Hobbes begins from a different perspective, as he perceives
England to have returned to the “state of nature” in the wake of the English Revolution. It is
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never clear exactly how Machiavelli would implement a regime focused on self-interest, only
that he does not understand the good of Rome and self-interest to be incompatible. Hobbes, on
the other hand, recognizes that most individuals are contented by security, and can thus create
the sovereign power who takes over the task of ruling. The people are satisfied by the prospect of
their protection at the hands of another. Hobbes initiates absolute government, a response to the
faction he perceives as being inherently problematic for politics. As such, he provides a solution
to faction by instituting the rule of one alone. Roman greatness, on the contrary, is directly
connected to the civil discord between the two humors. Modernity must find a way to motivate
the people into self-government, presumably through their own self-interest or as a means to
combat a fear of oppression. Without a nobility to do this, the prince might create a similar
“tumultuous” relationship as the plebs had with the nobility in antiquity.

Conclusion

The perception that Machiavelli is advocating a return to republican Rome is not
conjured from the imagination, as Machiavelli does in fact praise the Roman republic for its
greatness and its modes and orders. However, to exaggerate such praise and downplay the ways
in which his major works break from tradition is to do Machiavelli a disservice. Strauss’
Thoughts on Machiavelli is unequivocal in interpreting Machiavelli as a break from the ancients
and the beginning of a new modern tradition. While it is correct to search for nuance in an
attempt to find a cohesive teaching from the Prince and the Discourses, one must be cautious of
amplifying Machiavelli’s own words.
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Given the competing scholarship on the subject, it is useful to reconsider where
Machiavelli’s place lies in the history of political thought. To do this, one could choose various
threads or themes, including but not limited to virtue, religion, or liberty. For this analysis, I’ve
chosen to consider Machiavelli’s understanding of the average individual and his place in the
political regime. While others emphasize the power that Machiavelli extends to the people more
than I do, the textual evidence supports the expansion of popular control in Italy in a way that is
likely a precursor to liberal democracy. With further analysis, evidence suggests that
Machiavelli’s understanding of the best regime for modernity is one where the contention of the
nobility against the plebs is reduced to the humors of the rich and the poor. In such a system, the
rich achieve their place in society through some sort of merit, instead of through landed wealth
which he compares to tyranny.
Most importantly, in expanding the notion of citizenship to encompass a greater
population, Machiavelli is both constraining the corruption of the rich but also redefining
citizenship itself. No longer predicated on landowning or social status, political power finds its
way into the hands of the plebs – the lowest class possible. Not only is Machiavelli suggesting
that these individuals should be considered as part of the regime, he claims that they are a vital
aspect of the regime that seeks to maintain a free way of life where politics is conducted in the
appropriate realm: the public. To not revisit citizenship in modernity is to give over the
republican ideal to the partisanship of the few – which is unsustainable and ultimately a
detriment to the pursuit of greatness.
For citizenship to include such a large population, the duties and roles that define a
“citizen” must change. Machiavelli speaks on behalf of the people as protectors of freedom in the
city, while also suggesting that humans are corrupt and that one cannot eradicate this nature.
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Where ancient philosophy tasked itself with combining the citizen with active political
participation, rife with duties to oneself, one’s peers, and one’s city, Machiavelli largely ignores
the possibility of inculcating civic virtue. Instead, Machiavelli emphasizes the corruption that is
evident in cities where economic inequality is allowed to flourish. By way of solution,
Machiavelli expands political power to the people but does not attempt to change the nature of
the Italian citizen. Instead, the regime appropriate to modernity must accept both popular
political participation and popular corruption, somehow combining both aspects into a regime
that can pursue its own greatness. Civic virtue is not the appropriate means: one must refound
modes and orders when appropriate, and must keep political life public through the emphasis on
institutions that vent ambitions and an executive that stupefies his people through inspiring acts
of virtú.
At first glance, Machiavelli’s distrust of the people as rulers suggests that he cannot be
reorienting politics towards modern liberal democracy. His praise of greatness, particularly the
Roman variety, seems to accompany an argument that the people are responsible for the demise
of greatness in modernity. However, further analysis suggests that while the place of the people
as compared to the nobility does have something to do with the fall of Rome, blame does not rest
solely on the shoulders of the people. Instead, the relationship between the two humors in ancient
Rome shifts, and the innate corruption of the nobility instigates the partisan nature of the plebs.
Quietly content, secure in their liberty, the plebs become embroiled by the oppression they
perceive at the hands of the nobles – and ancient Rome is not equipped to manage the turbulent
result. Modernity’s new modes and orders must find a path to greatness under the umbrella of
self-interest and the inflamed corruption of human nature.
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Machiavelli’s political works are a first step on the path towards modern liberal thought.
To understand the fundamental effect that the earliest strains of liberalism had on political theory
is one step, but to see the effect of his works on political practice is quite another. The American
Founding presents an interesting case, one where liberalism was implemented relatively easily at
the outset, as the nation did not have an “old way” to replace. While the American founders did
not view themselves as particularly indebted to Machiavelli, the ideas on which the American
system are predicated have some Machiavellian implications. Further, in founding the new
nation upon the modern political tradition with reference to those such as Locke and
Montesquieu, the founders are actually instilling some of Machiavellian politics into the New
World.

CHAPTER 5: MACHIAVELLI’S INFLUENCE ON
THE AMERICAN FOUNDING
Having discussed the role of Machiavelli’s work in the emergence of liberalism, the last
task is to apply his work not just to liberalism as theory but liberalism in practice. Thus far, the
discussion has focused on how Machiavelli’s work critiques the ancient model and where the
earliest strains of liberalism can be found. While finding such threads is vital to understanding
how Machiavelli is the linchpin between two traditions, it is important to consider the way in
which Machiavelli declines to fully endorse a liberal agenda. Although Machiavelli could not be
aware of the liberal tradition that would follow his death, he does respond preemptively to the
mistakes that liberalism would make. I would suggest that not only does Machiavelli understand
the logical consequences of his more liberal teachings, but actively couches his assessment in
republican terms to critique the eventual oversights of liberalism.
Should Machiavelli have lived to see the emergence of modern liberalism, his major
critique of modern liberal democracy would have been in regards to the limited role it provides
for ambition, and as a consequence of that lack of ambition, a significantly diminished
opportunity for greatness. In the Roman republic, and in most aristocratic states, ambition serves
as the engine of greatness and empire. Without the ambition of great leaders with virtú, Rome
certainly could not have expanded in the way that she did – nor could she have maintained
herself as long as she did. We see Machiavelli’s commitment to ambition as he praises founders
who are one alone, in his discussions of glory as a motivator of men, and the need to satisfy the
ambition of the nobles in the creation of republican governing structures (I.5.2; I.9.2; I.37.1).
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Ambition is a catalyst for greatness, but is also an engine of destruction. The city
governed by a good prince will see the nefarious consequences of ambition eliminated (I.10.5) as
laws against excessive ambition are needed to check human nature (I.18.2). The draw of
ambition is powerful in humans, so powerful that it “never abandons” them; once the people find
themselves secured against the nobles, their ambition incites them to fight for a further share of
honors (I.37.1). As a solution, Machiavelli suggests creating institutions that help “vent” and
satisfy ambitions. This engenders a framework where some ambitions are fulfilled through
honors and property, while others are dispelled through the proper institutions that fill the people
with a sense of accomplishment and political efficacy.
Modern liberal democracy is a potential antithesis of ambition, as republican ambition is
traditionally understood as promulgated by a noble class. Liberal democracy, particularly in the
works of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau reject giving elevated political status to individuals
based on social status and wealth. Particularly important here is the rejection of extra political
power finding itself in the hands of the higher classes, and thus at the expense of the multitude.
As has already been shown, Machiavelli shares a general distrust of the noble class in modernity,
but also understands the necessity of an ambitious grandi in facilitating greatness. Machiavelli’s
solution to this problem is to redefine the grandi while expanding the role of the multitude. The
grandi still exist, though are no longer a “noble” class. The people, charged with maintaining a
free way of life, are strong enough to check the grandi when necessary – and the strength of the
executive provides its own ambition while also checking the entirety of the political system.
Thus, Machiavelli argues one should manage ambition in a modern setting by
institutionalizing practices that both curb corruption and inspire ambition. For Machiavelli, the
executive is significantly powerful, and a necessary component to ambition. The self-interest of
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the executive, for both glory and material well-being, is best understood as connected to the
interest of the city. Further, the grandi remain as a class with access to a certain amount of
accumulated wealth. However, their status comes from their own merit instead of their birth. In
this situation, individuals are motivated to become a member of the grandi, while in the past,
one’s birth would have excluded or included him. In Machiavelli’s prescription for modernity,
ambition remains a powerful engine of the regime. While the regime is certainly more
democratic, Machiavelli is unwilling to fully accept democratic mores at the expense of ambition
and greatness.
Just as the discussion about aristocratic values and their opposition to democracy began
long before Machiavelli, it has continued long after his death. In the history of political thought,
those who followed Machiavelli gave shape to the liberal understanding of personhood where
individual autonomy is salient and the social contract is the only legitimate foundation for
consent-based politics. Many nations attempted to democratize their political regimes, but
encountered significant backlash.1 In contrast to those nations, the United States had a much
easier time introducing the ideas of liberalism into practice. As a fledgling country, the U.S. was
advantaged by having no need to replace an “old way” – namely, a landed aristocracy with the
associated privileges.2 This leads Tocqueville to declare America the “extreme limit of
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Tocqueville refers to the French Revolution early in his introduction, claiming that France has
“abandoned what goods our former state could present without acquiring what useful things the current
state could offer; we have destroyed an aristocratic society, and having stopped complacently amid the
debris of the former edifice, we seem to want to settle there forever” (pg. 10). While Tocqueville argues
that the world is moving inevitably towards democracy, Edmund Burke cautions of the French
Revolution: “the Republicans in France, and their associates in other countries, make it always their
business . . . to destroy all traces of ancient establishments, and to form a new commonwealth in each
country, upon the basis of the French Rights of Men” (See Thoughts on the French Revolution, in Fidler
and Welsh 1999; pages 235-320).
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democracy,” suggesting that the U.S. is the most democratic country of his time, but also the
most democratic nation possible.3 Significant scholarship exists on the influence of Locke and
Montesquieu, among others, on the founding era in America. For many reasons the connections
to Machiavelli are less widely studied. Given my argument that Machiavelli was influential to
the liberal philosophical tradition, the application of Machiavelli’s liberalism to a political
regime is useful evidence of this thesis. By reading documents that surround the founding, or in
the case of Tocqueville comment on it, we can see the ways in which Machiavellian liberalism
influenced the debate surrounding the American founding and the writing of the Constitution.
Throughout the early liberal tradition, the most salient drawback of democracy remains
its challenge to ambition. As the ancient republican model transitions into a liberal democratic
one, the aristocratic ambition that once served as the engine of the republic is threatened. By
relying on the people as creators of their own government and future, modern democracy is less
able to facilitate greatness than its ancient counterpart. Machiavelli understands ambition as an
important part of the nature of the nobles, but argues a new grandi based on merit is the best way
to engender ambition and democratic mores in the modern city. In a very similar way, the
American founding attempts to both encourage and restrain ambition through the creation of its
political institutions. To address the founding alongside Machiavelli provides a new
understanding of the roots of the American way of life, one that finds its origin in Machiavelli’s
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A direct impact of the lack of aristocratic mores in America is the lack of class conflict. Brudney (1984)
argues that due to the lack of class conflict, Americans faultily assume (through their dependence on
Locke) that republicanism can exist without conflict. Machiavelli knows this is not the case, and
considers class divisions to be a necessary aspect of economic life. Further, Brudney argues that
Americans do not understand their own liberalism and its foundations, and thus become “hysterical”
when any challenge to it emerges.
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political works. Both the founding and Machiavelli address the pitfalls of liberalism in their
attempt to formulate the proper institutions for modernity. Ultimately, both settle upon an
institutional solution to the discrepancies associated with liberalism, instead of returning to past
republican mores.

Machiavelli’s influence on the American founding

The first and easiest method of finding the influence of any particular thinker is to look
for instances where their work is cited by later generations. In the case of Machiavelli, this is
mostly a futile exercise. There is very little evidence of direct reading of Machiavelli by the
founders, as they mostly do not cite him by name or mention his works.4 Some early American
political figures discussed Machiavelli quite frequently; while some are recognizable names from
our political past - including John Winthrop - they were not directly relevant to the founding
itself. To give one example, political debate in the New England states in the years predating the
Declaration of Independence included two distinct interpretations of Machiavelli: as a proponent
of elite centered governing, and as a supporter of popular government.5 Thus, not only was
Machiavelli directly referenced in a political debate on American soil, but his works were used in
ways that echo the scholarly debates and political issues that still exist today.
One particular founding figure used Machiavelli’s work frequently in his attempt to
understand the institutional limitations of democracy and the pitfalls of human nature: John
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Thompson (1995); Rosen (2006).

See Maloy (2011) for a discussion of the use of Machiavelli’s work to justify both sides of the political
debate surrounding John Winthrop’s vision for Massachusetts.
5
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Adams. While Adams is not always included in discussion of the debates that surrounded the
6

American founding, he was nevertheless incredibly important to the conversation and would go
on to become the second president of the new United States of America. In his Defense of the
Constitutions of the United States, John Adams is impressed with Machiavelli’s methodological
approach to politics, particularly his emphasis on what man is instead of what he ought to be.7
By way of reviving Machiavelli’s work, Adams hoped to transcend Machiavelli’s “new modes
and orders” in applying them to the current day American situation; by aiming to build upon
Machiavelli’s institutional framework with the Montesquieu’s idea of the separation of powers.
Outside of John Adams, direct references to Machiavelli are hard to find. Madison’s
work includes only three citations of Machiavelli, although there is evidence that he
recommended Machiavelli’s works to the Continental Congress.8 Earlier examples, such as the
debates over John Winthrop’s leadership delve seriously into Machiavelli’s work; and other
minor examples can be found spread throughout various texts.9 Although Machiavelli was not
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Although Machiavelli was a positive influence on John Adams, he did not agree with Machiavelli on all
matters. While he generally agreed with Machiavelli about the instability of human nature, Adams
disagreed on how to prevent and withstand the forces of social conflict. Adams sees Machiavelli’s “mixed
government” as a useful tool, but not sufficient without the more modern doctrine of the separation of
powers. Adams differentiates himself further from Machiavelli by suggesting that it is plausible to
eventually overcome human nature via constitutionalism. See Thompson (1995) pg. 415-417.
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directly on the minds of those who formed the American regime, his works shaped the thought of
those whose who would later influence the American regime.10 I do not suggest that statesmen at
the time “hid” their references to Machiavelli by referring to others, but that the ideas that are
influential to the founders might not have originated in the works to which they give credit.
Thus, the discussion of Machiavelli’s influence on the founding period is significantly more
robust through ideas traced to Machiavelli than through direct references found in primary
documents.
One conversation at the founding echoes the tension found in Machiavelli’s work
regarding the greatness of the aristocratic past and the democratic mores of modernity. As
Machiavelli finds that a certain aristocratic element is useful for society even in modernity, so
too do some founders who seek to institutionalize a small group of “wise” senators. While the
Federalist Papers argue that the Senate will be constituted of everyday citizens, the antiFederalists, along with Jefferson and others, believe such institutions will create an informal
American “grandi” that does not belong in modern liberal democracy. These dissenters may in
fact be correct, but the resulting institutional framework is one that Machiavelli would, for the
most part, endorse. While Machiavelli is concerned that ambition is weakened too greatly by
democratic institutions, the American founders believe they have found a way to ameliorate the
problems ambition poses to democratic mores while still engendering a spirit of progress and
greatness. Lastly, as is seen directly in Adams’ discussion of Machiavelli’s work but also in the

Machiavelli’s renewal of orders as a positive aspect of Constitutional politics, an important debate of the
framers including Jefferson.
See West (1991); Strauss (1995). Strauss’s argument is that the earliest threads of liberalism can be
seen in Machiavelli and later developed in writers such as Hobbes and Locke, thus presenting a
reasonable question: are references to Locke and Hobbes, among other moderns, indirect references to
Machiavelli?
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Federalist Papers, the founders share Machiavelli’s concerns about human nature and the
potential of citizens to self-rule, particularly as it pertains to the corruption that can come from
excessive ambition. The shared concern over the proper combination of ambition and popular
institutions offers a practical application of Machiavelli’s work that underscores his importance
to the history of political thought as it pertains to democracy, and further, the tradition of
American political thought.

Foundations of the American regime

As Maloy (2011) points out, Machiavelli’s writings were used by American political
figures to justify both an aristocratic form of government and a more popular one. John Winthrop
relied on Machiavelli’s strong executive to argue the best government for the new colonies
would be predicated on elite rule. Others rejected this argument and this reading of Machiavelli,
using his work to substantiate an argument in favor of expanded popular control and the
elimination of aristocratic mores.
This debate continues throughout documents that surround the founding of America.
Some founders, including Hamilton and Madison in the Federalist Papers seem committed to
maintaining an “elite” element of government within the American system while using
democratic rhetoric. Others, particularly Jefferson (who is eventually joined by Madison in his
later writings) are concerned that America is instituting a “artificial aristocracy” instead of a
“natural” one.11 The prospect of individuals rising to the top on their own merit is Jefferson’s

See Onuf (2015) on Jefferson’s views on aristocracy; Faulkner (2008) on Jefferson’s commitment to
popular sovereignty and science.
11
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idea of a natural aristocracy, and an important support for good government. However, in
establishing representative government, Jefferson fears that in practice, the Constitution will
exclude those deserving of office in favor of those with social or political connections. As
Machiavelli understood the proper aristocracy to be a natural one, based on merit, Jefferson and
Machiavelli seem to be in agreement with respect to this issue. In his commitment to popular
vigilance, Jefferson’s ideas are akin to Machiavelli’s desire to arm the people. Though not
necessarily motivated by active political participation, Jefferson is concerned that America’s
grandi will turn into the wolves that might devour the people – the “sheep.”
Adams similarly recognizes two Machiavellis to be found within the same works: one
Machiavelli as the advocate of republican values and institutions, another the teacher of evil. At
heart, Adams agrees with Machiavelli’s depiction of “aristocratic pride and democratic envy” as
being the two most important passions that drive human nature – and thus the history of societies
will continue to repeat itself as those passions battle one another for control.12 Adams, the sole
founder who openly cites Machiavelli’s works, chooses to emphasize the republican character of
his writings and suggests ways to apply this to the modern American situation. Throughout the
founding era, the rhetoric in favor of popular sovereignty continues to flourish, leaving behind
the advocacy on behalf of an aristocratic system, or the institution of American grandi.
Madison’s writings suggest he expects the people to maintain the freedom established by the
Constitutional Convention, which can only be accomplished through fostering a constitutional
passion in the people, wherein they view the Constitution as an end in and of itself.13 The
confidence these individuals have in a truly popular foundation of American politics
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differentiates them from Machiavelli. While Machiavelli recognizes the importance of a mixture
of aristocratic and popular values in maintaining greatness, the rhetoric of the founding suggests
that greatness is found in the governing principles that underlie the American political system.
The very first essay in the Federalist Papers provides the justification for the new
Constitution and its basis in popular foundations. Hamilton argues in his first paragraph that the
people of America have been charged with deciding “whether societies of men are really capable
or not, of establishing good government from reflection and choice” instead of founding
government on “accident and force” such as in the wake of war.14 Hamilton’s own views align
with the argument for popular sovereignty, though anti-Federalists would accuse him of wanting
to create strong, elite centered federal government. Hamilton’s discussion here of good
government as derivative of reflection and choice speaks to his vision of the perfect
commonwealth, an “imagined republic” in Machiavelli’s terms.15 Hamilton’s project, and that of
the Federalist more generally, is to create a nation that is a moral antithesis of an imperious
republic. At least in the defense of the Constitution provided by the Federalist, the reader is to
understand its institutional design as empowering the people above all else.
Although the rhetoric employed by the Federalist presents the Constitution as a safeguard
for popular government, Jefferson and the anti-Federalists question whether it upholds those
principles or, rather, if instead the Constitution empowers a wealthy elite analogous to the landed
nobility that Machiavelli despises in modernity. Jefferson questions the indirect linkages between
many political offices and the people. Specifically, he disagrees with the appointment of judges
to the Supreme Court and other federal bench seats as well as the ability of the president to
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appoint his cabinet officers. Further, Jefferson questions the election of senators, who hold their
seats for a longer period and represent an unsustainable number of constituents.16 In creating
such positions, Jefferson argues that the Constitution holds the people at an arm’s length instead
of actively involving them in the creation of true representative government.
Throughout the Federalist, Publius reacts to similar arguments made by the antiFederalists. In Federalist 57, Publius justifies, though rather weakly, the method of electing
members of Congress to show that those elected will mirror the social and economic
circumstances of their average constituents. Publius’ argument rests on the lack of “qualification
of wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or of civil profession” to say that every citizen whose
“merit may recommend him” is equally able to become an elected member of the new
government.17 The argument of the anti-Federalists and Jefferson is that the method of election
will lead to the election of those who enjoy a higher status or wealth, for reasons including name
recognition and resources needed to gain such positions. The Federalist does not provide a
satisfying rationale for how classism will be avoided, beyond stating that the absence of required
qualifications will allow any interested to run. In Publius’ justification of the Senate, however,
the informal American grandi thesis starts to gain strength. Senators must be older and have held
citizenship for a longer period of time, requirements justified by the “nature of the senatorial
trust” which requires a greater “stability of character.”18 A senator participates “immediately in
transactions with foreign nations” and thus ought to be fully weaned “from the prepossessions
and habits incident to foreign birth and education.” Further, at the time of the Constitution until
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the ratification of the 17 Amendment, Senators were appointed by state legislators – something
th

Jefferson would argue leads to the exchange of partisan (financial) benefits in return for
appointments.

Ambition

The Federalist Papers are riddled with references to ambition, and the institutional
means of diffusing its effects. Many mentions of ambition are attempts to show that the
Constitution will prevent ambition from destroying the new country. Some examples include
Federalist 27, where Publius argues that even if national rulers were “actuated by the most
ungovernable ambition” they would not employ “preposterous means” to satisfy it.19 In 46,
Publius suggests that America is advantaged by arming its citizenry and by its federal structure,
incorporating several subordinate governments “to which the people are more attached,” which
itself provides a barrier against ambition.20 A third example comes from 62, which contains the
argument that the bicameral legislature ensures that both houses would have to concur in order
for ambition to become dangerous; with a lesser institutional design, the ambition of one house
would be enough to corrupt the whole.21
The most useful discussion of ambition comes in the famous Federalist 51, where
Publius points to the real crux of his solution to ambition. As John Adams stated earlier, the
American Constitution surpasses Machiavelli’s institutional plans to prevent corruption by
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including the separation of powers amongst multiple branches. In 51, Publius is responding to
the charge that the separation of powers may one day collapse, and all power will be in the hands
of one individual, or one branch. He argues that the safeguard against this comes from “giving to
those who administer each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives,
to resist encroachments of the others.” He summarizes his position thus: “ambition must be made
to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights
of the place.”22 Here, Publius’ argument sounds particularly Machiavellian. It is not the case that
Publius is attempting to eradicate ambition from government, but instead trying to channel it in
such a way as to create good effects instead of negative ones. The proper American government
will create institutions that satisfy the ambition of individuals, thus preventing them from seeking
out additional powers from other branches of government. Further, those elected to office will be
tied to their constituents as it is only through pleasing them that they might find themselves
reelected. As Publius states, “duty, gratitude, interest, and ambition itself” are the ties that bind
republican legislators to the people they claim to represent.23 In creating such a system, the
representatives are able to satisfy their own ambition and penchant for glory, but are restrained
by the institutional checks on their power from both other branches and the sovereignty of the
people themselves.
Like Machiavelli, Publius considers unchecked ambition to be a key cause of corruption.
While ambition is a necessary tool for a republic with desires to expand such as Rome or the
founding of the expansionist American republic, ambition becomes problematic when the
ambitious accumulate too much power. Though Machiavelli argues that an overly ambitious
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individual will become corrupt as he seeks partisan benefits and creates disruptive factions
within city, Publius seems to argue that ambition’s most problematic characteristic is to
undermine popular sovereignty. Without mitigating the effects of ambitious individuals in
government, America would fail in achieving the project set out in the very first essay of the
Federalist – to create government from reflection and choice, predicated on the idea of the
sovereign American people.
Even more akin to Machiavelli, Publius understands a relatively strong executive to be an
essential part of the modern mixed government. Though Publius’ executive is significantly
weaker than Machiavelli’s, the executive created by the Constitution was highly controversial to
the American people. Having recently separated from the monarchy of England, most Americans
were unhappy with the idea that a president might “rule” – thus, the first “Constitution,” the
Articles of Confederation, did not include a president at all. In the Federalist, many essays
discuss the role of the executive, in part to quell the fears of anti-Federalists that
institutionalizing an office of the president might become akin to the monarchy America had just
fought so hard to reject. Federalist 70 discusses the necessity of a vigorous and energetic
executive at the helm of the government. The next Paper, 71, argues that the executive must be
independent from the other branches of government, and 73 reiterates the need to support the
vigor of executive authority. Within the papers focused on the executive, the Federalist rejects
the idea of a multi-person “president,” denies the legitimacy of heredity or lifetime
appointments, and establishes the possibility of impeachment and removal from office (69).
Though the anti-Federalists worried that such a strong presidential office would be in contention
with the “republican form,” Publius argues that each provision actually institutionalizes good
behavior. As the president can run for reelection, it is in his interest to treat his constituents, the
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American people, well. Further, an individual who has served as president of the United States
for four years is likely well experienced in statecraft – something akin to Machiavellian virtú.
Thus, reelection allows the republic to maintain the rule of those most deserving, an important
pillar of greatness. The president is a single person not only for efficiency and strength, but to
prevent the possibility that the American people would not know who to hold accountable in the
event of disaster.
Just as Machiavelli views ambition as a necessary component for the republic aspiring to
greatness, so too did the American republican empire have to contend with ambition in
government. Machiavelli uses institutional factors to constrain rulers to act in a certain way – just
as the Federalist would later justify the checks and balances found in the Constitution,
particularly where it came to the role of the executive. Only with the proper restraints can
ambition be harnessed into greatness, but the regime must be careful not to concentrate too much
ambition in its leaders. Ambition is an important driving mechanism of the great regime; thus
ambition must be made to counteract ambition as one’s personal interest must be connected to
the interest of the whole.

Human Nature

The American founders accepted and endorsed Machiavelli’s liberal understanding of
human nature as wicked and in need of constraint, while also endorsing a more republican idea
of a “higher good.” However, for the American founders, that higher good was not necessarily
philosophy or human excellence – it was the creation of good self-government. While the
Federalist and Adams both discuss the need to restrain human nature through institutions, and
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also dismiss the possibility of habituating individuals to virtue, they do seem to argue that the
American multitude is capable of the restraint necessary to create and maintain good
government. Machiavelli, on the other hand, seems to argue that no regime can maintain itself
forever, and thus no multitude is able to facilitate good government for very long without a
periodic refounding.
The Federalist might be most in line with Machiavelli’s teaching in its depiction of
human nature. One of the most famous of the Papers, 10, argues that men are factitious and
actuated by their own passions at the expense of others. The factitious nature of men as described
in Federalist 10 is similar to Machiavelli’s understanding of partisan corruption: people are
motivated by their own self-interest, even when one’s interest is “adverse to the rights of other
citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the whole.”24 Machiavelli argues that the
partisan nature of men will lead them to empower individuals such as Caesar from whom they
can acquire personal benefit – the Federalist concurs, positing that individuals will have “an
attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power” whose
“fortunes have been interesting to the human passions.”25 Human nature has thus divided people
into parties that are fundamentally opposed to one another, and “rendered them much more
disposed to vex and oppress each other” than to work together in order to foster their common
good.26 Further, the Federalist refers to men as “ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious” by
nature27 – all terms that sound as if they could be found in Machiavelli’s own work. This nature
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is not only depicted as negative, but also as fixed throughout the “uniform course of human
events,” another potential reference to Machiavelli.28 References to the negative qualities of
human nature are referenced throughout both Machiavelli’s works and the Federalist, and both
also understand human nature to be unchanging in all times. While Machiavelli prefers the world
partisan and the Federalist uses the term factitious, the definitions and understanding of human
nature remain the same. Unchained human nature and ambition will lead to corruption as
individuals seek out partisan benefits at the expense of greatness.
Human nature is vicious, yet both argue for the necessity of popular institutions. That
said, both do also understand human nature is something that must be accommodated by the
structure of government, as opposed to a characteristic that can be overcome through virtue,
moderation, or another form of habituation or enlightenment.29 The Federalist, just like
Machiavelli, argues that one cannot force or count upon moderation of others – and thus also
cannot extinguish the ambition of others.30 Institutions that depend on the stability of human
tranquility are foolhardy at the very least and doomed to fail under the burden of true human
nature. Publius sums up the role of government in constraining human nature with the famous
formulation: “if men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern
men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.”31 Government
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must be constructed in such a way as to control the nature of humans in their relations with one
another; it also must be constructed to control ambition within the government itself.
Machiavelli’s works show agreement with these principles, that human nature cannot simply be
overcome without the strength of well-ordered institutions.
Machiavelli and Publius have remarkably similar understandings of human nature, just as
John Adams draws heavily on Machiavelli in his own political treatise. However, the Federalist
diverges from Machiavelli in its hope for the future of democracy in America, and the desire of
individuals for good self-government. Machiavelli envisions a populace that gets involved in
politics only when their oppression becomes too much to withstand. The Federalist, on the other
hand, discusses democratic deliberation and self-government as a normative goal of individuals –
that enlightened individuals are driven by the need to govern themselves, or at least take part in
the decisions that will govern them. Machiavelli’s discussion of the good aspects of human
nature revolve around the benefit for the city when the people get involved and balance the
ambition of the nobility. The Federalist, though, argues “there are other qualities in human
nature, which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence.” Not only do these qualities
exist, but “republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree
than any other form.” Should a positive aspect of human nature not exist, it would be only
through despotism that men could be governed and their passions controlled. Both the Federalist
and Adams take for granted that the drive towards self-government will motivate men to
overcome the negative aspects of their own natures. Just as Machiavelli dispenses with the idea
of inculcating civic virtue, so too do the American founders – however, they assume that their
own attachment to self-government and democratic institutions can be understood as part of
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enlightened human nature, and thus, a self-government is an assumed motivation for all
Americans.
Though Machiavelli and Publius both discuss the role of ambition in democratic
institutions, their conclusions are somewhat different. Machiavelli emphasizes the necessity of
ambition in the great regime, and questions the ability of egalitarian democracy to engender such
ambition. For Machiavelli, the apparent purpose of restraining ambition is to protect the people
from the oppression of powerful leaders, but one must find a balance between protection and the
need for ambition as a device of greatness. The rhetoric of the Federalist maintains a similar
argument, though Publius also seems to emphasize the need to protect the government from the
ambition of the people. In 51, Publius discusses the restraint of ambitious leaders, but American
institutions are also set up in such a way as to disconnect the people from its elite governors.
While it is possible that the hybrid position of the Federalist can be explained by its role as
propaganda for the new Constitution, it also can be seen as a misapplication of Machiavellian
principles. In its quest to restrain ambition, the Federalist does not engender it in a public way,
which is the only means to prevent corruption. Instead, Publius misunderstands human nature to
be inherently driven by the need to self-govern, neglecting the true nature of self-interest and
individual ambition. In this construction, Publius overlooks the need to force an inherently
private nature of men into the public sphere in order to ameliorate the effects of corruption.

Tocqueville’s assessment of America

Some 70 years past the American Revolution, Tocqueville’s visit to America provides a
fruitful glimpse into democratic institutions in the New World. As an outsider, a Frenchman
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interested in the extent to which democracy was implemented across the Atlantic Ocean,
Tocqueville’s Democracy in America presents a friendly critique of not only American
democratic institutions, but of democracy as such. Though Tocqueville is certainly not a part of
the American founding, nor was he privy to the political discussions and traditions that spawned
the American Constitution, he does provide a theoretical assessment unrivaled by other thinkers
of his time. Tocqueville’s 1830s visit to America comes after both the writings of modern
thinkers who influence our understanding of liberal democracy, including Montesquieu, Locke,
and Rousseau, and also after the American founding. Tocqueville’s treatise presents a
particularly interesting perspective of democratic politics from a non-American individual who is
himself uncertain of democracy and its implications.
While Machiavelli’s discussion of ambition and democracy is buried amongst praise of
the ancients and talk of modern corruption, Tocqueville provides a more succinct teaching on
ambition and democracy by way of the American regime. His own French aristocratic
background makes his perspective useful, as he concurs with Machiavelli’s understanding of
ambition as the driving force of a successful regime. Further, he clearly articulates the
connection of aristocracy and ambition, and goes on to suggest that greatness and democracy are
often mutually exclusive. In reference to America, Tocqueville offers some possible institutional
changes in order to solve some of the problems he discerns, but he also provides a warning for
America’s future. Already in the 1830s he sees a lack of distinction in American culture;
America’s dearth of greatness amongst individuals in society combines with its lack of political
greatness to create a New World devoid of inventions and development. While the founders
considered America a novel example of enlightened self-government, Tocqueville provides a
Machiavellian critique in his concern for the future of democracy. Though Tocqueville is
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skeptical of aristocracy in his own way, he too understands the need for a grandi to propel the
regime to greatness.

Aristocratic honor into democratic pride

For Tocqueville, aristocracy itself is a human convention created by individuals to
maintain their supremacy over others. Included here is a new code of morality, that praises and
blames the actions of men not on the “intrinsic value” of those actions, but “in relation to
whoever their author or object was,” a code that is itself “repugnant to the general conscience of
the human race.”32 In creating a new code of honor, a nobility is able to create its own separate
body amidst the people that requires not only political privileges to maintain itself, but also its
own understanding of vices and virtues.33 Thus, individuals are not equal under the law, but are
blamed or praised in proportion to their actions and their place in society. If it is the case that all
men are born equal, such as Locke and Hobbes suggest, this is in itself “repugnant” to such an
understanding of humanity. To institute one class of individuals as politically superior to the rest
requires the creation of conventions that support such unnatural precepts. The maintenance of
this convention requires an emphasis on military courage, as aristocratic institutions are “born of
war.”34 Aristocratic honor is predicated on military courage as its power is rooted in war, and the
glory that maintains aristocracies is also found in military successes. Feudal societies obscure the
foundation of the fatherland, and instead focus the love and devotion of its subjects onto one
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man, the signeur. The love of fatherland reappears as central in the ascendency of democracy, as
classes are “destroyed and power centralized.”35
Amongst his many criticisms, Tocqueville also includes the benefits of such a regime.
Just as does Machiavelli, Tocqueville finds “a greatness and a force” among men in aristocracies.
That greatness and force fosters the individual opinions of aristocratic man, where his democratic
counterpart is easily flustered by the majority opinion.36 As such, a general sense of oppression is
engendered by the drive towards equality, as men are likely to doubt their own opinion when it
fails to match that of the majority. The diversity of opinion encouraged in aristocratic society is
beneficial, as otherwise the retreat into individualism leads to democratic selfishness and the
disintegration of bonds between men. The need for democratic man to see himself as equal to
others further leads to an obsession with wealth. Though one might think aristocratic man would
be more concerned with his material well-being, Tocqueville argues that such a man has never
experienced any other life than one of wealth and power, and thus lives without much thought
towards material gain. In contrast, democratic man is selfish; uninterested in the plight of his
fellow man and fixated on his own wealth.
The democratic desire for material well-being inherently alters honor found in such
societies.37 In the American case, honor is predicated on industrial and commercial interests – so
much so that America forces work onto all individuals, even those who have other sources of

35

D.A., pg. 592.

36

D.A., pg. 615.

37

Tocqueville eventually defines honor as the particular interests and needs of a nation, independent of
general human needs, that lead to the establishment of opinions on the matter of praise and blame. (D.A.,
pg. 598).

165
wealth. Democratic peoples in general are passionate about the acquisition of wealth as they
38

have social mobility unheard of in aristocratic times. The inflated influence of public opinion in
democracies transforms honor into an unfixed, malleable concept that changes over time. This is
contrary to aristocratic honor, which is in all times fixed and stable, as a caste system creates its
own particular needs within the society. In a democratic state, the conventional supports of
aristocratic honor are removed, and all that is left is true human nature which is motivated by
self-interest and wealth, but is not tied to the interests of the state. In Tocqueville’s view, the
democratic state is not only without the ties that bind the people to one another, but also to the
well-being of the state.

Ambition and pride in America

One of Tocqueville’s most salient critiques of American democracy is the transformation
of ambition under the new American institutions and mores. Though the American Constitution
does not legally prohibit ambition and acquisition, Tocqueville argues that the mores of society
prevent the fruits of ambition from growing. He finds two phenomena in the United States: first,
that the vast majority of people seek to improve on their original position in society, and second,
that only a small number of great ambitions stand out among the people.39 Thus, while all
Americans show a desire to acquire wealth to move up from their original social position into
one of higher status, almost no Americans stand out as being men of particularly great ambition.
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Instead, democratic citizens settle for desires that are proportional to their means. This lack of
40

great ambition is problematic as ambition is a necessary component of political greatness. In the
absence of ambition and desire for political greatness, Tocqueville sees lack of progress in
society as indicative of democracies.41
While the equality of conditions prevents an upper class from forming in a democracy,
this is not necessarily a positive quality of the regime. Normatively, America and other countries
with democratic mores desire the end of caste systems, both formal and informal versions.
Legally, American institutions provide all citizens with the same rights, a necessary step in
overcoming the aristocratic regimes of the not so distant past. However, as the institutions do not
prevent individuals from becoming excessively wealthy, it is the “democratic mores” to which
Tocqueville attributes the absence of an informal upper class. Just as Machiavelli does,
Tocqueville understands ambition to be the engine that drives the regime towards greatness.
Without a political system that engenders ambition, a nation risks the “immobility” and slow
advancement characteristic of democracies. If the goal of the regime is equality, then democracy
in American is doing its job. If the goal is greatness, then Tocqueville is troubled by the direction
of society in the States.
The nature of democratic man as Tocqueville understands him is similarly problematic
for both his and Machiavelli’s understanding of greatness. As was already mentioned,
democratic mores generate a passion for individual wealth in order to preserve one’s own station,
without a passion for amassing the wealth of the nation. Part of the problem with the nature of
democratic man is his pride and the way in which it manifests. The pride of democratic man is
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strong in his comparisons between himself and others – democratic man is always concerned
with seeing himself rise above those around him.42 This is itself problematic, as it does not create
the consolidation of individual interests necessary to propel the society as a whole towards
greatness. While man’s pride with respect to others is inflamed, his inner pride is absent.
Tocqueville asserts that while democratic man always believes himself superior to his neighbors,
the same man “despises himself to the point that he believes himself made only to taste vulgar
pleasures.”43 The result of this is individuals who “settle into mediocre desires” instead of “lofty
undertakings” and a sense of humility that is “not healthy” for them.44 The lack of internal pride
and ambition is problematic for democracies, as individuals are dissuaded from the acquisitions
that make cities and societies truly great. Just as Machiavelli understands humility to be the
Achilles’ heel of virtú, so too does Tocqueville recognize the negative aspect of democratic
individualism on a society’s potential for greatness.
While Machiavelli and Tocqueville might seem to be an “odd couple,” their concerns
about the sustainability of greatness and stability in modernity are quite similar. Machiavelli’s
concerns come on the cusp of the emergence of the liberal tradition, and while he advocates for
the advancement of some liberal principles, I argue that would have some reservations about the
manner in which Machiavellianism became liberalism. Centuries later, Tocqueville reiterates a
critique of modern liberalism, but from the perspective of a further developed idea of liberalism
that included the entrenchment of liberal institutions and mores in modern regimes.45 Though
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both find an important role for the people in political institutions (Tocqueville more so than
Machiavelli), both attempt to mix liberal and republican institutions to protect liberal ideas
without giving up the stability and energy found in the republican past. To do this, both
emphasize the need of a grandi to engender the ambition necessary to combat democratic
individualism, which is both volatile and unable to foster greatness. Such greatness is imperative
for the nation that wishes to grow its empire; for a thinker such as Machiavelli who focuses on
power politics, a nation cannot maintain itself without greatness.

Foundations of modern democracy

Machiavelli understands ambition to be a catalyst: of greatness, certainly, but also
destruction when improperly harnessed by the political regime. Modern democratic theorists,
including Machiavelli himself, attempt to moderate the influence of ambition by dissolving the
caste system that gave rise to strong, aristocratic ambition. However, where Machiavelli is
nuanced in his depiction of the grandi, arguing that some sort of upper class must remain the
locus of ambition for the city to achieve greatness, many who followed him attempted to further
enfeeble aristocratic mores to facilitate egalitarianism. The American founding presents an
example of this normative commitment to equality of conditions and democratic self-rule. In
creating three separate branches of government, the founders initiated a system of checks and
balances that at heart is meant to control the negative consequences of ambition.
But, not so fast. Before accepting a depiction of the founders as beneficent purveyors of
democratic self-rule and equality under the law, one must first revisit the constitutional debates
of the time. Thomas Jefferson, along with the anti-Federalists, viewed the Constitution as
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empowering an informal grandi through its elective offices and nonelective institutions. In truth,
while the Federalist attempts to argue that those chosen to represent the people will be actually
be representative of the average American citizen, its detractors have gained evidence in the
many years since their deaths. Elected representatives are decidedly not demographically similar
to those they represent: as of 2012, more than 50% of members of Congress had a net worth
higher than $1 million; as opposed to less than 1% of all Americans. The Federalist directly
responds to the charge that the House will be less than descriptive of the population more
generally, arguing unconvincingly that as the people will be voting, they will certainly vote for
those who are “like” them. However, as the anti-Federalists and Jefferson understood, those who
were elected to office would be of an informal higher class: those who could afford to run, those
who had the notoriety required to win, and those with the requisite ambition. Similarly, the
choice to allow state legislators to appoint senators, the lifetime terms of federal judges, and the
president’s ability to appoint his own cabinet further engendered a system of private political
benefits and informal aristocratic systems – at least in the minds of Jefferson and the antiFederalists.
The Machiavellian argument in favor of a modern grandi suggests the following
question: were the founders really unaware of the aristocratic mores they were mixing into the
New World democracy? Were the arguments in the Federalist and elsewhere really only lip
service to the arguments presented by the Jeffersonian democrats? To substantiate either claim,
one would have to delve deeply into the letters of the founding era to compare the arguments
made in private to the arguments made in the most public of places in support of the new
Constitution. However, some preliminary claims seem relevant here. If, indeed, the Jeffersonians
of the founding era were on to something in their instinct that the Constitution was creating an
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“artificial aristocracy,” the preceding arguments of both Machiavelli and Tocqueville support the
establishment of such mores. Machiavelli’s skepticism of a nobility in modernity does not lead
him to discount entirely the necessity of a grandi in order to pursue greatness. Tocqueville, an
aristocrat sympathetic to the normative desires of democracy, seems to further encourage a more
nuanced understanding of the two regimes. In the modern context, particularly the American one,
any formal aristocracy or nobility would be refused, leaving the founders with only one means of
harnessing ambition through the new Constitution: through creating democratic institutions that
nevertheless attracted a certain class or an unofficial aristocracy.
Just as Machiavelli’s modern grandi is a meritocracy, so too is the American version.
Institutionally, all individuals are capable of attaining elected political office. In practice,
however, a separation is easily seen between the “multitude” and the governing elites. This is not
to say that the American system is wrong; on the contrary, according to Machiavelli, the
American system is very right – except for the ease with which individuals of upper class wealth
are able to take office at the expense of those of real merit. Strong captains such as Cincinnatus
are praised by Machiavelli for their virtú regardless of their poverty; it is particularly important
to Machiavelli that men of virtú are found to lead the city to greatness, and they are often found
amongst the lower classes (III.25.1). The well-ordered city rewards virtú no matter from which
class it originates. In the same way, the American system allows the ascendance of individuals to
the highest ranks if they so merit. American rhetoric about the “self-made man” has surrounded
the election of many of our presidents from meager backgrounds, including Abraham Lincoln.
Such rhetoric corresponds well with the American commitment to industry and commerce,
though in reality it may be wealth, not merit, that propels Americans into political office. At the
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same time, American mores harness the ambition of an informal grandi as a means to empire and
greatness.
Machiavelli’s implied critique of modern liberal democracy can thus be understood.
While Machiavelli did not live to see the trajectory of the liberal tradition, it can certainly be
argued, and I hope I have done so, that Machiavelli foresaw the course of modernity in its
acceptance of democracy. As Tocqueville would argue some 300 years later, the modern liberal
tradition is most problematic in its inability to foster greatness. Democratic mores, far from
facilitating greatness, engender mediocrity as society fragments into individuals and families.
Without moderately stable in-groups, the state dissolves into individual interests as opposed to
consolidated group interests, which are inherently stronger. As a result, the interests of many
disappear in the midst of many competing ideas. Although Machiavelli certainly understands the
normative goal of democracy, and is plenty sympathetic to it, he cautions that one cannot give
way to an entirely egalitarian system if the goal is greatness. The solution is a modern
redefinition of the grandi, a rejection of the landed aristocracy protected by formal and informal
institutions. The modern grandi is a meritocracy, where the ambitious few are rewarded
regardless of their social position, and their passion is utilized to propel the city towards its goals.
While the rhetoric of the American founding seems to reject the importance of the ambitious
few, the institutions themselves encourage ambitious mores to accompany the normative desire
for democracy.
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Conclusion

Machiavelli, Publius, and Tocqueville each approach their discussions of democracy in
ways that are somewhat alike, but also very different. Each thinker recognizes ambition and
greatness as critiques of liberal democratic institutions, as the focus on self-government and
freedom of individuals directly contradicts the republican focus the love of fatherland. In
modernity, the people are unsatisfied when government is not predicated on consent, particularly
when they perceive such government to go against their best interests. As such, the modern state
must find a way to satisfy the desire for consent-based government, while also focusing on two
major aspects of the successful regime: greatness and stability. Ultimately, all argue that the
problem with liberal regimes is the inability to inculcate mores that tie the people together under
a common goal instead of their own personal benefit.
Machiavelli’s most serious concern about democracy is its inability to engender ambition,
and with it, greatness. Throughout the Prince and the Discourses, Machiavelli focuses on the
political success of both individuals and cities. An individual’s virtú is predicated almost entirely
on the outcome of their actions, as their leadership facilitates greatness and success, or ruin. For
the city, political success remains a measure of greatness, and here, Machiavelli provides two
separate and interconnected arguments. First, the city that wants to be great must maintain itself
while also expanding, as expansion is the only way to truly preserve power. Second, to both
acquire and achieve greatness, the city must empower the people, as the people are an integral
part of the military strength and institutional stability of the state. Stability is derived from the
proper balance between the two humors in the city – in modernity, the rich and the poor. By
removing titles to nobility and, so, presumably decreasing the strength of corruption, Machiavelli
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envisions the modern regime to be proto-liberal but does not divorce himself from Rome’s
republican past entirely. The focus on greatness provides an element of the “common good” that
will serve to unite the people, connecting their own self-interest to the interest of the state.
The Federalist echoes the Machiavellian argument, but alters it to suit the culture of early
America. While Machiavelli is pushing a republican tradition toward what would come to be
more liberal ideas, the Federalist is coming from the opposite direction, where the culture of the
people is committed to the idea of popular sovereignty and thus seeks to restrain the animus of
self-government to complement stability and greatness. By the time of the American Revolution
and the founding immediately following it, Americans had rejected the notion of being governed
from afar, by an individual whom they had not chosen for themselves. Publius is thus writing to
a generation inspired by such taglines as “no taxation without representation” and “give me
liberty or give me death!” Publius, then, is tasked with reconciling “energy and stability” in
government with “the republican form.”46 Here, Publius is referring to the republican form as the
model of self-rule put forward in the Constitution, and the need to integrate popular sovereignty
with the stability and energy of a central government strong enough to govern its people. Thus,
Publius creates this balance by restraining the people, making their influence on the government
mostly indirect. Further, the Constitution employs the Montesquieuian principle of the separation
of powers to establish stability in government itself. Although the institutions created by the
American founding include the people indirectly, the rhetoric of the Federalist suggests a people
motivated and united under the prospect of self-government.

46

Cooke (1961); pg. 233-234.
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Tocqueville’s republican critique of liberalism corresponds to what we might imagine
Machiavelli’s to have been, should he have had Tocqueville’s advantage of witnessing the
American experiment in progress. Tocqueville shares Machiavelli’s concern regarding ambition,
and would concur that some type of grandi is a necessary complement to liberal democracy for
the generation of greatness. Even further, Tocqueville supports Machiavelli’s redefinition of the
grandi to a merit based group of individuals, as he ultimately finds aristocracy to be unjust and
conventional in such a way as to not be conducive to the American project.
Machiavelli is not alone in his desire to transform the republican tradition into a
more liberal political science suited to modernity. The later modern liberal political thought
tradition would complete what Machiavelli began, by severing the connection between the two
schools of thought. In his anticipation of the strands of modern liberalism, Machiavelli identifies
problems that future nations may need to contend with. In so doing, while he disagrees with a
return to the ancient Roman model as the proper solution to the Italy of his time, Machiavelli
also does not provide a proto-liberal thought without significant reservations. Ultimately,
however, Machiavelli responds to his own critique of modern institutions by with a modern
solution, pointing to the self-interest of individuals instead of the need to inculcate mores of civic
duty and responsibility.

CONCLUSION

The preceding chapters have attempted to illuminate aspects of Machiavelli’s thought
that both scholars and political practitioners alike have debated. Machiavelli’s work is complex
in that it tackles multiple ideas at one and the same time, including but not limited to the Roman
Empire and its success, the modern city and its weakness, virtue, religion, and the common good.
In these pages I have attempted to elucidate Machiavelli’s place in the history of political
thought, arguing that he cannot be understood as completely in line with the republican tradition
that comes before him, just as he does not fit completely into the liberal tradition that follows.
Instead, Machiavelli inspires a new liberal teaching, while providing a critique of its deficiencies.
In particular, the ancient city is weak because it ultimately failed; the modern city is weak in its
inability to pull itself out of corruption. At its core, Machiavelli’s political thought is an attempt
to facilitate an approach to politics predicated entirely on success. It is not, after all, a moral
outcome he is after, but one that is “great.”
This dissertation speaks to a broad question in the history of political thought, and
political science in its own right: is democratic government the same as good government?
Machiavelli addresses this question from the perspective of political success and empire, arguing
that the fully democratic regime is unlikely to achieve the greatness once seen in ancient Rome.
Outside of Machiavelli, others have confronted this question from different angles. The
Federalist, for one, seems to argue that democracy and good government are one and the same:
that democracy itself is great as it satisfies the enlightened desire for self-rule. Authors such as
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Hobbes and Locke further the liberal tradition in the entrenchment of consent-based politics as a
source of legitimate political power. In so doing, Hobbes and Locke attempt to separate popular
sovereignty from popular rule.
At heart, Machiavelli’s incipient liberalism does not originate from the normative goal of
self-government, or in the idea that individuals ought to rule themselves. Instead, Machiavelli
approaches politics as a means to an end: political success and greatness. In the case of Rome,
greatness was only achieved through the empowerment of the people, as a way to balance the
power of the patricians and to facilitate expansion. In the generations since the fall of the Roman
Empire, that city became weak and divided, as the balance between the humors shifted. With that
shift, Roman citizens from both humors resorted to partisan friends in order to thrust their own
in-group into power and wealth. By Machiavelli’s time, Rome is weak, corrupt, and without even
a hint of the virtú that supported greatness in the ancient city.
Thus, Machiavelli supports a liberal understanding of politics, one that divorces itself
from a “higher good” for individuals or a transcendent “common good” for the city. Instead, the
only good is success, and the best political regime is the one that delivers it. Human nature is
corrupt, as individuals are self-interested partisans who seek to provide themselves with financial
and political benefits. So, the modern regime must contend with human nature as it is, creating a
system of political institutions that connect one’s self-interest to the interest of the city. To do
this, Machiavelli advocates interconnected segments of government that understand their own
interest to be satisfied only in the city’s achievement of greatness. Within this framework, the
introduction of a strong popular class to complement a strong grandi is a necessary means to
undermine the corruption of modernity. In this formulation of institutions, the nobility must be
reworked to re-shackle the people, and return the city to a workable balance of the two humors.
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In the absence of this institutional change, the corruption inherent in a noble class will serve only
to further incite the plebs, and with it, the sort of tumults that are unsustainable in the city.
While liberalism solves some of the problems Machiavelli sees in modernity, it also
presents a few of its own. Greatness is only one problem, the other is the dissolution of the “ties
that bind.” Encouraging human freedom and individual liberty is a useful project, but these
values are hard to reconcile with traditionally “republican” ones such as the commitment to the
common good and the inculcation of civic virtue.1 Both a commitment to the common good and
civic virtue are invaluable to the city, as they connect individuals and their own well-being to the
well-being of the city itself. In antiquity, the goal was for individuals to forego their own good
for the good of the city when necessary; to understand the ramifications of their actions as
individuals in terms of the repercussions to the whole.2 Liberalism itself does not provide a
mechanism to compel individuals into some form of civic duty. Thus, while Machiavelli’s protoliberalism embraces certain modern values, he acknowledges the limits of liberalism to inspire
concern for the welfare of the city. Later, Tocqueville will address the liberal tradition in a
similar way, arguing that a supplementary institution must be crafted to inspire such a love of
fatherland.

1

Burtt (1990) discusses three psychological sources of civic virtue in the republican tradition: the
education of the passions, the manipulation of interests, and the compulsion to duty. She argues along the
lines of Cato, that citizens can and will champion public good from self-interested motives, as a threat to
the public well-being is often equally threatening to self-interest.
2

Duncan (1995) responds to Burtt (1990; 1993) by arguing that her understanding of Aristotelian civic
virtue is incorrect. Instead of “overcoming” self-interest, Duncan argues that Aristotle aims to provide an
education that will create a well-ordered public sphere, where individuals are regulated by prudence and
thus are virtuous citizens. Self-interest and the fulfillment of the self can then be achieved on a multidimensional scale that also satisfies the public good.
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If Machiavelli and Tocqueville are right, then liberal democracy cannot facilitate
greatness on its own.3 Instead, the regime must attempt to inculcate some sort of mores that will
tie the city and its people together, uniting them under one goal. This, of course, is illiberal in its
own right – liberalism is predicated on the autonomy of individuals, and their right to be free of
the inculcation to common mores. One attempt to solve this problem without resorting to
republican institutions is by the doctrine of self-interest well understood. This doctrine posits that
one’s self-interest is inherently tied to the self-interest of others, and thus the good of the city can
be understood as the aggregated self-interest of its citizens. Machiavelli does not fully address
this doctrine, though he does consider self-interest to be an important part of the political
equation, particularly in modernity. Tocqueville devises the doctrine, but still advocates for
social institutions that will aid in avoiding the problem of isolation amongst individuals in liberal
democracies.4
Machiavelli’s major claim regarding the ancient Roman republic is that the balance
between the humors worked as a mechanism to maintain the free way of life for her citizens – it
alleviated the corruption of the republic and the oppression of the plebs at the hands of the
nobles. Most problematic here, however, is the discrepancy between this understanding of
political life and Machiavelli’s claim that the plebs desire liberty only so far as it provides
security. On one hand, these ideas are compatible. The plebs are decidedly not secure when

In a later piece, Burtt (1993) posits that the shortcoming of Cato’s understanding of civic virtue is that
the role of the people is akin to a watchdog; a reactive role instead of an active one in the deliberation and
formation of the political regime. As such, she concludes that civic virtue is too demanding in either the
republican or liberal formulation. The demands of civic virtue are such that a democratic political
problem is created, as citizens will not vote in favor of measures that would increase the inculcation of
civic virtue.
3

4

Democracy in America, pg. 482-492.
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oppressed by the nobles, and this propels them into political action to recover that security. On
the other hand, if it is to be understood as a prescription for modernity, then a constant threat
against the security of the plebs must exist for them to remain active political citizens at all
times. This further suggests that the nature of the nobles is inherently oppressive, and thus will
constantly present a threat to the liberty of the people. If it is the case that the people are
expected to be a check on the corruption of the nobles, which I argue is likely, then changing the
nature of the grandi might be problematic in its own dissolution of corruption. While I have
presented an argument in favor of the new grandi for maintaining ambition and acquisitiveness
in modernity, it is plausible that in attempting to alleviate corruption, this new grandi would
undermine the tumults that propel the plebs into the public sphere. I do not, however, think these
ideas are entirely in tension with one another. By reforming the grandi, Machiavelli intends to
force politics back into the public sphere and away from private modes. Thus, the tumults would
continue, but in the public mode that Machiavelli prefers.
Machiavelli may be right that the proper balance between the humors resulting in a
government with little corruption. But given that the people are satisfied with a modicum of
liberty that provides security, are the people really interested in active self-government? If they
are not interested, how might one go about engendering political participation in a liberal
regime? Tocqueville points to this problem in his early depiction of America, stating that
individuals are so committed to equality of conditions that they let go of the idea of liberty, and
the active political participation that protects liberty in democracies. Potentially problematic for
the liberal agenda, people are motivated only by their desire to not be ruled, rather than a positive
desire to rule themselves. Further, the narrow-minded selfishness inculcated by democratic
mores prevents individuals from seeing past their own situation: in financial terms, but also
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political ones. In order to circumvent this problem, Tocqueville relies heavily on voluntary
associations, both religious and secular.5 In creating small communities, a liberal democracy can
begin to foster the “ties that bind” that have been lost in the creation of the political system.
Membership in voluntary associations forces people to meet one another and to eventually
become concerned with the well-being of others instead of only one’s own fortune. In
encouraging these very basic connections, Tocqueville hopes to see an emergence of
commitment to political participation to protect one’s own liberty, but also to protect the good of
the whole. It is likely not the case that such associations will be enough to inspire a people to
greatness, but will ultimately attempt to better connect self-government and good government.
Machiavelli’s solution is a more institutional one, as he is attempting to introduce some
popular elements to a previously aristocratic government. His emphasis on the “perfection” of
Rome coming from the establishment of the tribunes to work alongside the Roman Senate is an
attempt to persuade readers to adopt a more accepting attitude towards democratic government.
Due to his stress on the corruption of human nature, Machiavelli’s likely argument is that the
plebs will be forced into active political participation as the only way to prevent their own
oppression. Even still, the importance here is government understood in terms of political
success and greatness. I argue that Machiavelli does not provide a comprehensive treatment of
the people as voluntarily active members of the political regime, but as individuals forced into
government to protect their own interests. If the people are miserable in their share of governing,
Machiavelli’s plan has not failed – it is not meant for their own self-fulfillment to result from
popular institutions; only their security.

For a discussion of associations in Tocqueville’s political thought, see Gannett (2003). Gannett provides
a useful analysis of Tocqueville’s discussion of the New England township and the connection between
civic life and political achievements.
5
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Already in the 1830s, Tocqueville sees the negative effects of American democracy
taking hold, particularly in the lack of participation in voluntary associations and the resulting
isolation of individuals and families. Americans, motivated by financial concerns and mores that
inculcate an unyielding work ethic, are pulling further away from self-government in order to
self-serve. Government, supposedly predicated on the American ideals of political liberty and
equality under the law, is thus becoming an elite-centered politics far different from the one
established by the founding. As Americans retreat away from public life, they allow the political
system to work on autopilot, and the indirect connection between the people and the institutions
set up by the Constitution becomes an insurmountable chasm.6 Though Tocqueville attempts to
provide a warning to the American people to encourage a return to the voluntary associations
that could make the nation great, it seems that his warning was not heeded in the generations
after his death. In 2000, Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone made a very similar argument, that he
couched in terms of “social capital.” He finds that Americans are losing “social capital” as our
connections to one another continue to decrease and our interest in our neighbors and the
fundamental social fabric of our nation shrinks.7 Jeffrey Green advances this idea further,
suggesting that the real problem with the creation of democratic government is that it fails to
understand that most citizens simply watch the goings-on in the political realm from afar, as if
spectators attending a theater production.8 This incompatibility between the nature of people to

Walzer (1974) argues that American citizens are “the citizens we should be” based on the political and
social system in which we live. He posits that there never has been a commitment to the fatherland, but to
the political principles espoused in the Constitution.
6

7

Putnam (2000) is also somewhat optimistic that America can reestablish itself as a political society.
Putnam’s book is often used in conjunction with civil service projects to attempt to increase civic
participation.
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draw away from politics seems to undermine the attempt to use self-government to facilitate any
sort of greatness.
As Machiavelli does not argue that people are actively engaged in politics, but only in
self-preservation, it appears his institutional solution is untenable under his conception of human
nature as it pertains to democratic politics. The people are motivated to participate in political
life only insofar as it protects them from oppression, and given the nature Machiavelli ascribes to
them in the Discourses (including that they are unable to fully understand the implications of
their own actions), this does not seem to be enough to maintain an uncorrupt democratic system
of government. Machiavelli’s understanding of the common good as the common benefit of the
city, however, might be useful here. Machiavelli designs a new way of politics that aims directly
at greatness and financial success, and part of that success requires the interconnected selfinterest of the people and the grandi, but also the various elements of government. In this way, a
web of self-interest potentially inculcates enough common interest to tie the people to the
success of the city. Unlike Tocqueville, Machiavelli does not have a normative claim to underlie
his desire for the active participation of individuals. Instead, active participation is desired
insofar as it maintains the free way of life that promotes greatness – akin to aggregated selfinterest.
Machiavelli’s anticipatory critique of liberal democracy posits the same problems for
American democracy as Tocqueville’s, although their aims are ultimately different. In the wake
of a uninterested population, society is apt to falter.9 Machiavelli has already seen and discussed

8

Green (2009) does not argue that the people are completely disinterested, but that citizens are better
understood as “frequent attendees at the political zoo” than as political animals themselves (pg. 33). This
accords with Machiavelli’s understanding of a people who engage with the political world when
necessary, but not actively or for their own fulfillment.
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this happening in the case of Rome, where the celebration of virtú has been replaced with the
elevation of partisan, corrupt individuals. As Rome encountered success, that city slowly turned
away from the virtú that achieved it. Once lost, virtú is incredibly hard, if not impossible, to
return to the city. In the American case, one could argue a similar pattern emerged from the
founding to current day politics. The American founders are revered as wise, virtuous individuals
who founded a government predicated on self-rule, one that would last far longer than most
regimes of its type. Even further, the regime they built has spread over the expanse of a
continent, far larger than any republican author thought a republic could stretch.10 In the
generations since, one notices a retreat from this sense of enlightened self-government, as
Americans satisfied in their liberties focus on their own status in the world instead of the status
of the fatherland. In this event, the presence of fewer individuals engaging with political life
lessens the likelihood of an individual with true virtú finding his way into the public sphere. In
the case of American institutions, the man of virtú born without financial or social connections is
unlikely to become a serious candidate for political rule, as many desirable offices are elective.
In his place, we find those with circumstances of birth and wealth that prepare one for a
successful transition into electoral politics, similar to the nobility Machiavelli wanted to do away
with.

9

In a similar vein as Tocqueville, Elkin (1987) proposes a redefinition of city politics in order to
overcome the problem of democratic isolation. In his formulation, the restructuring of city politics should
include neighborhood assemblies with political power, citywide referenda, and city legislatures with
political power as a means to harness political motives of individuals.
Aristotle’s thought, and the later understanding of Rousseau, posit that a republic must be relatively
small in size, as the expansion of political interests would undermine the republic if it were to expand too
far. Montesquieu’s commercial republic can stretch to a much larger size, and the American Founders
conceived of the American republic stretching across the North American continent under the doctrine of
manifest destiny.
10
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If it is the case that American society suffers from the inability to incorporate men of
virtú into political institutions, and thus the emphasis on liberal government cannot entirely rid
itself of republicanism if the goal is success, then what is to be done? Did the Federalist create a
political system that best suits the contemporary American political landscape, without truly
knowing where it might go? In creating the system it did, the founding reinvented mixed
government in the shadow of Machiavelli. Unlike traditional, Aristotelian mixed government
that “mixes” the classes who are represented, the American Constitution seeks to mix liberal and
republican institutions.11 As such, the Federalist provides both an argument for connecting the
people to their own rule as an important piece of liberal politics, but also an argument for holding
them at arm’s length and instituting strong, elite-centered government.
But potentially the most important aspect of republicanism is still missing: civic virtue.
The Federalist seems to argue that the people are interested in constructing their own
government, and that America will be the first (successful) experiment in implementing that selfrule. It asserts that enlightened individuals desire a say in their own ruling, and thus, there is no
need to inculcate civic virtue – the system will work well if most people are engaged as
suggested, but it will continue to work even if they are not.12 In this formulation, as well as in

11

Yarbrough (1979) concurs, arguing that the founders accepted liberal teachings without giving up on
the idea of public/civic virtue and its compatibility with liberal democratic principles. As such, the
founders created a system that would combine the advantages of both in order to alleviate the
disadvantages. Yarbrough also points to Jefferson’s plan for “ward republics” as a potential solution to
the problem of civic virtue in modern America. In this way, ward republics serve to bring the government
to the people, if the people choose not to voluntarily go to it. See also Yarbrough (1998) for a discussion
of private and public virtue in Thomas Jefferson’s writings; she claims that political parties have violated
Jefferson’s principles even while claiming to follow his political path. She also argues that Jefferson
himself can be understood as an embodiment of the tension between public virtue and self-interest.
12

Akard (2002) posits that while institutional traditions in America could draw out a stronger
commitment to democracy and civic virtue, the system of capitalism, the state, and democracy are often at
odds.
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that of self-interest rightly understood, it appears that the only way to inculcate a civic duty is for
it to be directly connected to the material well-being of the individual himself. Long gone is the
desire for glory and success that galvanized the ancient Republic. In Machiavelli’s own
understanding of ancient Rome, military virtue is directly connected to an individual’s desire for
glory and the greatness found in the Roman republic. In modernity, the warmongering that
satisfied such desire for glory is the antithesis of liberal ideas of self-rule and individual liberty.13
Thus, modernity has turned away from the focus on military achievement and with it, the
generation of military virtue.
The step away from military success in modernity provides a tangible problem for
America. As the Constitution, liberal in its principles, does not provide any means of enforcing
civic virtue, neither do American mores. While some political theorists argue for an education
that fosters a sense of civic virtue in the citizens of a city, the Constitution does not, and cannot,
provide for this. Further, as modernity has stepped away from its military past, virtue is not
fostered in the spirited, masculine manner that protects the fatherland from foreign assailants. In
America particularly, modern warfare has remained on foreign territory, divorcing the people
from the military virtue that once fostered civic duty. In the two recent exceptions, Pearl Harbor
and September 11th, Americans have displayed a short-lived but energetic sense of civic virtue.14

13

See Walzer (1974) for an informative discussion of citizen soldiers in America. He argues there is a
dearth of fervor of such soldiers in the absence of immediate threat. He also finds that as American social
virtues tend towards orderliness and politeness instead of a robust civic virtue, the increase in social
discipline will be accompanied by a decline in political enthusiasm (pg. 597).
Ackerman (1984) posits a model of “dualist democracy” characterized by “intermittent and irregular”
periods of civic virtue that occur during short-lived periods of increased political awareness. Although
these events are rare, they create a special sort of politics he calls “constitutional politics” that is highly
transformative. This seems to accord with Machiavelli’s understanding of the people actuated by
excessive oppression.
14
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Outside of these major domestic events, society has mostly retreated away from a sense of active
self-government in favor of democracy as a spectator sport. Thus, individuals value the ability to
step in and revolutionize institutions when necessary, but also perceive the commitment to
individual liberty as excusing their lack of participation in less salient policy concerns.
Though Machiavelli emphasizes a militarized civic virtue needed for the greatness of the
Roman republic, he does not implement means to return to it in modernity. Instead, Machiavelli
calls for a modern understanding of government, with liberal institutions that provide a
constitutional check and balance against one another. In order to do this in Rome, the people
must have a power equivalent to the grandi as the dissolution of corruption is dependent on a
people that can check the aristocratic element of society. Thus, Machiavelli replaces civic virtue
with a vicious, tumultuous conception of society where the people are forced into political action
as a means of protecting their own security. Without such a system, Machiavelli sees the
corruption of modernity continuing without reprieve.
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